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Mubarak criminal liability: is it a fair trial after the revolution or a drama 
series?1  






Divided in four parts, this article will describe a succinct background of former 
President Mubarak in history, military, and politics and why the Egyptian Revolution 
had been broken against him and his regime as well. Then will provide the main rules 
and principles of the leadership’s liability through comparing this concept under 
Islamic law and the domestic law (Egyptian Penal Code) and how to apply those 
legal principles to the recent case of Mubarak’s trial which known by the Media as a 
“Trial of the Century.” At the end of the article looks to the future of this responsibility 
in light of recent developments throughout the whole Middle East. 
 










1 I want to thank and express my sincere appreciation to the editorial board of Michigan State 
International Law Review for giving me the chance to participate in the law review’s annual symposium 
and publish this piece in the symposium’s issue. The preliminary draft of this article was presented at 
this symposium entitled: “Modern Global Revolution—The Aftermath of Revolution: Humanitarian, 
Legal, and Political Consequences” at Michigan State University College of Law (February 16-17, 
2012). Special gratitude is due to Abby Barflez, Victoria Hatch, Blake Nicholas, Nicholas Standiford, 
and Alexander Dobyan, for their kind invitation, hospitality, and generosity. Also, this article was 
presented at the Second Annual Workshop on International and Comparative Law at the Washington 
University in St. Louis School of Law, Saint Louis, Missouri, March 30, 2012. Further, I am grateful to 
the Michigan State International Law Review’s editorial staff for the great effort they made to review nd 
edit my article, especially Hazel C. Gooding and Sana Abid for their useful suggestions and insightful 
comments. 
2 Adjunct Professor of Islamic Law at Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law; Assistant 
Professor of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice Systems at the Alexandria University Faculty of Law 
(Alexandria, Egypt).  S.J.D., Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law (2013); LL.M., 
University of Connecticut School of Law (2008); LL.B., Alexandria University School of Law (2006). 
Likewise, Professor ‘Arafa is a Visiting Professor of Business Law at the Arab Academy for Science, 
Technology, and Maritime Transport (“College of Business Management”). Moreover, Professor ‘Arafa 
served as an Associate Trainee Attorney and Executive Attorney Assistant at ‘Arafa Law Firm (2007). 
Of course, all errors remain the author. For any comments or questions, please contact the author at 
marafa@iupui.edu or arafadr_mohamed@yahoo.com.  
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“If anyone travels on a road in search of knowledge, Allah will cause him to travel on one of the roads 
of Paradise”3 
The Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) 
 
“Knowledge is a treasure, but practice is the key to it”4 




We are a nation in need of vitality and renewal. While we stepped slowly, the 
world ran ahead, so that we have been left behind, after once being at the 
front. How, then, can we manage in the modern era? No type of reform or 
progress may be adopted otherwise than in an atmosphere of social 
reconciliation. Reform and progress alone cannot bring such social 
reconciliation.5 ‘Abd al-Razzāq al-Sanhūrī (1895-1971). 
                                                            
3 Quote of The Prophet Mohammad Ibn ‘Abdullah (570-632). SAHIH AL-BUKHARI, KNOWLEDGE, no. 356, 
311, Vol. 1, bk. 3, translated in Univ. So. Calif., Center for Muslim-Jewish Engagement, 
http://cmje.org/.  
4 Quote of Ibn Khaldoun, Al-Muqaddima, scholar and statesman (1332-1406).  AL-MUQADDIMAH IBN 
KHALDOUN, [THE INTRODUCTION OR PROLEGOMENON] 21 (Dar AlShaab: 1959, Arabic Source). Ibn 
Khaldoun was a lawyer, sociologist, economist, and Muslim jurist. He wrote his masterpiece, 
“Muqaddimah or Prolegomenon,” in 1377 A.D. It is the first volume of seven volumes of “Kitab Al-
‘Ibar.” See IBN KHALDOUN, THE MUQADDIMAH: AN INTRODUCTION TO HISTORY (N. J. Dawood ed., Franz 
Rosenthal trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1958) (providing an English translation). 
5 Quote of ‘Abd al-Razzāq al-Sanhūrī (1895-1971). (“Commenting on his quote, the author think that 
the required steps toward development in Egypt after January Revolution are as follows: (1) to 
appreciate our people and our country; (2) to respect and feel proud of our civilization and history; and 
(3) to start plan carefully and work seriously...If we miss any of these movements, we will never move 
ahead.”). Al-Sanhūrī was an Egyptian legal scholar and professor of law who drafted the revised 
Egyptian Civil Code of 1948. He wrote the draft of the ‘Iraqi Civil Code with the help of many ‘Iraqi 
Jurists guided by him. Forced into retirement by Gamal ‘Abdel-Nasser and physically attacked by a 
mob for attempting to restore “Constitutional Government” in 1954, Sanhūrī left Egypt and helped draft 
the civil codes of Syria, Jordan, Libya, and the Commercial Code of Kuwait. In 1970s Egypt awarded 
him its prize for social sciences. Sanhūrī was known for attempting to recreate a "pure" Islamic Law by 
modernizing the Sharie‘a rules using Western Civil Law—mainly of American and French inspiration—
and the guidance when needed of an natural law obviously just to all, to guarantee justice above 
religion but reaching its humanistic ends, ideology, and personal opinion in general, when all else—
including the countries legislation, the Sharie‘a principles, and traditional customs—fails to solve the 
problem. One commentator argued that Sanhūrī’s code reflected a "hodgepodge of socialist doctrine 
and sociological jurisprudence." Regardless of such interpretations, his place in the legal history of the 
modern Middle East is secure; his twelve-volume Al-Wasī fī Shar al-qānūn al-madanī al-jadīd 
[Medium Commentary on the New Civil Code] (Cairo 1952–1970) "adorns the bookshelves of many an 
Arab law firm, even in countries where the Egyptian Civil Code is not law" (Chibli Mallat). See 
generally Nabil Saleh, Civil Codes of Arab Countries: The Sanhūrī Codes (JSTOR 3381555) (2008), 
Anis Al-Qasem, Injurious Acts Under the Jordanian Civil Code, (JSTOR 3381318). See also ARTHUR 
GOLDSCHMIDT, BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF MODERN EGYPT (2000) at 181, GUY BECHOR, THE SANHŪRĪ 
CODE AND THE EMERGENCY OF MODERN ARAB CIVIL LAW 1932 TO 1949, (2007), and ENID HILL, AL-
SANHŪRĪ AND ISLAMIC LAW, (1987). In this respect, it should bear in mind that the  Egyptian Civil Code, 
Article 1, 1949 stated that: 
«…In the absence of any applicable legislation, the judge shall decide according to 
the custom and failing the custom, according to the principles of Islamic Law. In the 
absence of these principles, the judge shall have recourse to natural law and the rules 
of equity (justice)…»   
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At the risk of declaring apathetic and unenthusiastic, it should be noted that in 
every revolution the best day is the day on which the revolution is acknowledged and 
declared a success. From that point on it is mostly downhill because the accumulated 
problems of the past come rushing to the fore, demanding instant resolution, with 
anger, frustration, disappointment and hope all mixing together and competing for 
attention.6  It always takes time for revolutions to simmer down and for things to find 
a new level of normalcy.7 As generally well-known, revolutions are never tidy; 
instead, they are messy, chaotic, and unpredictable.8 Hopes are frequently 
destroyed—though some remain—and the reality of the situation and an appreciation 
for what needs to be done makes for a rude awakening and emerging.9 The 18 
magical days of January and February 2011, when Egyptians from all walks of life 
came together in Tahrir (“Liberation”) Square to demand the end of Mubarak’s 
presidency have long passed.10 But the memory of those days will remain in the 
nostalgia of Egyptians.11 It was a glorious period for the entire world to witness.12 
Tahrir Square is a revealing and dramatic look at the revolution that transformed the 
modern history of one of the world’s oldest civilizations.13 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
al-Qanun al-Madani [The Egyptian Civil Code promulgated by Law No. 131 of 1948 in force since 
the October 15 1949], Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, Oct. 1948, at art.1(Egypt). See ‘AMR SHALAKANY, 
Between Identity and Redistribution: Sanhūrī, Genealogy, and the Will to Islamize, 8 ISLAMIC L. & SOC. 
(2001) at 201-244. 
6 CRAIG KANALLEY, Egypt Revolution 2011: A Complete Guide to the Unrest, THE HUFFINGTON POST 
(Posted: Jan. 30, 2011 at 07:21 PM ET, Updated: May 25, 2011 at 07:30 PM ET available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/.../egypt-revolution-2011_n_816.  (last visited May 22, 2012). 
7 See generally Mohamed ‘Arafa, Towards a Culture for Accountability: A New Dawn for Egypt, 5 
PHOENIX L. REV. 1 (Fall 2011) (elaborating in details the causes of the January 25th Egyptian 
Revolution, the latest events, and proposing a new agenda for political, social, and cultural 
transformation in Egypt).  
8 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Fight for Democracy in Egypt’s Liberation Square:  Background Paper, CHI. 
COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFF. 1 (Feb. 10, 2011) [hereinafter Bassiouni, Fight for Democracy], available at 
http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/Events/FY%2011%20Events/02_February_11/EgyptB
ackgroundPaper110207.pdf.  
9 Id.  
10 For further discussion on the events of the Tahrir Square during the January Revolution time, see 
Ashraf Khalil, Liberation Square: Inside the Egyptian Revolution and the Rebirth of a Nation, (Jan. 
2012). (“In early 2011, the world’s attention was riveted on Cairo, where after three decades of 
supremacy, Hosni Mubarak was driven from power. It was a revolution as swift as it was explosive. 
For eighteen days, anger, defiance, and resurgent national pride reigned in the streets as protestors of 
all ages struck back against police and state security, united toward the common goal of liberation. But 
the revolution was more than a spontaneous uprising. It was the end result of years of mounting 
tension, brought on by a state that shamelessly abused its authority, rigging elections, silencing 
opposition, and violently attacking its citizens. When revolution bloomed in the region in January 2011, 
Egypt was a country whose patience had expired with a people suddenly primed for liberation.”). 
11 Id.  
12 Id. See also CLEMENT CHIGBO, THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION AND ITS LESSONS (Feb. 15, 2011).  
13 Khalil, supra note 10.  
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But the revolutionary light has been turned off/shut down in Tahrir Square and 
the extraordinary feeling of elation of people from all walks of life may has faded 
away after the impossible dream of removing Hosni Mubarak from the presidency 
was achieved.14 The stars that so many sought to reach have escaped the grasp of 
the “revolution”: even the high moral ground of nationalism and pride seems to have 
vanished with the new Islamicist majority taking over both Houses of Parliament 
(majlis al-sha‘aab and majlis al-shoura), and acting sectarian, deteriorative, and 
regressive.15 Still, many Egyptians have tasted the sweet flavor of freedom, though 
all too briefly, and they may want to taste it again.16 The challenges ahead are not 
likely to diminish these hopes.17 But then, many a revolution is taken over or coopted 
by others, and the peoples’ hopes are rushed and dashed.18 This is the unfortunate 
case of Egypt’s “revolution” of January 2011.19 Democracy as a process may have 
succeeded, but freedom, human rights, and the rule of law will surely be lost. 
                                                            
14 Bassiouni, supra note 8 & ‘Arafa, supra note 7. (“Facts on the ground show that this transformation 
does not occur without significant sacrifices both in terms of lives and livelihoods. But if the ultimate 
outcome is a more democratic, prosperous, and stable country, then the long wait is well worth it. After 
more than centuries of authoritarianism by foreign occupiers, kings, and military rulers, Egyptians 
deserve to finally rule themselves.”). 
15 Leila Fadel and Ingy Hassieb, EGYPT’S NEXT PARLIAMENT TO BE LED BY ISLAMICISTS, THE WASHINGTON 
POST (Jan. 2012). (explaining that Dr. Mohammad Sa‘ad al-Katatni, Professor of Botany, Secretary 
General of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (an offshoot of the MB) attended a 
news conference at the headquarters of the party in  Cairo. A temporary power-sharing agreement 
would install one of their candidates as parliamentary speaker in Egypt. Accordingly, al-Katatni 
becomes then President of the People’s Assembly within the recent parliamentary elections of 
February 2012 which has been dissolved recently according to the Supreme Constitutional Court 
(“SCC”)’s decision on June 14, 2012). For further illustration on the latest parliamentary and 
presidential elections in Egypt and the domination of Islamists, see Sahar F. Aziz, Revolution Without 
Reform: A Critique of Egypt’s Election Laws, GEORGE WASHINGTON INTL’L L. REV. (Fall 2012) and Leila 
Fadel, IN EGYPT, SALAFIST VOTE COULD PROVE DECISIVE, THE WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 2012). 
16 Eman Ragab, Between Success and Failure, AL-AHRAM WKLY ONLINE (Nov. 3-9, 2011) (stated that 
Elections, by definition, are not a means to make revolutionary change, but they are about the only 
hope left, given the ground the revolution has so far lost) available at  
http://www.weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1071/op4.htm. (last retrieved May 22, 2012).  
17 Id.  
18 Nick Rizzuto, Why the Egyptian Revolution has Failed, (July 25, 2011) (discussing that there are two 
successful liberal revolutions that prove instructive from the historical perspective which are the 
French and the American Revolution.) (“It does not matter how much the Egyptian liberals tap their 
fingers on their keyboards and tweet calls for protest and demonstrations, reality tells us that it’s those 
with their fingers on the trigger that will continue to dominate Egyptian national politics. Until the 
liberals are able to garner considerable support within the military, Egypt will remain under the control 
of the military…or worse.”).  [Yes, I used this article and you can cite it and refer to the online link of 
this website http://www.theblaze.com/blog/2011/07/25/why-the-egyptian-revolution-has-failed/. Also, If 
you want to rephrase a little bit in the explanation in this footnote, feel free to do that] 
19 See Pakinam Amer, Is the Revolution Failing? I used the online article and I quote the portion: 
Pakinam Amer, Is the Revolution Failing? EGYPT TODAY, SOCIETY, Jan. 2, 2012  available at 
http://www.egypttoday.com/news/display/...Revolution-Failing/secId:47.(“during a Cairo debate in late 
December 2011 with TV host Tim Sebastian, 54 percent of an audience of roughly 80 Egyptians 
believed that the January 25 revolution is failing.”). See also REFLECTION IN EGYPT ON AN UNFINISHED 
REVOLUTION “Video Feature.” (“A year after the first protests in Tahrir Square, young Egyptians look 
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Most analysts seem to have overlooked the convergence of a number of 
significant factors to occur in the upcoming period of time.  The most significant is the 
judgment in the case of former President Hosni Mubarak which was decided by Chief 
Justice Ahmad Refa‘at on June 2nd, 2012. It should kept in mind that Mubarak verdict 
divided Egypt further and likely deepen its polarization, as it triggered demonstrations 
and riots in which this situation can destabilize the country and engender unforeseen 
consequences likely to sink the country into chaos.20 Egypt has already begun to 
make strides in the movement towards democracy, as shown by the incident on 
August 3rd, 2011, when the inconceivable happened.21  “The deposed pharaoh who 
had ruled Egypt with an iron fist for thirty years was wheeled into a courtroom and 
placed in the defendant’s cage.”22  So far, this article will examine selected facets of 
the leadership of one of the Middle East’s authoritarian technical bureaucrats,23 
Mohammad Hosni Mubarak, at the helm of the Egyptian state since 1981 and Egypt’s 
longest serving leader since 1850.  In order to bring some clarity to the term “Heads 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
back at the promise of the Arab Spring as well as the reality many revolutionaries failed to foresee.”), 
available online at www.nytimes.com/.../video-egypt-reflections-on-revolution.html. (last visited May 
22, 2012). 
20 The verdict delivered by the Cairo Criminal Court against former dictator Hosni Mubarak and his 
feared Interior Minister, Habib Al-‘adly, angered many Egyptians who had hoped for the death penalty, 
as both were sentenced to life imprisonment, which in Egypt is typically a 25 to 30-year sentence. 
Others were upset at the vagueness and ambiguity of the ruling, which only implicitly blamed the two 
for the deaths of nearly 900 protesters during Egypt’s 18-day revolution in January/February 2011. Still 
others were unhappy that deputy ministers of Interior were found not guilty, and that the dictator’s 
sons, Gamal and ‘Alaa were spared sentencing for corruption because the statute of limitations had 
expired for the particular actions with they were charged. For further details of the verdict, see infra. [I 
used see infra here meaning that the detailed discussion of the trial and the verdict itself will be 
elaborated in Part IV of the article.] Also, I used this source at this point; see generally Matt Bradley, 
Verdicts Spark Anger in Egypt, MIDDLE EAST NEWS, June 2, 2012, 5:27 p.m. ET. (“Former President 
Mubarak Gets Life Sentence in Killings, But Others Are Acquitted”) available at http://www. 
online.wsj.com/.../SB1000142405270230355210457744172333873… See also Khaled Elfiqi, HOSNI 
MUBARAK, THE N.Y. TIMES, at 
http://www.topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/.../index.html.]  
21 ‘Arafa, supra note 7.(Yes, you can put this between quotation marks, as I referred to this quotes 
form my published article cited in FN 7, so keep the citation as I did] 
22 Id. (Same thing, Keep Id. as I refer to the same article cited in FN 7] 
23 Unlike the transcendent, personalized charismatic forms of leadership; bureaucratic leadership 
centered upon the applicability of modern technological and managerial principles to the business of 
government. Governmental legitimacy derives from the degree of successful use and practice of these 
principles and norms to the needs of society; therefore, bureaucratic leaders are theoretically subject 
to popular evaluation of their performance of the task of governance. While this holds true in 
democratic systems of governance, technical bureaucracy also lends itself to more authoritarian 
manifestations, in which the leadership does not subject itself to a public assessment of its 
performance and activity, thereby creating exclusive control over political processes. See ROY R. 
ANDERSEN, ROBERT F. SEIBERT, AND JON G. WAGNER, POLITICS AND CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 4th ed., 
(1993), 202. [I already cited the source in red in which  get the information from explained in this 
footnote in addition I used this online article, See generally LEADERSHIP EXPERT, Leadership Styles—
Autocratic vs Democratic vs Bureaucratic available at http://www.leadership-expert.co.uk/leadership-
styles/ (“emphasizing an in-depth look at 3 key leadership styles—which are autocratic, democratic, 
and bureaucratic—that will highlight the benefits and shortfalls commonly associated with each.”) 
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of States Liability in Comparative Law”—and to better understand where the line 
might be drawn between this responsibility in “Islamic Law” and “Positive Law”—this 
article will explore not only the meaning of this liability in the technical sense, but will 
also inspect the legal frameworks accompanied by a literature review which based on 
the fundamental rules of this accountability, and applying  those frameworks to the 
modern trials of the leaders in the Arab Middle East. 
 Divided into a part which is comprised of two articles, Section II of this article 
will describe a succinct background of former President Mubarak in history, military, 
and politics and why the Egyptian Revolution had been broken against him and his 
regime as well. Section III will provide the main rules and principles of the 
leadership’s liability through comparing this concept under Islamic law and the 
domestic law (Egyptian Penal Code) and how to apply those legal principles to the 
recent case of Mubarak’s trial which known by the Media as a “Trial of the Century.” 
Others sections – to be shown in the next article – looks to the future of this 
responsibility in light of recent developments throughout the whole Middle East. 
It should bear in mind, that the Arab Spring Revolutions have given rise to 
much legal and political chaos. This chaos could be partially alleviated by reforming 
or proposing new laws in different sectors to bolster the societies in Arab countries, 
and suggesting a new legislation governing leader’s accountability after revolutions 
against them is a sector ripe for reform. 
 
I. Backdrop of Mohammad Hosni Mubarak and the January Egyptian 
revolution 
 
A. Who is Mohammad Hosni Mubarak? Mubarak in military, history, politics, and 
criminal trial and jail 
 
Often described as cautious and reserved, former President Hosni Mubarak 
conveys none of the charismatic appeal of his predecessors, Gamal ‘Abdel Nasser 
and Anwar Al-Sādāt, and has not generated the mass popular following of Nasser, or 
even the considerably lesser levels of integral support enjoyed by Sādāt.24  His 
carefulness and moderation have however made him a solid, if not idealistic and 
                                                            
24 See generally WILLIAM L. CLEVELAND, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST, (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1994), 343. 
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visionary leader, who has guided Egypt through the turbulence of the post-Sādāt 
eon.25 These qualities have also recommended him to the United States, which has 
frequently called upon him to act as an intermediary in regional affairs, predominantly 
the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.26 
On the domestic plane, Mubarak’s personality has had more pernicious 
consequences.27 His wary, careful nature-an asset in interstate negotiations-has 
translated into a deficiency of innovation and a lack of desperately needed domestic 
political reform initiatives.28 Furthermore, lacking the personal appeal to engender a 
popular base of support, Ex-President Mubarak has been reluctant to undertake the 
systemic political reforms that Egypt desperately requires.29 
                                                            
25 Thomas W. Lippman, Egypt after Nasser: Sadat, Peace, and the Mirage of Prosperity (New York: 
Paragon House, 1989), 221; and Howard Schneider, Mubarak’s Method: Overshadowed by 
Predecessors Nasser and Sadat, Egypt’s Leader Has Served Longer, Honed Economy, THE 
WASHINGTON POST, June 27, 1999, A23.  
26 MARTIN SIEFF, MUBARAK STATUTE IN MIDEAST ENHANCED, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, July 31, 1996, A17. 
See generally Stanley Reed, The Battle for Egypt, 4 FOREIGN AFF. 72, (Sep./Oct. 1993). For further 
discussion on the Israel/Palestine conflict, see Gregory Harms & Todd M. Ferry, THE PALESTINE-ISRAEL 
CONFLICT: A BASIC INTRODUCTION, 2nd ed. (2012) (“The Palestine-Israel conflict is the most notorious 
and ingrained conflict of the twentieth, and now twenty-first, century. Yet the way it is reported in the 
media is often confusing, leading many to assume the hostilities stretch back to an ancient period. In 
May 2011, President Barack Obama gave speeches about the Middle East that discussed the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, using terms like “final status issues,” “1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps,” and 
“demographic realities.” Obama’s speeches were strongly denounced by both the Palestinians and the 
Israelis, while political commentators across the world debated what Obama’s speeches actually 
meant.”). [Keep the quote and don’t remove it, as it is very significant at this point, just check the 
source again in the new 2012 edition]. See generally Walter Laqueur & Barry Rubin, THE ISRAEL-ARAB 
READER: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT, 7th ed. (2008). Press Release, The 
White House, Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa (May 19, 2011), available 
at  http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/19/remarks-president-middle-east-and-north-
africa; see also, Mideast Students Analyze Obama’s Speech, Region’s Future, WORLD LEARNING (June 
6, 2011), http://www.worldlearning.org/21641.htm.  (providing the author’s and others’ opinions on 
President Barack Obama’s speech). 
27 See generally ALAA AL-DIN ARAFAT, THE MUBARAK LEADERSHIP AND FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT, 
1st ed. (MacMillan 2009). Kirk J. Beattie, Prospects for Democratization in Egypt, 3 AMERICAN-ARAB 
AFF., (Spring 1991), 33. 
28 John R. Bradley, Inside Egypt: The Land of the Pharaohs on the Brink of a Revolution (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan 2008), 209, 213-4. See ABDULHALIM QANDIL, AL-AYYAM AL-AKHIRA [THE LAST 
DAYS], (Cairo: Dar al-thaqafah al-jadidah 2008), 11-19. 
29 See generally May Kassem, In the Guise of Democracy: Governance in Contemporary Egypt, 1st 
ed. (1999). See also Mona Makram Ebeid, Political Opposition in Egypt: Democratic Myth or Reality, 
43 MIDDLE EAST J. 3 (Summer 1989); See also Ghassan Salame, Democracy Without Democrats?: 
The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World (Dec. 1994) (“Ideas of democracy and political 
liberalization have recently become central to political debate within and about the Middle East. The 
current focus on the merits of democratic practice in many areas of the world, coupled with the spread 
of economic liberalism, will inevitably, according to some accounts, bring about a measure of political 
pluralism. Against this, the persistence of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East”) citing Roger 
Owen, Socio-economic Change and Political Mobilization: The Case of Egypt, (1994), 186-189. In this 
regard, one commentator argued that: 
Starting in 1980s and 1990s, some steps towards political liberalization started taking 
place in numerous Arab states including Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, 
Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and Yemen. Among these countries, Egypt seems to 
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Important because of its central geostrategic position, its lengthy civilization, 
and rich cultural history, Egypt has historically played a crucial role in the political life 
of the Middle East as it represents the cornerstone of North Africa.30 In the past half-
century, Egypt has been firmly at the center of turbulent regional politics, partially due 
to its historical hegemonic role, but equally because of the highly charismatic, 
personalized leaders who have left ineradicable imprints upon the domestic, regional, 
and international arenas.31 Scholars argued that: 
 
Egypt is one of the major powers in the Middle East. The vigour of its cultural 
life and the extent of its influence make it a force which cannot be ignored in 
the Arab world. Yet, despite the comparative confidence with which its rulers 
handle power, the country has a politically contradictory past with which to 




grant many of the civil and political rights to its citizens which many other Arab states 
do not. Compared to other Arab states, Egypt represents the strongest continuity of 
democratizing measures. However, at the same time, political liberalization in Egypt 
fluctuates between genuine progress and setbacks which leaves central authority 
solidly in control. 
(“An examination of President Mubarak’s leadership in the political domain (including his handling of 
the Islamist opposition) suggests that unique personality traits notwithstanding, he falls squarely within 
the patterns of Egyptian leadership common to his more famous, charismatic predecessors, Sādāt and 
Nasser. Indeed, while he has at time taken great pains to distinct both his leadership style and 
substantive policies from those of his ancestors, commonalities nevertheless seem to far outnumber 
differences. The prevalent strength of the ruling party, professions of reform and liberalization and 
subsequent deliberalization, and vacillating policies towards Islamist elements are fittingly descriptive 
of not just the Mubarak regime but of all the regimes of post-revolutionary Egypt.”).[This quotes came 
from the book I cited above as my assistance said to me: Democracy Without Democrats?: The 
Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World, just make sure about the pages. Please don’t remove these 
quotes as it is very important for the reader’s explanation regarding the Egyptian history, just check 
more times on the page and the source again.] 
30 ‘Arafa, supra note 7, at 1. (“The Arab Republic of Egypt, a prominent North African Arab country and 
a key power in the Middle East, witnessed an unprecedented and monumental change beginning the 
twenty-fifth of January, 2011, after nearly thirty years of autocratic dictatorship under former President 
Mohammad Hosni Mubarak.”).  
31 See generally Ami Isseroff, History of Egypt, Egypt: A Brief History, Egypt, A Concise History in 
EGYPT - HISTORY - FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE MODERN PERIOD, at 
http://www.mideastweb.org/egypthistory.htm.   SAMER SOLIMAN, The Autumn of Dictatorship: Fiscal 
Crisis and Political Change in Egypt under Mubarak, STANFORD STUDIES IN MIDDLE EASTERN AND I 
(2011). (“The Egyptian protests in early 2011 took many by surprise. In the days immediately 
following, commentators wondered openly over the changing situation across the Middle East. But 
protest is nothing new to Egypt, and labor activism and political activism, most notably the Kifaya 
(“Enough”) movement, have increased dramatically over recent years. In hindsight, it is the durability 
of the Mubarak regime, not its sudden loss of legitimacy that should be more surprising.”). [Cite this 
quote by referring to the book review/synopsis from the Stanford Press website]. 
32 ROGER OWEN & CHARLES TRIPP, EGYPT UNDER MUBARAK, 1st ed. (Apr.1990) [Check carefully this 
book, as it is available at Amazon online, don’t remove it from citation] and the quote come from this 
book at its synopsis/introduction. See also MAHMUD A. FAKSH, EGYPT UNDER MUBARAK: THE UNCERTAIN 
PATH (1983).   
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Certainly, the flamboyant leadership style of ‘Abd al-Nasser remains scraped 
in the collective memory of Egyptians and foreigners alike.33 Nasserism, however, 
was more than the sum of political maneuvers; it was “a feeling, a sense of 
excitement, a hope for a new Arab future”34 and despite its many flaws, was a source 
of pride for Egyptians and Arabs alike.35 Following Nasser’s death in 1970, the 
advent to power of Mohammad Anwar al-Sādāt ushered in a new era in Egyptian 
politics.36 Sādāt, unlike his more charismatic predecessor, displayed far more 
restraint in his style of leadership, yet displayed a decided penchant for political 
adventurism, often garnering him great admiration abroad, particularly in the West, 
but which failed to fully endear him to his domestic constituency.37 His decision to 
dismantle many Nasser-era policies and his ground-breaking trip to Jerusalem, which 
made possible the Camp David Accords,38 earned him acclaim from Western 
                                                            
33 See generally RAYMOND WILLIAM BAKER, EGYPT’S UNCERTAIN REVOLUTION UNDER NASSER AND SADAT 
(Harv. Univ. Press 1978); MALCOLM H. KERR, EGYPT UNDER NASSER (1963). See also R. Hrair 
Dekmejian, Egypt under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics, (1971). 
34 Cleveland, supra note 24, at 302 & ‘Arafa, supra note 7, at 8-9. See generally P.J. VATIKIOTIS, THE 
HISTORY OF MODERN EGYPT: FROM MUHAMMAD ALI TO MUBARAK, (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 
1991).[Check carefully on Google books and keep it as it is already available online]. See also JAMES 
P. JANKOWSKI, EGYPT: A SHORT HISTORY (2000). RAYMOND FLOWER, NAPOLEON TO NASSER:  THE STORY 
OF MODERN EGYPT (2002). 
35 While there can be little question that Nasser’s reform in many ways represented a marked 
improvement upon oppressive British-dominated and monarchical forms of government, the 
implementation of his reformist schemes was effected in a highly paternalistic and authoritarian 
manner. Thus, Nasser set in motion, in the post- revolutionary period, tendencies that long predated 
his rule and that surely have long outlived him. See Randa Ali,  From Nasser To Sabbahi: The Dream 
Of Social Justice Lives On, AHRAM ONLINE, July 23, 2012 (“Some 60 years after the July 1952 
Revolution, many Egyptians voted for Hamdeen Sabbahi in the presidential race out of a yearning for 
the social justice promised by Gamal Abdel Nasser”), at http://www. 
english.ahram.org.eg/News/47815.aspx. 
36 Raymond A. Hinnebusch,  Egyptian Politics Under Sadat: The Post-Populist Development of an 
Authoritarian-Modernizing State, (1988) (“Anwar Sādāt presided over a remarkable transformation in 
the Egypt built by Nasser: economic liberalization superseded populist revolution from above, a 
Western alliance replaced Nasser’s challenge to Western power in the Arab world and an authoritarian 
state was adapted to growing pluralist pressures.”). See ALI E. HILLAL DESSOUKI, EGYPT UNDER SADAT, 
(1988). [Keep this citation, as I checked it and found it online but out of print]. 
37Dessouki, supra note 36. See also KIRK J. BEATTIE, EGYPT DURING THE SADAT YEARS, (2000). 
38 For further elaboration on Camp David Records and The Egyptian Israeli Peace Agreement of 1979, 
see Oded Balaban, Interpreting Conflict: Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations at Camp David II and Beyond 
(2005); Clayton E. Swisher, The Truth About Camp David: The Untold Story About the Collapse of the 
Middle East Peace Process, (2004), and Shibley Telhami, The Camp David Accords: A Case of 
International Bargaining, (2001). It should kept in mind that the Egyptian–Israeli Peace Treaty of 1979 
was signed by Anwar al-Sādāt and Israeli Prime-Minister Menachem Begin in Washington, D.C., 
United States, on March 26, 1979, following the Camp David Accords (1978), a series of meetings 
between Egypt and Israel facilitated by the United States President Jimmy Carter. Both Sādāt and 
Begin were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for creating the treaty. In his acceptance speech, Sādāt 
referred to the long awaited peace desired by both Arabs and Israelis. The President Sādāt said that: 
Let us put an end to wars, let us reshape life on the solid basis of equity and truth. 
And it is this call, which reflected the will of the Egyptian people, of the great majority 
of the Arab and Israeli peoples, and indeed of millions of men, women, and children 
around the world that you are today honoring. And these hundreds of millions will 
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governments and a Nobel Prize for Peace, but incurred the ire of segments of the 
Egyptian populace as well as the larger Arab-Islamic world.39 The confluence of 
internal discontent springing from the failed promises of his al-infitah al-Iqtsadi 
(“economic opening”)40 coupled with the ostracism of Egypt in the Arab world, its 
increasing reliance on American support, growing interclass inequality and repressive 
anti-opposition measures eventually undermined any residual popularity Sādāt 
enjoyed following the relatively successful Egyptian performance in the 1973 War 
with Israel.41  One commentator argued on October 6, 1973 War: 
 
The Two O’ Clock War is a spellbinding chronicle of the international chess 
game that was played out in October 1973. It is a story of diplomacy and 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
judge to what extent every responsible leader in the Middle East has responded to the 
hopes of mankind. 
39 The main features of the agreement were the mutual recognition of each country by the other, the 
cessation of the state of war that had existed since the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, and the complete 
withdrawal by Israel of its armed forces and civilians from the rest of the Sinai Peninsula which Israel 
had captured during the 1967 Six-Day War. Harry Hurwitz & Yisrael Medad, Peace in the Making: The 
Menachem Begin, Anwar Sadat Personal Correspondence (2011); Gregory Harms & Todd M. Ferry, 
The Palestine-Israel Conflict: A Basic Introduction, 2nd ed. (2008). The Egyptian/Israeli Peace Treaty 
available at http://www.palestineinarabic.com/.../treat.../treat.../Peace_Treaty_Between_...   (last 
retrieved May 22, 2012). 
40 JOHN WATERBURY, THE EGYPT OF NASSER AND SADAT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TWO REGIMES, 
(1983). In this respect, al-infitah al-Iqtsadi means "opening" signifies the economic liberalization 
scheme initially designed by Sādāt to encourage foreign—initially Arab—investment in Egypt. When 
the initial Arab response proved lackluster, Sādāt then sought to encourage investment by foreign 
investors of any nationality. The results of the infitah were mixed, with some important investment 
flows into Egypt, although at levels far below those anticipated. The infitah also had important social 
consequences. For a more detailed treatment of the infitah and some of the social implication of 
foreign direct investment in Egypt, see Jeswald Salacuse, Back to Contract: Implications of Peace and 
Openness for Egypt’s Legal System, 28 AMERICAN J. COMP. L. (1980) 315-333; Jeswald Salacuse, 
Foreign Investment and Legislative Exemptions in Egypt: Needed Stimulus or New Capitulations, in 
SOCIAL LEGISLATION IN THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST, Michalak and Salacuse, eds. (1986), 241. 
41 At the same time, after the Egyptian Revolution, and the domination of the Islamists in the recent 
Egyptian Parliament, Muslim Brotherhood leaders have signaled their intent to maintain peace with 
Israel. In an interview with Tom Friedman of the New York Times, ‘Essam El-‘Erian, Vice Chairman of 
the Freedom and Justice Party (“FJP”), said that: 
This [peace treaty] is the commitment of the state—not any group or party—and we 
have said we are respecting the commitments of the Egyptian state.” However, many 
Brotherhood members have said that the peace treaty may be “reviewed.” One 
spokesperson for the Salafist Nour Party said, “We will abide by the treaty, but this 
does not mean accepting a number of clauses which the Egyptian people are clearly 
and unanimously against, such as exporting gas to Israel.”  
See POLITICAL ISLAM WITHOUT OIL, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 10, 2012). Walter J. Boyne, The Two O’ Clock 
War: The 1973 Yom Kippur Conflict and the Airlift That Saved Israel (2002) and ABRAHAM RABINOVICH, 
THE YOM KIPPUR WAR: THE EPIC ENCOUNTER THAT TRANSFORMED THE MIDDLE EAST, (2005). (“Israel 
convinces itself there will be no war, while Egypt and Syria plot the two-front conflict. Then, on Yom 
Kippur, Saturday, October 6, 1973, we see Arab armies pouring across the shattered Bar-Lev Line in 
the Sinai and through the Golan defenses. Even the famed Israeli air force could not stop them. On 
the Golan alone, Syria sent 1,460 tanks against Israel’s 177, and 115 artillery batteries against Israel’s 
11. And for the first time, foot soldiers wielding anti-tank weapons were able to stop tank charges, 
while surface-to-air missiles protected those troops from air attack.”).  
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military might that accounts for many of the dilemmas faced in the present-
day Middle East…This is a war that Israel never thought was possible.42 
 
On October 6, 1981, individuals associated with the Islamist al-Jihad 
organization assassinated Sādāt.43 Largely dominated by his two predecessors, 
Hosni Mubarak, Vice-President under Sādāt, does not display the charismatic 
abilities so characteristic of Nasser, nor does he show the adventurism or personal 
pretense of Sādāt.44 However, during his presidency, Mubarak has carefully used a 
combination of cautious, restraint, and limited reform to chart a course for Egypt that 
is solidly grounded in the Arab world but is equally responsive to international, 
particularly American, influence.45 Mubarak, like his successors and many other 
Egyptians of modest means, began his career in the Egyptian armed forces.46 
Serving first as a fighter pilot from (1950-1954) and later as the director of the Air 
                                                            
42 Boyne, supra note 41. See generally SHIBLEY TELHAMI, AARON DAVID MILLER, AND JEHAN SADAT, THE 
SADAT LECTURES: WORDS AND IMAGES ON PEACE (2010).  
43 JOSEPH FINKLESTONE, ANWAR SADAT: VISIONARY WHO DARED, (1996). (“The Assassination of Sādāt 
occurred on October 6th, 1981. He was assassinated during the annual victory parade held in Cairo to 
celebrate Egypt’s crossing of the Suez Canal. The assassination followed a recent crackdown by Mr. 
Sādāt against religious extremists and other political opponents. There were unverifiable reports that 
some members of the armed forces had also been detained.”). (“One troop truck contained the 
assassination squad, led by Lieutenant Khalid Islambouli. As the truck passed, the assassins 
dismounted, and Islambouli approached Sādāt. Sādāt stood to receive his salute, whereupon, 
Islambouli threw three grenades at Sādāt, only one of which exploded, and additional assassins rose 
from the truck, firing assault rifles into the stands.”). See 1981 YEAR IN REVIEW: ANWAR SĀDĀT KILLED 
(1981) available at http://www.upi.com/Audio/Year_in_Review/Events-of-1981/Anwar-Sadat-
Killed/12311754163167-5/#ixzz1uKZh28bi; 1981: EGYPT’S PRESIDENT SĀDĀT ASSASSINATED, BBC 
NEWS, (2005) available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/6/.../2515841.stm; 
LEARNING NETWORK, OCT. 6, 1981: EGYPT’S ANWAR SĀDĀT IS KILLED, (Oct. 6, 2011), and THE 
ASSASSINATION OF ANWAR SĀDĀT—BBC ACTIVE, “Video Featured” at  
http://www.bbcactivevideoforlearning.com/1/TitleDetails.aspx?TitleID=54. (last visited May 22, 2012) 
(“Since the declaration of a state of emergency following the assassination of Sādāt in 1981, Egyptian 
authorities have detained thousands of persons suspected of belonging to or sympathizing with 
Islamic organizations.”). See infra. 
44 Biographical information on Mubarak has been drawn can be found in DILIP HIRO, DICTIONARY OF THE 
MODERN MIDDLE EAST, (1996), s.v. Mubarak; Derek Hopwood, Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1990, 
3rd ed. (1993), 184-185. 
45 Schneider, supra note 25. See generally SUSAN MUADDI DARRAJ & ARTHUR MEIER, JR. SCHLESINGER, 
HOSNI MUBARAK (MODERN WORLD LEADERS) (2007), and LALLY WEYMOUTH, MUBARAK MERITS U.S. 
SUPPORT, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, (July 27, 1995), 13B. [Keep the citation since we make sure that 
the article is online and accurate, if you want to refer  to it as it is posted as summary/introduction, feel 
free to do so, but don’t remove it from the footnote]. 
46 DARRAJ & MEIER, supra note 45.Born in 1928 in the Nile delta village of Kafr al-Musaliha, Monufia 
Governorate, Mubarak graduated from the Air Force Academy in 1950. In 1937, the Royal Military 
Academy, which was later to become a hotbed of anti-royalist sentiment, opened its doors to 
candidates of all classes, eventually becoming an important vehicle of merit-based social mobility for 
the lower and middle classes. Like many of his contemporaries from the lower and lower-middle 
classes, Mubarak saw in the newly expanded armed forces a means of social and economic 
advancement, and after graduation in 1950, he entered the Egyptian air forces. 
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Force Academy.47 Additionally, Mubarak received training in the Soviet Union in the 
early 1960s.48  
Following the decisive Arab defeat in 1967, Mubarak was appointed chief of 
staff of the air force in 1969 and Deputy Defense Minister in 1972, eventually his 
military career reached its high and  rising pinnacle to the rank of Commander (Chief 
Marshall) of the aviation force in the recognition of October War 1973.49 In April 1975, 
Sādāt appointed him to the position of Vice-President, a position he would hold until 
Sādāt’s assassination in October 1981.50 But as the years went by, Mubarak became 
more dictatorial, and more aloof, carefully designing his public appearances, pushing 
forward Sādāt’s open door policies that paved the way for crony capitalism, 
implementing repressive laws limiting political activity, stifling political decent, and 
curbing freedom of expression with an iron hand, as few knew what to expect of him 
at the helm of the Egyptian nation.51 Often depicted in terms reflecting his 
                                                            
47 AIR MARSHAL MOHAMMED HOSNI MUBARAK, EGYPTIAN ARMED FORCES, available at www.mmc.gov.eg/.  
48 GALAL A. AMIN, EGYPT IN THE ERA OF HOSNI MUBARAK, 1981-2011 (2011). P.J. VATIKIOTIS, THE 
HISTORY OF MODERN EGYPT: FROM MUHAMMAD ALI TO MUBARAK (1999).  
49 THE DAILY BELL—HOSNI SAYYID MUBARAK, BACKGROUND: HOSNI MUBARAK, (June 2011) available at 
http://www.thedailybell.com/1996/Hosni-Sayyid-Mubarak.html. (last retrieved May 11, 2012). (“Mr. 
Mubarak maintained peace with Israel and close ties to America, even as he jailed critics, squelched 
opposition parties and rigged elections. Under a veneer of public apathy, anger grew as the country’s 
economy crumbled.”).   
50 Amin, supra note 48. For all his unpopularity today, when he took over Mubarak was seen by many 
Egyptians, as the great Middle East Historian Peter Mansfield says: 
An honest, straightforward, even uninspiring man who’s been credited with changing 
Egypt’s fortunes by forging ahead with peace with Israel. In exchange for the detente 
with Tel Aviv, America has provided Egypt with massive amounts of military and 
economic aid over the last three decades. 
51 The Emergency Law (Qanun Al-Tawaar’e in Arabic) in Egypt was established by Law No. 162 of 
1958.  During the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the emergency status was imposed. It has remained in 
effect, except for an 18-month break in 1980 where it was reimposed following the assassination of 
President Sādāt. This law empowers the police to undertake many actions that remain questionable, 
which include putting individuals in jail while bypassing the court. The law allows imprisonment of 
individuals for indefinite periods and restriction of their civil rights and liberties for virtually no reason, 
thus keeping them in prison without trial.  Law No. 162 of 1958 (Emergency Law), Al-Jarida Al-
Rasmiyya (Egypt), available at http://www.emerglobal.com/lex/law-1958-162; see also Daniel 
Williams, Egypt Extends 25-Year-Old Emergency Law, THE WASHINGTON POST (May 1, 2006), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/30/AR2006043001039.html.  
Additionally, the Emergency Law allows Mubarak to declare a state of emergency “whenever security 
or public order are jeopardized within the Republic or any of its regions, whether due to war or to 
circumstances threatening war, national unrest, general disasters or the outbreak of an epidemic.” 
Article 3 of the Emergency Law provides that “the President and his delegate, the Minister of Interior, 
are empowered during a state of emergency to, “restrict freedom of assembly, movement and 
residence, arrest and detain suspects or those dangerous to security and public order, permit the 
search of persons and places” unrestricted by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedures.” 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, Egypt, no. 2 (1993) quoting text of Emergency Law 
162/1958. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ARBITRARY DETENTION AND TORTURE UNDER EMERGENCY POWERS, 
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (AI) Index: MDE 12/01/89 (May 1989). The Emergency Law further affords 
the President the power to order censorship or confiscation of any means of expression, the right to 
specify opening and closing times for stores, and the right to evacuate or seal off areas of disturbance. 
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unassuming style, President Mubarak has been variously described as “a technician, 
not a systematic thinker or a visionary,52 “quiet and courteous”53, and an “honest if 
plodding-manager.”54  
The infitah, the controversial Peace Agreement with Israel and Sādāt’s 
stratagems of limited political liberalization remained largely intact, though over time, 
Mubarak refashioned and modified these initiatives, though characteristically, his 
modifications were by no means radical.55 Instead, he would distillate consistently on 
domestic stability, economic and political reform and the reintegration of Egypt into 
the Arab fold.56  
 
B. Is Mubarak has any pros or just cons?  (“greater political restraint”) 
 
 Instead of political reform, Mubarak has since the early 1990s and particularly 
since beginning his fourth term as President-focused his attention on the resurrection 
of the moribund, ossified Egyptian economy.57 In one of his recent interview before 
his resignation from the office, he stated that: 
 
[T]he world is business now....Politics is working for business, In the same 
interview, he blames his more famous predecessors for the state of the 
Egyptian economy: “I received the country in the most terrible situation,” 
“Economy zero,” “Debts high,” and “Infrastructure nothing.” No hope to invite 
anybody to invest his money, No telephone lines, No electricity, No water or 
sewage. No, no, no, no, no….58  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, EGYPT: RECENT HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS UNDER THE STATE OF EMERGENCY, 
AI Index: MDE 12/07/96 (Oct. 1996); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, EGYPT: INDEFINITE DETENTION AND 
SYSTEMATIC TORTURE: THE FORGOTTEN VICTIMS, AI Index: MDE 12/13/96 (July 1996), available at 
http://wvw.amnesty.orgailib/aipub/1996/MDEl51201396.htm.  (last visited May 22, 2012). [Don’t touch 
anything of those as I checked everything in here and all of that is online and the emergency law is 
available online, also, this had been checked before within my article published at Phoenix Law 
Review last year which stated in FN7, and copy of the criminal code attached].  
52 Lippman, supra note 25. 
53 Sieff, supra note 25.  
54 See STANLEY REED, THE BATTLE FOR EGYPT, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 4 (Oct. 1993), 94. (“According to 
Mubarak, he never desired the position of President and would have much preferred to be named 
ambassador to Paris or London…Unlike Sādāt who, upon coming to power, immediately set about 
stripping the programs of Nasser, Mubarak remained highly loyal to the policies instituted by his 
predecessor.”). Schneider, supra note 25. 
55 TAREK OSMAN, EGYPT ON THE BRINK: FROM NASSER TO MUBARAK (2011). 
56 Arafat, supra note 27, at 61-87. ALADDIN ELAASAR, THE LAST PHARAOH: MUBARAK AND THE UNCERTAIN 
FUTURE OF EGYPT IN THE VOLATILE MID EAST (2009). 
57 Hopwood, supra note 44, at 184. It is interesting to note that as late as 1991; commentators were 
unable to discern any coherent long-term economic program on the part of Ex-President Mubarak. 
58 Schneider, supra note 25. 
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Almost universally described in terms reflecting his risk-averse, reflective 
nature, Mubarak has displayed an astonishing passion for undertaking a broad 
economic reform program.59 This is the area in which President Mubarak has sought 
to distinguish himself: “Nasser liberated Egypt; Sādāt gave it peace; I wish to rebuild 
it,” asserts Mubarak.60 Nearly a decade ago, Mubarak embarked Egypt on the 
International Monetary Fund’s (“IMF”) economic reform and structural adjustment 
program aimed at macroeconomic stabilization, corrective social policy (such as 
reworking the extensive programs of subsidies) and creating a little bit social safety 
net for the poor,61 even an estimated forty million people are living at or below the 
poverty level out of Egypt’s total population of eighty-five million.62 While the initial 
phase of the reform package was considered successful-Egypt had large foreign 
investments and a relatively strong currency-it was equally clear that the alteration 
program would be stuck by the leadership’s uncertain commitment to full-fledged 
reform in light of the potentially disruptive social transformations engendered by 
improvement and the interfering with vested financial interests of public businesses 
and the government-controlled labor unions.63 Privatization64 of the huge public 
sector occurred at a pace far slower than anticipated, and by 1997, privatization 
schemes only amounted to 15 percent of the known public sector.65 Additionally, 
                                                            
59 IGOR MAN, THE RIFTS IN EGYPT’S VILLAGE, 40 WORLD PRESS REV. 7 (1993), 7. 
60 Id.  
61 DIETER WEISS AND ULRICH WURZEL, The Economics and Politics of Transition to an Open Market 
Economy: Egypt, PARIS: ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (“OECD”), 
(1998), 23. 
62 About forty million Egyptians, half the population, were living below the poverty level, as those 
individually earn between $2 and $5 a day. Bassiouni, Fight for Democracy, supra note 8, at 3.   
63 Weiss & Wurzel, supra note 61, at 27. 
64 See generally, DAVID PARKER & DAVID SAAL, INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON PRIVATIZATION 87 
(Edward Elgar eds.,2003) [this book is online, check carefully Amazon books]; PRIVATIZATION: THE 
PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR 60 (Roger L. Kemp ed. 1991). Privatization is 
the incidence or process of transferring ownership of a business, enterprise, agency, or public service 
from the public sector (the state or government) to the private sector (businesses that operate for a 
private profit) or to a private non-profit organization. In a broader sense, privatization refers to transfer 
of any government function to the private sector, including governmental functions like revenue 
collection and law enforcement. 
65 Figures given are approximations since the Egyptian government has not filly revealed the extent of 
public sector holdings. Weiss & Wurzel, supra note 61, at 131; see also THE ECONOMIST, EGYPT: 
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS V. 351, 8123. (“It would be grossly unfair however to dismiss 
Mubarak’s economic reforms as wholly unsuccessful.”). Growth rates are quite respectable at between 
three and five percent per year, private sector earnings now account for fully 70 percent of the Gross 
Domestic Product (“GDP”). As generally-well known, GDP refers to the market value of all officially 
recognized final goods and services produced within a country in a given period. GDP per capita is 
often considered an indicator of a country’s standard of living; GDP per capita is not a measure of 
personal income. Under economic theory, GDP per capita exactly equals the Gross Domestic Income 
(“GDI”) per capita. And by 1997, Egypt had earned an investment-grade bond rating. For further 
discussion on GDP and the methods of its measurement, see generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, AMARTYA 
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some progress has been made in effecting limited reforms in the areas of trade 
liberalization66 and financial sector reorganization and deregulation.67  
Nonetheless, President Mubarak’s commitment to economic reform has been 
lessened by his desire to maintain personal control and specific interests.68 Mubarak 
has so involved himself in the control of Egypt’s economic reform that “[he] 
sometimes seems to run the government almost single-handedly, personally 
approving major investment projects and, in one recent case, issuing an order for 
playground equipment in rural villages” and short-term stability even at the expense 
of long-term prosperity.69 His reluctance to assertively confront the economy’s 
structural insufficiencies, several of which are inseparably linked to Egypt’s larger 
political issues, has handicapped progress in this realm in which the President sees 
himself as visionary.70  
A country owning gigantic human capital, Egypt has yet to realize its vast 
potential as a political and economic actor in the region and further afield.71 Its 
progress on this path is severely hampered by political exhaustion and economic 
immobility, largely the result of almost absolute executive domination of the political 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
SEN, AND JEAN-PAUL FITOUSSI, MISMEASURING OUR LIVES: WHY GDP DOESN’T ADD UP, (2010); F. 
PULSELLI, S. BASTIANONI, N. MARCHETTINI, AND E. TIEZZI, THE ROAD TO SUSTAINABILITY: GDP AND FUTURE 
GENERATIONS (THE SUSTAINABLE WORLD) (2008), and ALEKSANDR V. AVAKOV, TWO THOUSAND YEARS OF 
ECONOMIC STATISTICS: WORLD POPULATION, GDP AND PPP, (2010). 
66 Free trade is a system of trade policy that allows traders and merchants to trade across national 
boundaries without interference from the respective governments. According to the law of comparative 
advantage, the policy permits trading partners’ mutual gains from trade of goods and services.  
Interventions include subsidies, taxes and tariffs, non-tariff barriers, such as regulatory legislation and 
quotas, and even inter-government managed trade agreements, such as the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) and the Central America Free Trade Agreement (“CAFTA”)—contrary to 
their formal titles—and any governmental market intervention resulting in artificial prices. See Anup 
Shah, Free Trade and Globalization, GLOBAL ISSUES, http://www.globalissues.org/issue/38/free-trade-
and-globalization.  (last updated Nov. 28, 2010).   
67 DAVID HIRST, UN CAPITALISME A L’ INDONDSIENNE : L’EGYPTE AUX PIEDS D’ARGILE, LE MONDE 
DIPLOMATIQUE (Paris), (Oct. 1999), 15, available at  http://www.monde-
diplomatique.fr19991101HIRST/12543.html. It should be noted that in this sense that “Deregulation 
Policy” means the removal or simplification of government rules and regulations that restrict the 
operation of market forces. Deregulation does not mean elimination of laws against fraud or property 
rights but eliminating or reducing government control of how business is done, thereby moving toward 
a more laissez-faire, free market economy.   
68 Weiss & Wurzel, supra note 61. 
69 John Lancaster, Despite Plaudits of the West, Mubarak Regime is Stumbling: The Real 
Egypt/Bureaucratic Paralysis and Social Unrest, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE (Neuilly-sur-Seine, 
France), Mar. 15, 1995. 
70 See Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, The Primacy of Economics: The Foreign Policy of Egypt, in THE FOREIGN 
POLICIES OF THE ARAB STATES: THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE, eds. Baghat Korany and Ali E. Hillal 
Dessouki (1991), 169. 
71 Soliman, supra note 31. See also MOHAMED HAKKI, EGYPT UNDER MUBARAK: MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM 
PAPER (1983). 
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arena.72  Egypt continues to be a state subjugated by an enormously powerful 
executive who enjoys expansive constitutional (and extra-constitutional) grants of 
authority, thereby exercising substantial and major control over all facets and policies 
of government from the ostensibly autonomous legislature73 to the judicial branch,74 
in which the Minister of Justice is not a member of the judicial staff.  He is “certainly 
one of the executive authority members as he is subject to the cabinet.”75 He 
occupies a political job from which judges are prohibited while active and enjoys no 
independence concerning his judicial decisions.76 In other words, the Justice Minister 
is not an active judge, so the issue is whether he serves judges or the ruling 
                                                            
72 Steven A. Cook, The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, (OXFORD 2011). 
73 The control enjoyed by the President and his party, the National Democratic Party (“NDP”), over the 
legislature, known as the People’s Assembly (majlis al-sha‘ab) cannot be questioned. As a threshold 
matter, the Abrogated Egyptian Constitution provides that both the President and the People’s 
Assembly shall share equally in the right to propose legislation. See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB 
REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended, May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, March 26, 2007, as 
abrogated March 30, 2011, available at http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/LastPage.aspx?Category_ID=208 
[hereinafter ABROGATED EGYPT CONSTITUTION]; replaced by CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION OF THE ARAB 
REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, as promulgated 30 March 2011, [hereinafter EGYPT TEMPORAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
DECLARATION], available at http://www.egypt.gov.eg/english/laws/constitution. [Those links are for the 
Abrogated Egyptian Constitution of 1971 and the Temporal Constitutional Declaration of March 30, 
2011 and both are online, just check them carefully in English, if you find another links in English, feel 
free to do so and cite them].This normative goal however fails to fully reflect the reality of lawmaking in 
Egypt, where the Executive has become the chief engine of legislation: legislation proposed by the 
Executive is far more likely to be codified as law by the Assembly than proposals emanating from the 
Assembly itself. In 1990, 214 laws proposed by the executive were passed, while during the same 
period, only seven were proposed by the Assembly itself, of which only one was adopted. By the same 
token, in 1991, 451 executive-proposed laws were adopted and only one proposed by the Assembly 
was passed out of a total of seven originally presented. See generally IBN KHALDUN CENTER FOR 
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES (“ICDS”) (Cairo 1995). [I am referring here to check the general reports of this 
organization regarding some laws’ execution at this time period, may be not available at this moment 
as they are very old, but I think it’s better to keep it as we verified the online website of the 
organization itself rather than no citation or if you find another thing to cite supporting the idea, feel 
free to do so.]  
74 Mubarak sought to make the judicial authority totally subordinate, but now judges are asking for 
judicial independence from government control in addition to full judicial supervision over 
parliamentary and presidential elections. The case of judicial independence may be a legislative 
corruption because the corrupt parliament blocks issuing a good law. The parliament kept the old law 
to keep the judicial system under the control of the executive branch. For further elaboration on this 
point, see generally Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron, ed., JUDGES AND POLITICAL REFORM IN EGYPT, (The 
American Univ. in Cairo Press, 2008). 
75 This part is based on a portion of the author’s Doctoral Dissertation Thesis entitled: “Towards a New 
Anti-Corruption Law After Mubarak: Based on a Comparative Study Between the United States 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA 1977”), Egyptian Anti-Bribery Law, and Islamic Sharie‘a Law” at 
the Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law under the supervision of Professor Dr. Frank 
Emmert (2013). [This chapter in my doctoral dissertation attached] 
76 Maugiron, supra note 74. All of that creates a constitutional issue. The most significant is that 
judicial reform is considered a main condition for independence, democracy, impartiality, and political 
neutrality.   
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regime.77 For example, in the most recent parliamentary elections of 2010, several 
violations took place.78 Therefore, and after the revolution, judges demanded a new 
law to ban interference from the executive; however, certain political powers lead 
some corrupt journalists to describe the judicial authority as a state inside the state.79 
An effective justice system would encourage Egyptian citizens to believe in their right 
to voice their concerns about the wrongdoings of corrupt officials though almost all 
observers agree that executive control of the latter is far more tempered.80  
                                                            
77 After the White Revolution, a number of former ministers and high-ranking officials have not been 
the subject of formal interrogation, among whom are former Minister of Justice Mamdouh Mar‘ie who 
is known for his role in the forged ballots scandal during the 2005 presidential and parliamentary 
elections. Recently, he was asked to appear before the Inspector-General of the Ministry of Justice to 
answer 58 reports accusing him of various misdeeds. Among the reports are accusations of Mar‘ie of 
having exercised pressure on a judge at Kafr al-Sheikh Court to rule in favor of his nephews on a land 
dispute on twelve acres owned by the agrarian reform. When the judge refused, the former Minister 
referred him to a disciplinary committee. Another accusation relates to the aforementioned minster, his 
interference in the work of judges at the Illegitimate Gain Agency, which resulted in the resignation of 
the Head of the Agency in 2008. He did not appear before the Inspector-General, claiming health 
reasons. See generally AL JAZEERA AND AGENCIES, EGYPT PM APPOINTS NEW KEY MINISTERS, Mar.6, 
2011 (“Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Justice portfolios change hands amid violence outside state 
security buildings in Cairo… A Former Attorney General, as minister of justice to replace Mamdouh 
Marie, who has been widely accused of corruption.”) 
78 The judiciary, consequently, demanded that investigations be held. Nevertheless, the judges 
surprisingly found that those that demanded investigations to be held were referred to a disciplinary 
court without following the legal measures. The Regime supported by the police was so arrogant in the 
exercise of power that they did nothing to hide the massive and wholesale fraud. Less than 25% of the 
population participated in the elections, with the government party-fielded candidates winning 90% of 
the seats in Parliament. ‘Arafa, supra note 7. 
79 See BUSCAGLIA EDGARDO, JUDICIAL CORRUPTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: ITS CAUSES AND 
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 1-11 (1999). 
80 Cook, supra note 72. It should bear in mind, that there are codes of conduct and ethics for members 
of the judiciary. There are strict rules preventing conflict of interest. For instance, according to Article 
72 of Law No. 46 of 1972, no judge may be employed or perform any commercial act, or perform any 
act that could threaten the independence and dignity of the judiciary. The majlis al-qada’a al-a‘laa 
(“Supreme Council of the Judiciary” (“SCJ”)”) may prevent any judge from performing any act 
inconsistent with his or her duties and functions. Moreover, courts are forbidden from expressing 
political opinions. See Authority Judicial Law No. 46 of 1972, Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya [OFFICIAL GAZETTE 
OF EGYPT], June. 1972, at art.72 (Egypt).The law is only available in Arabic, no English version or 
official translation of it, so the keep the citation and don’t omit it, if you want to refer to it as an Arabic 
version, feel free to do so.] Regarding the acceptance of gifts, Law No. 47 of 1978 for State 
Employees prohibits members of the national judiciary from taking gifts, hospitality, commissions, or 
advances from people for whom they deliver state services. However, this rule is not being fully 
applied in practice. Moreover, there are no provisions in Law No. 46 of 1972 on the judiciary 
concerning the protection of prosecutors and judges in cases of corruption. One of the important cases 
of judges being investigated for corruption charges occurred in 2007, when 20 judges were sent to the 
disciplinary committee for failing to perform their duties according to high standards, although this was 
perceived by some as politically motivated as these judges had openly criticized the integrity of 
elections. Moreover, Article 75 of the aforementioned law stipulates:  
Judges who are related to each other by ties of parenthood or alliance by marriage, 
up to the fourth degree, may not sit in the same judicial circuit. Further, the public 
prosecutor, or one of the parties to the case or defense counsel in charge of his 
defense may not be one who is tied up by such relationship with any of the judges 
examining the case. The proxy of an attorney at law, who entertains such relationship 
with the judge, shall be disregarded unless the proxy was given after examination or 
adjudication of the case by the judge.  
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Despite promises of political and economic liberalization, the Mubarak regime 
was be easily placed in the deeply rooted Egyptian political tradition characterized by 
a paternalistic “pyramidal” hierarchical structure, which harkens back to previous 
regimes, if not far more ancient antecedents.81 While sources from the early period of 
his presidency note that he was “highly consultative” and “respect[ed] public opinion” 
without “seeking to impose his own,”82 in later years, he has earned a reputation 
among his critics for imperiousness.83  
 
One critic charged in 1995 that the President has “no advisers” and “since 
the Gulf War, [he] has tended to tell people what to do....He has become 
cocky. Ruling Egypt looks easy to him.”84  
 
While seemingly dissimilar with Mubarak’s restrained personality, it is quite 
easy to see that the vast amount of political control enjoyed by him and the powerful 
National Democratic Party (“NDP”) he represents might well lead to arrogance, even 
in the most personally conservative of leaders.85 In Egypt, however, civil society 
exists in many respects solely at the sufferance of the government, and thus remains 
incapable of acting as any sort of social intermediate against the hegemonic, invasive 
tendencies of the central government.86 The civil society organizations that Mubarak 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Such rules are not typically applied in practice. POGAR (2004). See Act No. 47/1978 regulating Civil 
Servants in the Public Sector, Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF EGYPT], June 1978, at 
arts.15-27 (organizes civil service and aligns it with the public interest) (Egypt). On the other hand, set 
rules for gifts and presents to avoid corruption, while increasing the salaries of the judiciary. Regarding 
working in other courts or international bodies while serving as judges, Article 65 of Law No. 142/2006 
permits this, although with a presidential decree, after taking the opinion of the general board of the 
court to which the judge belongs or the Attorney General, and with the consent of the Supreme 
Council. Moreover, a judge is not allowed to be appointed at any international position for more than 
four consecutive years. The only exception to this rule is if the appointment supports the general well-
being of the nation. Further, there are no restrictions in the law for judges to enter the private sector 
after they leave office. See Law No. 142/2006 amending Law No. 46/1972 on Judicial Authority, Al-
Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, June 2006, at art. 65(Egypt). MONA EL-NAHHAS, THREAT TO THE PRESS?, AL-
AHRAM WKLY ONLINE, Dec. 13/19, 2007, available at 
http://www.weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/875/eg3.htm.  (last retrieved May 22, 2012). 
81 LARRY P. GOODSON AND SOHA RADWAN, DEMOCRATIZATION IN EGYPT IN THE 1990s: STAGNANT OR 
MERELY STALLED?, 19 ARAB STUDIES QUARTERLY 1 (1997), 7.  
82 Dessouki, supra note 70.  
83 As a president serving the longest period of time in a country as a president with a long history of 
extremely powerful presidents, Mubarak has been accused of attempting to rule the country as his 
personal fiefdom.(This is my own words and thoughts, no need for citation) 
84 Lancaster, supra note 69. See generally Charles Robert Davidson, Reform and Repression in 
Mubarak’s Egypt, 24:2 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 75 (2000), 81-82. 
85 Davidson, supra note 84. 
86 Id.  
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has permitted to operate fulfill their role as “social safety valves” concern over the 
destabilizing effect of free and open discourse must be balanced.87  
Of special concern to former President Mubarak has been the creeping 
Islamization of these civil society organizations, particularly among the influential 
professional associations. In a language highly evocative of his successors, Mubarak 
tends to paint all Islamists as terrorists and Islamic movements as terrorist 
movements.88 This personal enmity on the part of Mubarak to Islamists of all stripes 
and the consequent lack of distinction among the variable groups has led him to 
instigate a number of punitive measures which affect Egyptian civil society as a 
whole.89 Owing at least in part to their more democratic internal electoral processes, 
several of these groups have come to be dominated by Islamists even after the 
                                                            
87 However, the values typically inculcated by civil society organizations, moderation, respect for 
institutional processes, the utility and inevitability of compromise are all inherently antagonistic with 
continued single-party rule in a "multiparty" state and therefore necessitate close governmental 
oversight. Some analysts suggest that the Mubarak government’s apprehension of a more evolved 
civil society is grounded, at least in part, in its fear of the emergence of an Algeria-like situation in 
Egypt. Keep the explanation in the footnote and rephrase in the language that you feel it is a bit similar 
to the dissertation thesis and cite this dissertation as: See Charles Robert Davidson, Political Violence 
in Egypt: A Case Study of the Islamist Insurgency 1992-1997, (Doctoral Dissertation Thesis), 
FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY (2005), 176. See, e.g., Ebeid, supra note 29, at 121; 
Cassandra, The Impending Crisis in Egypt, 49 THE MIDDLE EAST J. 1, (Winter 1995), 16. Indeed, the 
Egyptian government has long gone to pains to distinguish its circumstances from those of its 
striferidden neighbor. See, e.g., ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT COUNTRY REPORT, EGYPT, no. 1 (1992), 
at 9. However, while this “Algeria Complex” may play some role in the government’s hostility toward 
the instruments of civil society, Egypt is not Algeria and the conflicts are highly dissimilar, a fact that 
cannot have escaped the Egyptian leadership. The “Algeria Complex” is more likely a method for the 
government to justify its stranglehold on political life, justifying its increasing intrusiveness with vague 
references to “national security” and “public order and stability.” The 1997 Presidential decree, 
extending the duration of the state of emergency an additional three years, was approved by the NDP-
dominated People’s Assembly, which stated that it would be inappropriate to repeal the legislation 
while “the remaining dens of corruption are still lurking and waiting to seize any opportunity to 
undermine security and stability by damaging tourism and causing sedition among the people’s 
communities.” See EGYPT PARLIAMENT EXTENDS EMERGENCY LAW FOR TWO YEARS, AGENCIES, ARAB 
NEWS, MENA NEWS AGENCY, May 11, 2010 (“Egypt’s Parliament voted to extend a decades-old state 
of emergency for a further two years”), at http://www.arabnews.com/node/344725. See also Egypt’s 
State of Emergency Extended (May 2010) (discussing that the law granting extensive police powers to 
be used only for “terrorism” and drug cases), available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/.../20105116134595496.html.  (last visited May 22, 2012).  
88 Weymouth, supra note 45. For instance, of the Muslim Brotherhood-generally considered the most 
moderate and innocuous of Islamist groups, Mubarak has stated: 
They say they are moderates (but) they are not moderates. They are working...to 
support violence in this country, “cautioning that should Islamists come to power 
through whatever channel-an Iran-like state might result.” It was a mistake to 
persuade the Shah to leave.  
89 Joel Campana, From Accommodation to Confrontation: The Muslim Brotherhood in the Mubarak 
Years, 50 J. INT’L AFF.1, (1996), 278. In this respect, asserting his support for the key policies of his 
predecessor, shortly after being proclaimed President on October 13, 1981, Mubarak ordered the 
arrest of members of various Islamic organizations (particularly those of al-Takfir wa al-Higra) and 
dismissed a number of officers and enlisted men suspected of Islamist leanings from the armed 
forces.  
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revolution, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood (“MB”),90 thus provoking ever more 
restrictive measures91 against the Muslim Brotherhood in particular and civil society 
organizations in general.92 In 1995 interview Ex-President Mubarak, stated that:  
 
[T]he Muslim Brotherhood is inextricably linked with the more violent terrorist 
organizations in Egypt and that “they tried to kill Nasser, and they killed 
Sādāt because he gave them room for dialogue.”93  
 
In reaction to the legitimization, mobilizing potential and sectarian bent of 
these voluntary organizations, Mubarak has undertaken various means to subvert 
and disrupt their political influence.94 Despite his reflective and reserved style, in the 
realm of civil society and the development and deepening of the rule of law in Egypt, 
he has responded to threats to centralized presidential power in a manner that would 
not be wholly unfamiliar to his more flamboyant predecessors.95 His responses to the 
proliferation of Islamist tendencies in civil society organizations have ranged from the 
establishment of enervating legal impediments to more vulnerability suppressive 
                                                            
90 For further discussion on the Muslim Brotherhood, formation, and their political role in Egypt, see 
‘Arafa, supra note 7, at 15-17. 
91 Consistent with the growing hostility towards civil society organizations, the Mubarak government 
dealt a debilitating blow to civil society, immediately prior to the 1995 elections, by arresting 81 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt’s largest non-governmental civil association) and other 
Islamists on what are widely considered specious charges of “planning to incite armed rebellion” 
leading to the inescapable conclusion that the arrests were prompted to preclude participation in the 
elections. 
92 Id.  
93 Weymouth, supra note 45.  (“Negad al-Bora‘i, secretary-general of the Egyptian Organization for 
Human Rights (“EOHR”), intimates that had the candidates who represented the emergent youthful 
leadership of the group-been allowed to participate in the elections, they may have won a significant 
amount of parliamentary seats and thus become a “major irritant” for Ex-President Mubarak.”).  
94 Cassandra, supra note 87, at 15. In 1993, for instance, in an attempt to stave off any Islamic "take-
over" of the syndicates, the Mubarak government enacted legislation ironically entitled "Law to 
Guarantee Democracy within the Professional Syndicates," (Law No. 100/1993) which required a 
minimum first-round voter turnout of 50% of the members in the syndicate, or at least 33% in a second 
round; failure to meet these standards results in a voiding of the vote and the placement of the 
syndicate under the supervisory control of a panel of government-appointed judges for a six-month 
period, pending new elections. While the Islamist presence in the syndicates may appear to Mubarak 
as emblematic of the rise of Islamic sentiment (categorically equated with an anti-government outlook), 
far more prosaic forces may be at work. At least one source suggests that the preponderance of 
Islamists in the engineers, physicians, teachers, and particularly lawyer’s syndicates was largely due 
to low voter turnout, “which in the elections to the board of the lawyers’ syndicate in 1992, hardly 
exceeded ten percent.” Whatever the cause of the Islamist presence in the syndicates, the 
promulgation and enactment of such legislation is an unequivocal indication of government antipathy 
towards competing power structures, particularly those enjoying a high degree of popular legitimacy, 
financial means, and an activist agenda. 
95 Id. See generally RICHARD P. MITCHELL, THE SOCIETY OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERS (1993); CARRIE 
ROSEFSKY WICKHAM, MOBILIZING ISLAM: RELIGION, ACTIVISM, AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN EGYPT (2002). 
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actions and indiscriminate manners.96 Moreover, the war against the Islamic Group 
has caused additional inroads to be made on political and civil rights.97  
Of course, successful economic reform in Egypt has been hindered, not 
astoundingly, by the failings of the political system, which in addition to undermining 
investor confidence also encumbered emerging investment schemes through 
bureaucratic unresponsiveness.98 This status quo represents that there is significant 
credible evidence that the comportment of the Egyptian government fails to meet 
domestic and international standards of conduct.99  
Though such conflicts are rarely won on the basis of brute strength and are 
emblematic of deeper societal cracks, Mubarak has chosen the far easier option of 
attacking the visible manifestations of his country’s more pervasive ills, instead of 
making the difficult personal and political sacrifices, for which Egypt’ dire 
circumstances so evidently call.100 Whereas narrowly tailored security legislation that, 
while allowing the government to combat internal violence, also safeguarded civil and 
political rights could hardly be considered objectionable, the far-reaching and 
intrusive legal and law enforcement regime that has been constructed has had 
disastrous effects on the already debilitated civil and political rights of Egyptians. 
                                                            
96 Nonetheless, Mubarak has certainly acted with greater restraint in most cases than could be 
expected of his predecessors in similar circumstances, as the continued, albeit circumscribed, 
functioning of Egyptian civil society suggests. Offering far less procedural due process than the civilian 
judiciary, these military tribunals have been soundly criticized by domestic and international human 
rights organizations for their harsh brand of justice, which dispenses with many critical procedural 
safeguards enshrined in domestic and international conventions. In what is perhaps a testimony to the 
independence of the civilian judiciary, military tribunals have since 1992 become the government’s 
forum of choice, particularly in high-profile cases because of the rapidity of adjudication and the 
severity of punishments handed down. Since 1992, one thousand civilian defendants have been tried 
in proceedings usually characterized by inadequate and delayed access to counsel and other 
procedural irregularities. Arguing that these tribunals are more efficient than the more independent-
minded civilian judiciary, the government has used the military courts, which offer highly limited 
avenues of appeal, to try both violent and non-violent opponents. 
97 For instance, legislation such as the now repealed Law 93/1005 penalized journalists and writers 
“for insulting public officials or state institutions” or “for harming the peace or economy” and violators 
were subject to five year- imprisonment and a harsh fine. For further elaboration about the military 
trials, see Ahmed El-dakak, Approaching Rule of Law in Post-Revolution Egypt: Where We Were, 
Where We Are, And Where We Should Be, 18 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y, (Spring 2012), 46-48. 
(Eldakak’s article attached, and will be online soon as it is in the editing process within the law review’s 
editorial board of the journal) 
98 MAMOUN FANDY, EGYPT NEARS TWILIGHT ZONE AFTER UNDEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS, 11 CHRISTIAN 
SCIENCE MONITOR, (Dec.1995), 19. ASHRAF KHALIL, GRAND POLITICAL THEATER IN EGYPT, (1999). 
99 For instance, the loosely-worded legislation allows for arbitrary and capricious law enforcement, 
while, at the same time, denying the courts a meaningful standard by which to judge the conduct of 
the defendant and the state. According to reports by human rights groups, detention orders issued by 
the Executive branch are frequently found lacking any legally justifiable grounds for detention, merely 
justifying detention with generalities such as “danger to national security.” 
100 Fandy, supra note 98. 
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101The continued use of these measures, after the most significant threats of violence 
have passed, plainly reveals the extent of government unwillingness to engage in 
even minimal power-sharing arrangements, in which all of these features make the 
country ripe for January 25th uprising.102  
Hosni Mubarak had monopolized and exploited power for thirty years through 
rigged elections and was working to install his son Gamal as his successor.103 The 
level of corruption in the government circles was unprecedented in Egypt’s history.104 
On the other hand, Egypt was in decline on every front, from health and education to 
the economy to the foreign policy.105 The vast-destructive police and security 
apparatuses that cost billions—at the expense of Egyptians—was one of the worst 
means of repression in the world.106 Then, why did not Egyptians rise up against all 
these injustices before January 25th?  There were three reasons for why there was no 
revolution before that date. First, the long tyranny had given Egyptians such a legacy 
of weakness and submission that they would not rise up, whatever happened.107 
Secondly, revolution in Egypt was possible but there are various factors standing in 
the way, as severe torture and tyranny, the lack of organization able to lead the 
masses and demonstrations, and the fact that Egyptians were distracted by the need 
                                                            
101 Id. 
102 Id. One commentator argued that: 
[I]t would be incorrect, however, to conclude that President Mubarak’s personality 
makes him an ineffective leader or one that is absolutely adverse to change. To his 
credit it must be recalled that President Mubarak faces an almost unimaginable matrix 
of social and economic woes, on a scale that few Western leaders can imagine. And 
while it is highly tempting to judge from afar and make sententious pronouncements 
about his shortcomings in leadership of Egypt, a country whose actions have long 
been closely scrutinized regionally and internationally, one must recall that dire 
domestic circumstance notwithstanding, President Mubarak has had the courage to 
make slow, incremental changes to the Egyptian political and economic 
landscape…The few changes made to the political system under President Mubarak 
have been largely cosmetic, and have not brought about any significant reform of the 
inert political structures that have long needed regeneration. 
103 Id.  
104 ‘Arafa, supra note 7, at 12-15. (“A small group of businessmen, mostly closest friends of Gamal 
Mubarak, has complete control and dominate the Egyptian economy and were running it in their own 
interests…A few rich people lived like kings in their palaces and resorts, moving around in private 
planes, while poor individuals were committing suicide as they could not support their families or dying 
in the crush to cheap bread or bottles of cooking gas or in general to obtain their essential or 
necessary life-daily needs”).  
105 Id.  
106 Id., at 6-9. In this sense, the general public is tortured in police stations and in many cases, their 
wives and daughters was raped in front of them to confess to crimes they had not committed.    
107 Owen, Tripp, and Faksh, supra note 32. 
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to make a living and were seeking individual solutions to the crises.108 The third 
explanation proclaimed that Egyptians were no less inclined toward revolution than 
other peoples, and they had carried out more revolutions in the twentieth century 
than some European nations, but they have a specific nature in which makes them 
less motivated toward violence and persuaded toward compromise.109 But on 
January 25th, million Egyptians come out in the streets calling for the downfall of the 
regime and Mubarak’s departure.110 People in Tahrir Square were new Egyptians 
recreated new in a higher form.111 There was a deep feeling of solidarity and 
courteous conduct, as if the revolution had not only rid Egyptians of fear but also 
cured them of their social defects.112 Bringing the autocrat down and winning freedom 
for Egypt was the main goal.113 Day after day, the revolution made progress, and the 
regime tottered, till February 11th, 2011 as a historic day in the modern Egyptian 
history when the protestors heard and followed by more loud shouts of “Hosni 
Mubarak steeped down from the office of the Republic.”114 
The Egyptian Revolution took the world by surprise and forced Western 
interests to review the superficial and mistaken political analysis of Egypt that had 
long been current.115 From the first day broad international solidarity was evident, as 
people in the West declared their support for the demand of Egyptians, while some 
                                                            
108 As a result, many preferred to escape geographically and historically, as they moved to the oil 
states in the Gulf, like Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, etc....to work, usually in humiliating trades, so that 
they could come back home with sufficient funds  money to afford reasonable life. 
109 One Egyptian writer stated that: 
Egyptians are like camels: they can put up with beatings, humiliation, and starvation 
for a long time but when they rebel they do so suddenly and with a force that is 
impossible to control. 
See generally ALAA AL-ASWANY, ON THE STATE OF EGYPT: A NOVELIST’S PROVOCATIVE REFLECTIONS 
(Apr.2011) translated by Jonathan Wright. 
110 ‘Arafa, supra note 7. 
111 Id. at 3-5. It is unfair to call this is a “youth revolution.” Of course young people began and led it, but 
the whole Egyptians joined in and fully represented. They took a stand in Tahrir Square, living together 
like members of the same family defending the same values and principles, asking for justice, fairness, 
democracy, civil, political, and human rights, and rule of law’s application on equal grounds.  
112 Id. It was an extraordinary phenomenon that thousands of women sleeping in the street without any 
sexual harassment, people left their personal belongings in the street in the certain knowledge that no 
one would steal them. Furthermore, Coptic Christians formed a ring around Muslims as they prayed to 
protect them from attacks by the regime’s violence. The riot police committed every probable crime in 
order to stop the revolution, as firing gas tear and rubber bullets at the protestors, using riffles 
equipped with laser sights…etc. till killing and injuring them. 
113 Id.  
114 Id. Millions of Egyptians then launched into a riotous celebration throughout the night, overjoyed 
Mubarak had resigned and the dictatorship had fallendown. 
115 NICHOLAS JOHNSTON AND KATE ANDERSEN BROWER, OBAMA TELLS MUBARAK HE MUST STICK TO 
PLEDGE OF DEMOCRATIC REFORMS IN EGYPT, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 27, 2011), available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/.../2011.../obama-says-mubarak-must-take-con.   (last retrieved May 22, 
2012). 
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Western governments hesitated until the last moment between promoting the 
revolution and backing Mubarak, their doctorial ally.116  
The significant question remains: Why did Egypt unexpectedly uprising? What 
were the problems and inconsistencies in the society that made revolution 
foreseeable? The solution to Egypt’s countless glitches requires much hard work on 
the part of the whole of Egyptian society. Endowed as it is with huge, almost 
unfettered powers, the Executive branch is one of the logical engines of reform. It 
remains to be seen whether any Egyptian president, irrespective of temperament, will 
be willing to be run the risk of potential short-term instability to obtain long-term 
political progress. Personal traits seem to play a far more important role in the realm 
of Egypt’s international affairs, which can be managed by the powerful Presidency 
without many of the fears attending forthright domestic reform. Besides, the 
government’s almost hermetic exclusion of Egyptian community from this process of 
reform and rehabilitation impedes the creativity and the synergy that will no doubt 
reinforce and underpin Egypt’s successful transition to the 21st century, regardless of 
who is leading the nation. Currently, the question is, Hosni Mubarak as a leader of 
Egypt for almost thirty years, Was he meet the requirements of the Muslim leader 
(ideal) in practice? In other words, should the Egyptian leader represent the Islamic 
leadership model adopted in the early Islamic State?117  
 
II. Islamic leadership’s accountability: a spiritual leadership paradigm 
 
Leadership has been an object studied by many scholars for centuries, and 
brings numerous theories forth in the concept of leadership. Leadership is a 
multidisciplinary field concerned with both ethics and morality. John K. Davis defined 
Leadership as: 
 
[T]he ability to persuade others to seek defined objectives enthusiastically. It 
is the human factor which binds a group together and motivates it toward 
goals. Management activities such as planning, organizing, decision making 
are dormant cocoons until the leader triggers the power of motivation in 
people and guides them toward their goals.118 
 
                                                            
116 ‘Arafa, supra note 7.  
117 The same query also applies to Nasser and Sādāt as leaders of Egypt from 1952 till 1981.  
118 See generally John K. Davis, Human Behavior at Work, (New Delhi 1967), 96.  
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 The above definition of leadership stresses that a leader is more than just a 
manager. Leading and managing are not the same thing. Warren Bennis in Fortune, 
a leadership and governance expert, précised the distinction between leadership and 
management as follows:   
 
The difference between managers and leaders is fundamental. The manager 
administers, the leader innovates…The manager maintains, the leader 
develops. The manager relies on systems, the leader relies on people. The 
manager counts on control, the leader counts on trust. The manager does 
things right, the leader does the right thing.119 
 
Accordingly, leadership in Islam is a trust. Often, it takes the form of an 
unequivocal contract or pledge between a Wali/Hakem/Imam (“Leader/Head of 
State”) and his al-mahkomeen (“followers/general public”) that he will try his/her best 
to guide them, to protect them and to treat them fairly and with justice.120 
Consequently, the focus of leadership in Islam is on integrity and justice.121 Given the 
recent emphasis on ethical behavior in the leadership literature,122 an examination of 
the moral bases of leadership from an Islamic perspective may provide some 
interesting insights for the field of leadership in general. In this part, we will examine 
what leadership is from an Islamic perspective, discuss the moral dimensions of 
leadership and uncover the characteristics of leaders and followers as suggested by 
Islamic law. Thus, it is very significant to understand the nature and process of 
leadership from an Islamic angle; describe the characteristics of effective leaders in 
general, and of Islamic leaders in particular; analyze leadership and followership 
styles; learn how you can mobilize, organize, and develop your followers Islamically; 
learn how you, as a leader, can build commitment by acting as a coach and mentor, 
and apprehend how to delegate effectively concerning the steps that will enable you 
to become a more effective leader (or follower). 
                                                            
119 W. WARNER BURKE, DALE G. LAKE AND JILL WAYMIRE PAINE, ORGANIZATION CHANGE: A 
COMPREHENSIVE READER (J-B Warren Bennis Series) (2008). 
120 See generally MUHAMMAD AL-BURAEY, ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT: AN ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE 
(1985). 
121 Id.  
122 See JAMES M. KOUZES, BARRY Z. POSNER AND TOM PETERS, THE LEADERSHIP CHALLENGE: HOW TO 
GET EXTRAORDINARY THINGS DONE IN ORGANIZATIONS (1995).  
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To begin with, Muslims base their behavior as leader and/or as follower upon 
the word of God as revealed in their holy book, the Qur’an.123 They believe that the 
Prophet of Islam, Muhammad (PBUH)124, has modeled the way for Muslim leaders 
and followers for all times.125 This belief is supported when God says the following 
about Muhammad (PBUH):  “And you stand an exalted standard of character.”126 
Muhammad’s (PBUH) example, then, is what both Muslim leaders and followers seek 
to emulate.127 According to him, leadership in Islam is not earmarked for small 
                                                            
123 Qur’an is the word of God which Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) relayed through revelations from 610 
A.D. until 632 A.D.  Starting with Al-Fatiha (“the first Surah/Surat, or chapter”) and ending with Al-Naas 
(the final “Surah”). The Qur’an, the holy book of Muslims, represents the first and the major source of 
Sharie‘a law in which the word of God was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) verbally 
through the Angel Gabriel over a period of 22 years (610-632 C.E.). It represents the primary source 
and constitution of Islamic law. Qur’an was memorized, recited, and written down by the Prophet’s 
Sahaba (“Companions”) after every revelation as dictated by the Prophet. It was not compiled in one 
text but during the reign of the first Caliph Aboū-Bakr. It is regarded as the culmination of a series of 
divine messages that began with the revelations of Adam, Suhuf of Ibrahim (“Scrolls of Abraham”), the 
Torah, the Zabur (“Book of Psalms”), and the Bible. In this respect, it should be noted that a great 
resemblance between Qur’an and the holy books of Judaism and Christianity exists. See AHMAD 
FARRAG HUSSIEN, AL-MADKL LE DERASSAT AL-SHARIE‘A AL-ISLAMIA: AL-KITAB AL-AWAL [AN INTRODUCTION 
TO THE STUDY OF ISLAMIC SHARIE‘A: BOOK I] (2006). See also RAMADAN ‘ALI AL-SHORONBASY, AL-MADKL 
LE DERASSAT AL-FIQH AL-ISLAMIA: AL-GOZE’E AL-AWAL [AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ISLAMIC 
JURISPRUDENCE: PART I] 5 (2003). [Both sources are in Arabic and I have them both in Egypt not here 
but I am sure about their accuracy and existence cited as this way in my upcoming article published by 
the 18 Golden Gate Annual Survey of International and Comparative Law 171, Spring 2012 and keeps 
them as I cited, and don’t remove, a copy of my article attached]. ABDULLAH YUSUF ALI., THE HOLY 
QUR’AN: TEXT, TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY (1989) [hereinafter THE QURA’N].[This is an Online 
English source and you just check it carefully online as it is available]. 
124 “PBUH” is an abbreviation which means “Peace and Blessing be Upon Him.”  
125 YOUSSEF KASSEM, MASADER AL-FIQH AL-ISLAMI [SOURCES OF ISLAMIC LAW] 65 (2000). (“Sunnah is 
the collective word for the mass of texts which tell of the Prophet’s spoken words, or are an account of 
acts or the absence of acts attributed to him. In other words, it is the oral or the habitual traditions—
practice, life style, and conduct of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)—(“Sunnat al-Nabi”) and represent the 
second fundamental source of Islamic law.”). These comprise the tradition, or more literally, the path of 
the Prophet (PBUH) which Muslims strives to follow. See MOHAMED N. ‘AWADIN, MASDER AL-FIQH AL-
ISLAMI [SOURCES OF ISLAMIC LAW] 37 (3rd ed. 2001). [Both sources are in Arabic and I have them both in 
Egypt not here but I am sure about their accuracy and existence cited as this way in my upcoming 
article published by the 18 Golden Gate Annual Survey of International and Comparative Law 171, 
Spring 2012 and keeps them as I cited, and don’t remove, a copy of my article attached].  
126 THE QUR’AN, 68:4.  
127 RAFIK ISSA BEEKUN AND JAMAL A. BADAWI, LEADERSHIP: AN ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE (1999). They stated 
that: 
An organization with good management, but poor leadership will preserve the status 
quo, but may not be able to advance to a higher level of performance. An organization 
that has an excellent leader, but nobody with good management skills may aspire to 
great heights, but crash precipitously because there is no one to follow through. In 
modern Islamic organizations, both leaders and managers are needed. Leaders can 
reframe experience to open new possibilities; managers can provide a sense of 
perspective and order so that the new possibilities become reality. 
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elite.128 Rather, depending upon the situation, every person is the “shepherd” of a 
flock, and occupies a position of leadership.129  
In most circumstances in life, Muslims are urged to appoint a leader and follow 
him. According to the Prophet, Muslims must appoint a leader during a trip, select a 
leader to lead the prayer, and choose a leader for other group activities.130 
Leadership, then, can be portrayed as a process by which the leader seeks the 
voluntary participation of followers in an effort to reach certain purposes.131 This 
designation recommends that leadership is essentially a process whereby the leader 
guides willing followers.132 At all times, a leader must remember that he cannot 
compel or enforce others to do things against their free will.133  
Though several studies and concepts have been conducted about it for years, 
may it be leadership roles, traits, and theories but do not say much about leadership 
in the Islamic approach.134 Islam—as a religion of peace—but often misjudged and 
misunderstood, has a very comprehensive concept of leadership that is concentrated 
on faith and values according to Allah (“God”).135  
Hence, the motivation of leadership in Islamic (“Sharie‘a) law is on doing good 
things based on the source of law of Islam.136 Leadership in Islam is amanah 
(“trust/honesty”).137 It represents a psychological contract between a leader and his 
followers that he will try his/her best to guide them, to protect them and to treat them 
fairly, equally, and with justice.138 According to Islamic law, the two primary roles of a 
leader are those of servant-leader and guardian-leader.139 First, the leader is the 
servant of his followers (“sayyid al-qawm khadimuhum”).140 He is to seek their 
welfare and guide them towards good, decent, and upright.141 The idea of a leader as 
                                                            
128 THE ISLAMIC GUIDANCE SOCIETY, LEADERSHIP & UNITY IN ISLAM (2002). 
129 SAHIH AL-BUKHARI, narrated by ‘ABDALLAH IBN ‘UMMAR, [hadith 3.733]. Muhammad is reported to 
have said: “Each of you is a guardian, and each of you will be asked about his subjects.”[Keep the 
citation as stated as I am pretty sure about it from the Islamic law perspective, just only you snippet 
online, as I am referring to the Sahih Al-Bukhari’s book and I am pretty sure about the reliability of the 
narrator and the numbers of the hadith as well].  
130 Beekun & Badawi, supra note 127. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 (“Let there be no compulsion in religion. […]”). THE QUR’AN, 2:256. 
134 Beekun & Badawi, supra note 127. 
135 Id. 




140 Id.  
141 E.P. HOLLANDER, LEADERSHIP DYNAMICS (1978). 
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a servant has been part of Islam since its beginning, and has only recently been 
developed by Robert Greenleaf: 
 
The servant-leader is servant first…It begins with the natural feeling that one 
wants to serve, to serve first. […] The best test, and the most difficult to 
administer, is: Do those served grow as persons?142 
 
The Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) has emphasized a second major role of the 
Muslim leader: to protect his community against tyranny and oppression, to 
encourage God-consciousness and taqwā, and to promote, equality, fairness, and 
justice.143 Whether as servant or as guardian, a Muslim leader may make use of 
certain bases of power to be effective.144 Islam recognizes existence of power, but 
suggests etiquette for its use.145  
On the other hand, power is “the ability to marshal the human, informational, 
and material resources to get something done.”146  Five foundations of power are 
usually revealed in the leadership Islamic literature; the Islamic perspective of 
leadership incorporates all five, but views them differently.147 
 
(1) Legitimate Power 
 
Legitimate power is associated with one’s position in the organization.148 
Generally speaking, Islam disheartens Muslims from actively pursuing positions of 
authority.149 Campaigning for a position of influence may imply that one is enamored 
with the position for one’s own progression (development) or some other self-serving 
reason.150 Muhammad (PBUH) is reported to have said:  
                                                            
142 Id. See also AFZALUR RAHMAN, MUHAMMAD AS A MILITARY LEADER (1990). 
143 A commander (of the Muslims) is a shield for them. […]. Omar Hassan Kasule, Sr. Leadership 
Module-General theme: Leadership, [Workshop 1] in MUSLIM LEADERS’ FORUM 98 HANDBOOK (1998),3. 
[Keep it as I cited as you made sure that it is already stated in a symposium and I cited as a 
symposium, just check the correct format but don’t remove the citation as we reach the same result for 
this citation and I am quite sure it’s available online somewhere, just double check, but no omit] 
144 Beekun & Badawi, supra note 127. 
145 Id.  
146 Morgan McCall, Jr., Power, Influence, and Authority: The Hazards of Carrying a Sword, TECHNICAL 
REPORT, (Greensboro, NC: Center for Creative Leadership, 1978), 10. 
147 See J.R.P. French and B. Raven, The Bases of Social Power, in DORWIN CARTWRIGHT (1959), 150-
167.  
148 Id.  
149 Beekun & Badawi, supra note 127. 
150 Id. The subject of leadership is crucial in Islam. In most circumstances in life, Muslims are urged to 
appoint a leader and follow him. For instance, the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) said, “When three are 
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Do not ask for a position of authority, for if you are granted this position as a 
result of your asking for it, you will be left alone (without God’s help to 
discharge the responsibilities involved in it), and if you are granted it without 
making any request for it, you will be helped (by God in the discharge of your 
duties).151 
 
An exception can be made to this restriction when a person sees a situation in 
which there is a potential crisis or disaster.152 Should he have the expertise required 
to help others in this circumstances, he may seek a specific position so as to provide 
assistance.153 
 
(2) Reward Power 
 
A leader who has position power may also control organizational and 
managerial rewards, including pay raises, desirable work assignments, or 
promotions.154 The same holds true for Islam. It is noteworthy in this regard that 
‘Ummar ibn al-Khattab (RA)155 used to pay state public officials high salaries.156 He 
wanted to guarantee that they would not get tempted by bribes, kickbacks or even 
under what referred to as the rashwa mukna‘h (“disguised bribery”).157 By treating his 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
on a journey, they should appoint one of them as their commander.” For example, the husband is the 
leader of his family. In the absence of her husband, the wife assumes the role of leader of the house. 
151 ABOŪ AL-HUSSEIN MUSLIM IBN AL-HAJJAJ IBN MUSLIM IBN WARAT AL-QUSHAYRI AL-NISABURI, [hadith 3. 
1013, [hereinafter SAHIH MUSLIM], available at http://cmje.org/.  
152 In this domain, see SAYYID, ABU A’LA MAUDOODI, THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT: DYNAMICS OF VALUES, 
POWER, AND CHANGE (Ed. by Khurram Murad, 1991). 
153 For example, Prophet Joseph asked for such a position when he requested the King of Egypt to be 
placed in charge of the granaries. A deed, accompanied by the right intention, is within the parameters 
of Islam. 
154 Beekun & Badawi, supra note 127. 
155 ‘Ummar Ibn Al-Khattab (RA) is the second Caliph in Islam. Abbreviated words of honor and 
salutations attached to the name of the four Caliphs of Islam following the death of Muhammad 
(PBUH). Thus, (RA) is the acronym of “May God be pleased with him.” 
156 MOUSTAFA ABOU ZIED FAHMI, FAN AL-HUKUM FI AL-ISLAM [PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNANCE IN ISLAM] 155-
166 (2003). See also ‘ABD ELGHANY BASSIOUNI ABDUALLAH, ’USUL ‘ILM AL-IDRA AL‘AMA: DERASAH LE 
’USUL WA MABADE’E ‘ILM AL-IDARA AL‘AMA FI AL-ISLAM WA AL-WALAYEAT AL-MOTAHEDA AL-AMRICIYA WA 
FRANSA WA MASER WA LEBENAN [PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: STUDY OF THE GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN ISLAM, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FRANCE, EGYPT, AND 
LEBANON] 84-101 (2006). [See also Rafik Issa Beekum & Jamal A. Badawi, Leadership: An Islamic 
Perspective, (1999). Feel free to rephrase in this section in case you find something similar to the 
language and cite the article as well. Already a lot of changes in the language had been changed and 
not similar to the original language or copied and pasted especially when we cite the article. I have a 
copy of these books and I am attaching the scanned first pages of it to make sure about it, keep them 
and don’t remove and will not be able to find them] 
157 Id. For further discussion on this point, see generally Mohamed ‘Arafa, Corruption and Bribery in 
Islamic Law: Are Islamic Ideals Being Met in Practice? 18 GOLDEN GATE ANNUAL SURV. INT’L & COMP. 
L. J. 171 (Spring 2012) (explaining the legal regulation of corruption and bribery in Islamic law, present 
a comprehensive Islamic legal description on corruption in so far as its definition, elements and types 
of crimes, causes, and remedies are concerned.). (“Concluding that like positive criminal laws, bribery 
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appointees equitably, ‘Ummar (RA) became one of the most outstanding Islamic 
leaders.158 
 
(3) Coercive Power 
 
Above and beyond, controlling organizational rewards, a leader in a position of 
authority also controls group and collective sanctions.159 Islam identifies the 
legitimacy of coercive supremacy, but proposes that it should not be used to coerce 
or force followers towards evil.160 In fact, the Prophet once said that: “obedience (to 
the leader) is required only in what is good.”161 Placing prominence on the role of the 
leader as servant, ‘Ummar (RA), was quoted as saying to the people: “I have 
appointed over you governors and agents not to beat your bodies or take your 
monies, but rather to teach you and serve you.”162 
 
(4) Expert Power 
 
Leaders who retain valuable expertise and information have expert power with 
respect to their followers who need this information to perform their task.163 As 
generally well-known, there is no priesthood and clergy in Islamic law.164  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
and corruption are taboo in Sharie‘a law because they are considered grave criminal offenses and a 
great sin. However, Muslim nations have been deficient in addressing the issue in their national laws 
and have failed to meet the lofty standards of Islam.”). [Article Attached, in print and available online 
on this citation, 18 Ann. Surv. Int’l & Comp. L. 171, and keep the whole footnote] 
158 ‘Ummar (RA) used to record the possessions of his officials at the times of their appointments and 
confiscated wholly or partly whatsoever they added while in office on suspicion of benefiting from their 
offices. Also, the Caliph instructed one of his commanders to adjust the values of gifts offered to him—
which he had dispatched to the bit al-mal (“central/public treasury”)—against the tax liability of the 
people, because taking anything more than the stipulated Jizya(h) (“poll tax”) would have been unjust. 
Furthermore, Caliph ‘Ummar Ibn ‘Abd Al-‘Aziz (RA) said that: 
I am of the view that the ruler should not trade. It is also not lawful for the officer to 
trade in the area of his office… because when he involves himself in trade he 
inadvertently misuses his office in his interest and to the detriment of others, even if 
he does not like to do so. 
Any doubts that remain for the believer after such contextual elaboration are to be resolved at the 
personal level through conscientious reflection (“Ijtihad”). See G.R., HAWTING, THE FIRST DYNASTY OF 
ISLAM: THE UMAYYAD CALIPHATE A.D. 661-750, at 77 (giving a detailed biography about ‘Ummar Ibn 
‘Abd Al-‘Aziz).  
159 See Edward W. Kostrzebsk, THE SHADOW OF MUHAMMAD: DEVELOPING A CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP 
MODEL FOR THE ISLAMIC WORLD (2002).  
160 Id.  
161 SAHIH AL-BUKHARI, [hadith 9.259/5.629]. 
162 Al-Buraey, supra note 120, at 248. 
163 For instance, in a prayer congregation, a person may be chosen to lead the prayers because of his 
knowledge and learning of Islam. 
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(5) Referent or Charismatic Power 
 
A person has charisma when others wish to follow him because they are 
attracted by his personality and temperament.165 Born leaders are usually 
charismatic.166 Ethical charismatic leaders, such as Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and 
all other Prophets (RA), use power for the benefit of mankind, learn from criticism, 
work to develop their followers into leaders, and rely on moral and honorable 
standards.167 A recent, very charismatic American Muslim leader was Malcolm X.168 
Many embraced Islam in the United States after listening to, or reading about him.169 
In this respect, Barboza said that: 
 
[Malcolm X’s] life showed me something eminently more useful than skilled 
oratory: what role religion could play as one approached this race-conscious 
society. He provided an example of how a man could use conviction as a 
powerful instrument to change the course of life--one’s own and others.170 
 
Given how Islamic law views leadership and authority, what will ensure that a 
Muslim leader behaves ethically? The moral bases of Islamic leadership are 
expected to provide the inner core that guides leaders.171 Leadership in Islamic law is 
entrenched in belief and willing submission to the Creator, God.172 It centers on 
serving Him. In the same vein, the Glorious Qur’an cited that: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
164 Kostrzebsk, supra note 159. 
165 ROBERT K. GREENLEAF, THE SERVANT AS LEADER, CENTER FOR SERVANT- LEADERSHIP, [Indianapolis, 
Indiana (1970)]. 
166 Id.  
167 Such as Moses, Jesus, Joseph (RA), and others.  At this point, see Louay Safi, Leadership and 
Subordination: An Islamic Perspective, 12 AMERICAN J. OF ISLAMIC & SOCIAL SCIENCES (Summer 1995), 
2204-223. 
168 Malcolm X (May 19, 1925—February 21, 1965), born Malcolm Little and also known as El-Hajj 
Malik El-Shabazz was an African-American Muslim minister and human rights activist. To his 
admirers, he was a courageous advocate for the rights of African Americans, a man who indicted 
white America in the harshest terms for its crimes against black Americans. Detractors accused him of 
preaching racism, black supremacy, anti-Semitism, and violence. He has been called one of the 
greatest and most influential African Americans in history. See ROBERT R. TERRILL, THE CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO MALCOLM X (2010); OBA T’SHAKA, THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF MALCOLM X (1983); EUGENE 
VICTOR WOLFENSTEIN); THE VICTIMS OF DEMOCRACY: MALCOLM X AND THE BLACK REVOLUTION (1989), 
and EDWARD RONALD LEADER, UNDERSTANDING MALCOLM X: THE CONTROVERSIAL CHANGES IN HIS 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1993). 
169 Id.  
170 STEVEN BARBOZA, AMERICAN JIHAD: ISLAM AFTER MALCOLM X (New York 1994), 16. 
171 Id.  
172 Id.  
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And We made them leaders guiding (men) by Our Command and We sent 
them inspiration to do good deeds, to establish regular prayers and to 
practice regular charity; and they constantly served Us (and Us only).173 
 
To serve God, a Muslim leader, as Head of State or any senior public official, 
such as prime-ministers, ministers, and governors, etc…is to act in accordance with 
the injunctions and commands of God and His Prophet (PBUH), and must develop a 
strong Islamic moral character.174 As a result, this moral character will be reflected by 
his increasingly strong belief in God as he/she progresses through four stages of 
spiritual development: iman, islam, taqwā, and ihsan.175 Each phase is discussed in 
terms of how it affects a Muslim leader’s conduct.  At the core of Islamic moral 
personality is iman or faith (belief) in God.176 Iman entails belief in the Oneness of 
God and the Prophethood of Muhammad (PBUH).177 A leader with a robust iman will 
consider himself and all his assets and possessions as belonging to God.178  “The 
leader will bow his ego, his ideas, his passions and his thinking to God.”179 Iman also 
implies belief in the life hereafter and in one’s ultimate accountability for one’s 
deeds.180 A leader with a firm, steady, and balanced iman will not dodge 
responsibility for his actions, and will continuously emphasize good deeds.181  
                                                            
173 THE QUR’AN, 21:73.  
174 ABOU-AL-ALA‘LAA AL- MOUDOODI, AL-HOKOUMAH AL-ISLAMIAH [THE ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT] (1977), 29. 
175 For further discussion on the stages of spiritual development in the Islamic state, see generally 
MAGED RAGHEB EL-HELW, AL-KANOUN AL-IDEARY [THE ISLAMIC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW] (1994). (Arabic 
source in Egypt and I am sure about its existence and that fitting the meaning of this textual sentence. 
So keep it and don’t remove it and I provided you before with the information you need regarding the 
publication date and place in one of our previous e-mails) 
176 MUJTABÁ MŪSAVĪ LĀRĪ, IMAMATE AND LEADERSHIP: LESSONS ON ISLAMIC DOCTRINE, translated by 
Hamid Algar (1996) [The book is available on Google books online, book four under the Foundation of 
Islamic Cultural Propagation in the World, 1996, check carefully]. 
177 See generally ROY MOTTAHEDEH, LOYALTY AND LEADERSHIP IN AN EARLY ISLAMIC SOCIETY (2001).  
178 Id. Accordingly, It is on this premise that Islam emphasizes the importance of good governance and 
states its element as follows: Good leadership is the first element of good governance. Islamic law, 
therefore, lays down certain outstanding qualities as basic prerequisites for a leader. If the fruits of 
governance must reach the masses in its bunches, a conscious Muslim should be made the leader, 
where this is not available, God-consciousness should be the priority of the selectors in picking who 
leads them. Another spectacular quality of a leader in Islam is justice, equity, and fair play combined. 
A leader is expected to be just and fair in his/herdealings. The concept of justice relating to the people 
is very much emphasized in many verses in the Holy Qur’an. God says:  
Ye who believe! Stand firmly for Allah as witnesses to fair dealings and let not hatred 
of others to you make you to swerve to wrong and depart from justice; Be just, that is 
next to piety, Then fear Allah for Allah is well acquainted with all that you do. THE 
QUR’AN, 5:8. 
179 Id.  
180 Id. Another quality of a leader is truthfulness. A leader is expected to be truthful in words and in 
actions. This reflects in his fulfilling his covenants with his creator and redeeming his/her promises and 
obligations to the people. 
181 To reinforce this idea, the Qur’an links iman with good deeds no less than 60 times. For example 
God says: (“And He is Allah (to be worshipped Alone) in the heavens and on the earth, He knows what 
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Although Muslims consider it desirable to appoint a leader with iman and faith, 
it may not always be possible to find such a person.182 An organization may have to 
choose between a strong Muslim with weak leadership skills or a strong leader with 
moderate/weak Islamic understanding.183 A leader with insufficient or inadequate 
expertise can bring disaster to an organization whereas a skilled leader may advance 
and help the same organization.184 Therefore, the criterion is even if the skilled leader 
were not a strong Muslim, his shortcomings can be made up through shoura or the 
consultative process of decision making.185 
Building upon iman, Islam is the second layer of the moral character of an 
Islamic leader and followers.186 Islam means the achievement of peace with God, 
within oneself and with the creation of God, through willing surrender and submission 
to Him.187 As Al-Moudoodi points out so well, “Iman is the seed and Islam is the 
fruition.”188 Because of his or her iman, a leader who practices Islam will never 
perceive himself as supreme.189  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
you conceal and what you reveal, and He knows what you earn (good or bad)”); (“He sends down the 
angels with inspiration of His Command to whom of His slaves He pleases (saying): "Warn mankind 
that La ilaha illa Ana (none has the right to be worshipped but I), so fear Me (by abstaining from sins 
and evil deeds)”),  and (“And he made it [i.e. La ilaha ill-Allah (none has the right to be worshipped but 
Allah Alone)] a Word lasting among his offspring (True Monotheism), that they may turn back (i.e. to 
repent to Allah or receive admonition)”).THE QUR’AN, 6:3, 16:2, and  43:23. 
182 See NACEUR JABNOUN, ISLAM AND MANAGEMENT (1994). 
183 Id. The example of ‘Amr ibn al‘aas is to be remembered in this sense. He had been a Muslim for 
only four months when he was appointed by the Prophet to a key leadership position. For further 
discussion on ‘Amr ibn al-‘aas’s governance in Islam, see IBN TAYMIYYA, ASSIYASAH AL-SHAR‘IYYA 
(1996). 
184 Fahmi & Bassiouni, supra note 156, at 51-56, 179-255.   
185 Id. The principle of Shoura constitutes one of the four essential principles in the Islamic perspective 
on socio-political organization. The other three are justice, equality, and human dignity. Shoura is also 
a central issue in the on-going debate among Muslims over political reform. Shoura principle in Islam 
is parallel to the democratic principle in Western political thought, having analogous aspects and about 
the same tendency or direction. It is predicated on three basic precepts. First, that all persons in any 
given society are equal in human and civil rights. Second, those public issues are best decided by 
majority view. And third, that the three other principles of justice, equality, and human dignity, which 
constitute Islam’s moral core, and from which all Islamic conceptions of human and civil rights derive, 
are best realized, in personal as well as public life, under Shoura governance. Shoura, as a principle, 
is rooted in the Qur’an itself. The Qur’an has presented Shoura as a principle, and not as a system of 
governance. The distinction is important to note, because the Qur’an thereby has left it to successive 
generations of Muslims to continue to strive toward a more perfect realization of the Shoura principle. 
God says: 
(“Those who hearken to their Lord, and establish regular prayer; who conducts their affairs by mutual 
consultation; who spends out of what We bestow on them for sustenance are praised.”). THE QUR’AN, 
42:38.  
186 Id.  
187 Id.  
188 MAUDOODI, supra note 152, at 115. 
189 A. BEHZADNIA AND S. DENNY, TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF: FROM IMAM ‘ALI TO MALIK-E-ASHTER 
(1981), 8.  In this regard, ‘Alī ibn Abī ālib (RA) (the fourth rightly guided Caliph) letter to Malik al-
Ashtar an-Nukai, the new Governor of Egypt, stresses this point in the following manner:  
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On the other hand, as an individual submits to God through Islam, he develops 
an awe and admiration of God.190 This all-encompassing, inner consciousness of his 
duty towards Him and this cognizance of his accountability towards Him is taqwā.191 
As demonstrated by Al-Moudoodi, “the essence of taqwā lies in an attitude of heart 
and mind rather than in an outward form.”192 When pervaded with taqwā, a person’s 
frame of mind—his thoughts, emotions, and inclinations—will reflect Islam within a 
better understanding to apply the notion of leadership’s responsibility in positive law 
based on the main principles of headship and management in Islamic law.193 Taqwā 
will restrain a Muslim leader or follower from behaving unjustly—whether to 
community members, to customers, to suppliers or to anybody else. 
  
God commands justice the doing of good and liberality to kith and kin and 
He forbids all shameful deeds and injustice and rebellion: He instructs you 
that you may receive admonition.194  
 
Furthermore, whereas taqwā is the fear of God and the feeling of God’s 
Presence, ihsan is the love of God.195 It should bear in mind, that this love of God 
inspires the individual Muslim to work towards attaining God’s Pleasure.196 The 
Prophet Muhammad (PHBU) describes ihsan as follows: “To worship God as if you 
see Him, and if you cannot achieve this state of devotion then you must consider that 
He is looking at you.”197   
The perpetual feeling that God is watching is likely to prompt any leader or 
follower with ihsan to behave at his/her best.198 The difference between the Muslims 
with taqwā and Muslims with ihsan is concisely explained by the following 
example.199 Among government workers, there may be some who perform their 
duties meticulously, but who do not establish any additional commitment. Other 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Malik, you must never forget that if you are a ruler over them, then the Caliph is a ruler 
over you, and God is the supreme Lord over the Caliph. 
190 Id.  
191 Id., at 116. 
192 Id., at 118. 
193 Fahmi & Bassiouni, supra note 156 [Both sources are Arabic and I have a copy of these books and 
I am attaching the scanned first pages of it to make sure about it, keep them and don’t remove and will 
not be able to find them. Also, I am sure about their accuracy and existence cited and keep them as I 
cited]. 
194 THE QUR’AN, 16:90. 
195 Fahmi, supra note 156. 
196 Id.  
197 Id.  
198 Jabnoun, supra note 182. 
199 SAHIH AL-BUKHARI, [hadith 1.47].  
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employees, however, push themselves beyond the call of duty; they are eager and 
energized, and willing to make sacrifices in the performance of their tasks. Within the 
context of Islamic law, the first category of officials is like believers who do what is 
sufficient and necessary; they are those that have taqwā.200 By contrast, the second 
group of servants has ihsan.201 These are the Muslim leaders and followers who will 
diligently carry the marvelous of Islam under the most difficult circumstances.202  
Based on the aforementioned debate of the four layers of Islamic moral 
character, leaders and followers may be classified depending on what stage they are 
at: Iman, Islam, Taqwā, and Ihsan. The Islamic moral character requires that leaders 
highlight the following five key parameters of Islamic behavior: justice and fairness, 
trust, righteousness, the struggle towards self-improvement, and promise keeping. 
With respect to fairness, justice is a dynamic characteristic203 which each 
Muslim must strive to develop whether he/she is a leader or a follower. This Qur’anic 
provision explains that: 
 
You who believe! Stand out firmly for God as witnesses to fair dealing and let 
not the hatred of others to you make you swerve to wrong and depart from 
justice. [...]204 
 
The need to achieve a balance and to take a middle road is quite imperative in 
a leader, and is stressed repeatedly by God in the Qur’an.205 The principle of justice 
and equality must be observed and pragmatic by all Muslims, leaders and followers 
alike.206 This is why the Prophet emphasized that justice must never be compromised 
by personal affiliations or other considerations.207 Additionally, the concept of trust 
stresses the idea of responsibility towards organizational stakeholders, and holds 
                                                            
200 Jabnoun, supra note 182. 
201 SAYYID ABUL A‘LA MAUDUDI, Political Theory of Islam, in KHURSHID AHMAD, (ed.), ISLAM: ITS MEANING 
AND MESSAGE (1999). See also CHARLES J. ADAMS, Mawdudi and the Islamic State, in JOHN L. 
ESPOSITO, (ed.), VOICES OF RESURGENT ISLAM (1983).  
202 Id.  
203 MUHAMMAD UMAR-UD-DIN, THE ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY OF AL-GHAZZALI (1991), 241. See also James 
Naify, Al-Ghazali, in THE PIMLICO HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY (Richard H. Popkin ed., 1999) 
(providing background information on this important Muslim scholar). 
204 THE QUR’AN, 5:8. 
205 God describes those “who will be rewarded with the highest place in heaven” as:  (“Those who, 
when they spend, are not extravagant and not niggardly, but hold a just (balance) between those two 
extremes; [...]”). THE QUR’AN, 25: 67-68. 
206 For instance, God admonishes Muslims thus: (“God does command you to render back your trusts 
to those to whom they are due; and when you judge between man and man that you judge with justice 
[…]”).THE QUR’AN, 4: 58. 
207 Fahmi, supra note 156. 
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true whether those entrusting something to Muslims are themselves non-Muslims.208 
As a core value, trust fits within the overall Islamic etiquette governing social 
relationships, as trust is explicitly linked to leadership in the Qur’an.209  
It should be noted that once an individual has accepted to be the leader of a 
group or organization, he has become their trustee.210 In a for-profit, Muslim 
organization, the management of the organization is entrusted with the shareholders’ 
investment, but in a non-profit organization, the management of the society is 
charged with watching over the properties in the trust.211 Subsequently, any 
managerial decision must be balanced regarding this trust.212 Should one be wasting 
time or organizational resources in performing one’s task, one is transgressing and 
contravening his/her employer’s trust.213 
Moreover, righteous behavior is described in the Qur’an as follows:  
 
                                                            
208 God says in the Holly Book of Muslims: (“O you that believe! Neither betrays not the trust of God 
and the apostle nor misappropriates knowingly things entrusted to you”.). THE QUR’AN, 2:177. 
209 In this regard, we refer to the story of Prophet Joseph (RA). After the king had indicated that he 
placed great trust in him, Prophet Joseph deliberately asked to be put in charge of the granaries and 
storehouses, and the demanding task of establishing them and guarding them. As one translator of 
the Qur’an, ‘Abdullah Yusuf Ali, points out, Prophet Joseph (RA) understood the need to build 
reserves better than anyone else, and was prepared to take on this task himself rather than throw on 
to another the burden of restricting supplies in times of plenty. See ‘ABDULLAH YUSUF ALI, THE QUR’AN: 
TEXT, TRANSLATION & COMMENTARY (English and Arabic Edition 1987) (Containing the full Arabic text of 
the Qur’an, an accompanying English translation, and extensive commentary), COMMENT 1716. (“This 
is a compilation of the Muslim faith’s Final Revelation from God to mankind through the last Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH). Also, the Qur’an has a wealth of information—both worldly wisdom and 
intellectual concepts—providing a code of life for humankind generally and Muslims in particular 
regarding the leadership elements and the ways of governance and management. Indeed, the 
Qur’an’s miracle lies in its ability to offer something to non-believers and everything to believers.”). 
210 See generally SYED MOHAMMAD ATHER AND FARID AHAMMAD SOBHANI, MANAGERIAL LEADERSHIP: AN 
ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE, 4 IIUC STUDIES (Dec. 2007/Apr. 2008) at 7-24.  
211 Id.  
212 Id. The concept of trust can be extended to other dimensions of one’s work as a leader or a 
follower. 
213 Id. According to the research conducted by ‘Adnan Aabed of Brigham Young University, He argued 
that: 
[I]n Islam, the two main roles of leadership based on the Sharie‘a are servant-leader 
role and guardian-leader role. In these roles, certain leadership principles and traits 
constitute the Islamic leadership principles: […] (2) Leaders have to provide direction 
(a vision) to their organization; (3) Leaders should communicate their vision to others 
in ways designed to generate strong commitment needed to serve as a support to 
achieve the desired goals; (4) Leaders have a major role in creating and maintaining 
the culture of the organization…(6) Leaders should provide space for, and even 
should invite constructive criticisms. Effective Islamic leaders should have some 
leadership qualities such as conviction, justice, sacrifice, eloquence, sound decision-
making, etc… [T]here are 25 characteristics necessary for leadership based on the 
ways and traditions of the Prophet and the Qur’an.  
For further details in this domain, see ADNAN AABED, A STUDY OF ISLAMIC LEADERSHIP THEORY AND 
PRACTICE IN K-12 ISLAMIC SCHOOLS IN MICHIGAN, DOCTORAL THESIS [unpublished] (Apr. 2006).  
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It […] is righteousness to believe in God and the Last Day and the Angels 
and the Books and the Messengers; to spend of your substance out of love 
for Him for your kin, for orphans, for the needy, for the wayfarer, for those 
who ask [...]; to be steadfast in prayer and practice regular charity; to fulfill 
the contracts which you have made; and to be firm and patient in pain (or 
suffering) and adversity.214 
 
These general features will now be linked to the attributes that Islamic leaders 
and followers should embrace.215 Based on the above verses, numerous moral 
attributes of righteous leaders become outstanding: (a) they act justly and do not 
allow their personal feelings to hinder or delay justice and impartiality; (b) they have 
iman; (c) they take care of those in need, especially in the general public and do so 
for the love of God;216 (d) they are steadfast in prayer and practice charity; (e) they 
observe all contracts, and (f) they are patient no matter what type of adversity they 
may be experiencing.217  Over-all, then, organization participants of all faiths are 
eligible to be treated with basic human decency, dignity, and with the maximum of fair 
play and justice.218 
In the same vein, struggle within oneself towards self-improvement is depicted 
very accurately by the Qur’an.219 The Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) stressed the 
importance of this inner striving to improve oneself. God’s Messenger said: 
 
The believers in the world are in three classes: those who believe in God 
and His Messenger and do not doubt, but strive with their property and their 
persons in God’s cause; the man whom people trust with their property and 
their persons; and the man who, when he is about to display greed, 
abandons it for the sake of God, Who is Great and Glorious.220 
 
The dimension of inner struggle permeates the very progression from iman to 
ihsan, and continues thereafter.221  Leaders and followers practicing this principle are 
constantly monitoring checking, and evaluating their intentions, actions, purposes, 
                                                            
214 THE QUR’AN, 2:177. 
215 Aabed, supra note 213. (“In an Islamic organization, a leader is expected to be sensitive to their 
needs.”). 
216 See SYED MOHAMMAD ATHER, Islamic Management: An Introduction and Its Contrasts to Traditional 
Management, 1 IIUC BUS. REV. (July 2006).  
217 Id. See also ENAYET ULLAH PATWARY, Leadership in Islamic Perspective: Executive Views, 2 INT’L 
ISLAMIC CHITTAGONG UNIV. (2003). 
218 See generally SAEED M. MOHTSHAM, Vision and Visionary Leadership: An Islamic Perspective, 3 
INT’L. BUS. REV. 2 (June 2007) at 248-277. 
219 THE QUR’AN, 22:77-78. 
220 ABOŪ SA‘ID AL-KHUDRI, [3854], transmitted by AHMAD. (“This principle encapsulates the process of 
inner struggle towards self-betterment.”). 
221 Aabed, supra note 213. 
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and acting to improve themselves accordingly.222 They work hard at practicing what 
they say, and encourage others in this struggle for self-improvement.223 Last but 
certanily not least, all Muslims—whether leaders or followers—are urged to keep 
their promises.224 They also cannot make promises that are not Islamic in nature.225 
God says that: “O you who believe! Fulfill (all) obligations.”226 Keeping one’s word 
characterizes a Muslim as breaking or violating one’s word is equivalent to 
hypocrisy.227 Keeping promises is a key technique for all, and a leader is not 
exempted from this important norm.228 The Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) recited: 
 
I bought something from the Prophet (PBUH) before he received his 
Prophetic commission, and as there was something still due to him I 
promised him that I would bring it to him at his place, but I forgot. When I 
remembered three days later, I went to that place and found him there. He 
said: […] I have been here for three days waiting for you.229  
 
Now that we have discussed the ultimate cores—the backbone—of Islamic 
leadership, we need to explore what normative attributes are required of Muslim 







223 JOHN P. KOTTER, WHAT LEADERS REALLY DO, HARV. BUS. REV. (May/June 1990), at 103-111, 150-
157. (discussing the distinction between “Management” and “Leadership” and how to create a culture 
of leadership).  
224 Aabed, supra note 213. 
225 MUHAMMAD ANISUZZAMAN and MD. ZAINUL ABEDIN MAJUMDER, Leadership: Western and Islamic: A 
Conceptual and an Explorative Study (1996). 
226 THE QUR’AN, 5:1. 
227 Anisuzzaman & Majumder, supra note 225. 
228 Id. In other words, important characteristics of Islamic leadership, which are also applicable for the 
managerial 
leaders in an organization are: (a) Allegiance: The Islamic managerial leader is bound in allegiance to 
God; (b) Global Islamic Goals: The leader perceives the goals of an organization not only in term of 
the interests of the group, but also in terms of wider Islamic objectives; (c) Adherence to Sharie‘a and 
Islamic Manners: The leader must adhere to Islamic injunctions. He can only continue his office as 
long as he observes the principles of Sharie‘a. His behavior must conform to Islamic manners, and (d) 
Delegated Trust: Islamic leadership is a position with divine trust. He must enjoy this trust with highest 
degree of responsibility. See supra text. 
229 ABOŪ DĀWŪD SULAYMAN IBN ASH`ATH AZDI SIJISTANi, translated in Univ. So. Calif., Center for 
Muslim-Jewish Engagement, available online at http://cmje.org/. [hereinafter SUNAN ABOŪ DĀWŪD]. 
“Sunan” in WINALIM. USA: ISL SOFTWARE CORPORATION, (Release 4, 1996). [The source is on the 
mentioned link under Abou Dawud, check it carefully, keep the citation and don’t remove it as I am 
sure about the scholar from the Islamic law perspective, as he narrated what I said in the text] 
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• Legal Qualifications of the Leader in Islamic (Sharie‘a) Law  
 
With no doubt, the features of an Islamic leader affect his/her behavior, and 
are congruent with the characteristics of effective leaders identified by Kouzes and 
Posner.230 In fact, there are top four characteristics identified by these scholars to the 
Islamic model. 
 
a) Honesty: Leaders are considered honest and authentic to the extent that 
there is “consistency between word and deed.”231 They do what they say 
they are going to do. In the Qur’an, the Prophet Moses is himself labeled 
as “strong and trustworthy” by one of the damsels232 and the Prophet 
Joseph is described as one who is truthful.233 By the same token, the 
Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) used to be called Sadiq (“the truthful”) and 
Amin (“the trustworthy”) during his young age.234 Then, the inquiry is, why 
is honesty and integrity so important with respect to Heads of States 
(leaders)? Even though Kouzes and Posner do not provide the reader with 
an answer, Islam does.235 Leadership is more than an as an assignment or 
a job; it is a trust—as already pointed out previously. 
 
b) Competence:  Societies are more likely to follow a leader’s directives if 
they trust and believe that this person knows what he or she is doing.236 If 
followers doubt the capabilities and proficiencies of their leader, they will 
be less enthusiastic in accepting directions from him/her.237 As suggested 
by Hollander, a leader who is competent in one situation may not be 
competent in another.238  Except in matters where he had received a direct 
                                                            
230 See generally James M. Kouzes and Barry Z. Posner, The Leadership Challenge: How To Get 
Extraordinary Things Done In Organizations, (2nd ed. with Jossey Bass, 1995).  
231 Id.  
232 THE QUR’AN, 28:26. 
233 Id., at 12:46. 
234 Kouzes & Posner, supra note 230.  
235 Id. 
236 Id.  
237 Id.  
238 Hollander, supra note 141.  
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revelation from God, the Prophet would often seek and follow the advice of 
his Sahaba (“companions”).239  
 
c) Inspiration:  Followers expect their leaders to remain positive about the 
future no matter how bad the situation may be.240 The leader must never 
give up or lose hope.241 An example of how a leader inspires his followers 
comes from Aboū-Bakr (RA).242  
 
 
d) Patience:  In the Qur’an, God explicitly identifies patience as one of 
defining physical characteristics of Islamic leadership, the Qur’anic 
provision reads:  
 
And We appointed from among them Leaders giving guidance under Our 
command so long as they persevered with patience and continued to have 
faith in Our Signs.243  
 
Indeed, like all other believers, a leader can expect to be tested, and he will 
need to endure.244  
 
a) Humility:  A Muslim leader is to be humble, and must never let his ego get 
the better of him. The second Caliph ‘Ummar, lived in a simple house.245  
He had no bodyguards for his personal security, and walked the streets of 
Madinah without any escort or guides.246 Furthermore, the fourth—rightly 
guided—Caliph of Islam, ‘Alī ibn Abī ālib (RA), in his letter to Malik Al-
‘Ashtar an-Nukhai, strongly encourages him to remain humble in his new 
                                                            
239 As Rahman indicates, “This enabled all his men to take part in discussion and offer suggestions 
and in this way the best solution was found by mutual consultation.” Rahman, supra note 142.  
240 Id.  
241 Id.  
242 After the death of the Prophet, Muslims were in shock. ‘Ummar (RA) was especially distraught. 
Aboū-Bakr—as the first Caliph of Islam—calmed him down, and then delivered the following address:  
People, if you have been worshipping Muhammad, then know that Muhammad is 
dead. But if you have been worshipping God, then know that God is living and never 
dies. 
See MUHAMMAD HUSAYN HAYKAL, THE LIFE OF MUHAMMAD (PBUH), (1976), 506-507. 
243 THE QUR’AN, 32:24. 
244 The example of the Prophet and early converts to Islam during the boycott of the Muslims in 
Makkah illustrates the need for patience. 
245 Haykal, supra note 242.  
246 IRFAN FAQIH, GLIMPSES OF ISLAMIC HISTORY (1988), 96, 107. 
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position as Governor of Egypt, and explains to him why pride, superiority, 
and egotism are to be avoided.247 At this point, the Prophet Muhammad 
(PBUH) recited that,  
 
Never say to yourself, ‘I am their Lord, their ruler […], and I must be obeyed 
submissively and humbly.’ Such a thought will unbalance your mind, will 
make you vain and arrogant, will weaken your faith in religion and will make 
you seek the support of any power other than God’s […].248 
 
The following story demonstrates how the Prophet exhibited patience and 
humility when a ban was imposed on the Muslims by others: 
 
When we complained to God’s Messenger (PBUH) of hunger and raised our 
clothes to show we were each carrying a stone over the belly, God’s 
Messenger (PBUH) raised his clothes and showed that he had two stones on 
his belly.249 
 
b) The willingness to seek consultation:  Additionally, Sharie‘a law stresses 
consultation in all affairs.250 Through the Qur’anic phrase “amruhum 
shoura baynahum” and the Prophet’s habit of seeking and accepting 
advice, the limits on the exercise of power have been set both by the 
Qur’an and the Prophet’s teachings.251 One scholar points out, shoura 
plays a critical role in administration and management, specifically within 
the decision-making process; it provides a restraint on leader’s 
administrative power and authority.252 
 
In this domain, it is noteworthy that follower physiognomies also embody a 
vital ingredient in the leadership process.253 Just as in the case of their leader, the 
                                                            
247 Id.  
248 See generally ALI A. BEHZADNIA AND SALWA DENNY, TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF: FROM IMAM ALI TO 
MALIK-E-ASHTER (1981), 8. [Keep the citation and don’t remove it as it is an old book and may be not 
available online, except you may find the title online, but I think there is a copy it in Egypt’s library as I 
saw it before. If you find another source, supporting the idea stated in the text, feel free to do so] 
249 See ‛ĪSÁ MUAMMAD IBN ‛ĪSÁ IBN SAWRAH IBN MŪSÁ IBN AL-AĀK AL-SULAMĪ AL-TIRMIDH=scholar’s 
name [JAMIA‘A AL-TIRMIDHI/ SUNAN AL-TIRMIDHI=the book]. [Keep the citation and don’t remove it as I 
am sure about the scholar and his work and you will not find the work online or even in the US 
libraries, and available in Egypt libraries from the Islamic law perspective] 
250 Faqih, supra note 246. 
251 THE QUR’AN, 42:38 supra note 185. 
252 Al-Buraey, supra note 120. 
253 Id. 
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characters of Muslim followers affect their behavior.254 At first glance, these 
characteristics correspond to those of their leaders except for the additional features 
of obedience to the leader and dynamic followership.255 At all times, the leader must 
be obeyed.256 God’s messenger saying, “Hearing and obeying are the duty of a 
Muslim, both regarding what he likes and what he dislikes.”257 According to general 
principles of Islamic law in that area, after a leader has been duly elected, he may “be 
considered to have received a pledge of allegiance from the community.”258 
Consequently, both the majority who voted in favor of him as well as the minority who 
may have voted against now owes obedience, loyalty, and allegiance.259 Sharie‘a law 
considers obedience to the leader so dynamic that it views any kind of 
insubordination to be abhorrent unless in very specific circumstances.260  Regarding 
the dynamic followership, though Islamic law emphasizes that followers should 
comply with the directives and orders of their leader, it does not condone blind 
subservience.261  
 
• The urgency towards an Islamic leadership paradigm  
 
As Islamic law and jurisprudence as well is unique in assuring the right of 
personal security, Al-Imam Al-Ghazali established what are known today as the “Five 
Essentials,” which have become the objective criteria for scholars to determine 
whether an idea or solution promotes the public interest.262 Accordingly, Islam 
assurances five essential things (“makasid al-sharie‘a al-islamia/al-daruriat al-
khams”) to all individuals and forbids unwarranted violation of them by the state.263 
                                                            
254 Id.   
255 Id. 
256 Reported by IBN ‘UMMAR. [This scholar is the narrator of the Hadith and keep the citation like that 
and don’t remove it as I am sure about the reliability of the narrator.] 
257 Rahman, supra note 142, at 75. 
258 Al-Buraey, supra note 120.  
259 Id.  
260 Id.  
261 On one occasion, ‘Ummar was suggesting the quantity of dowry to be fixed at the time of a 
marriage ceremony. What he said was not in accordance with Islamic principles. A lady immediately 
stood up and said, “O ‘Ummar, fear God.” Hearing her sound argument based on the Qur’an, ‘Ummar 
realized his mistake and said, “The lady is right and the leader of the Muslims (himself) is wrong.” 
From that, we realize how ‘Ummar’s behavior illustrates clearly that followers in Islam are not to be 
passive bystanders should the leader err. See generally MOHAMMAD SHIBLI NU‘MANI, OMAR THE GREAT: 
THE SECOND CALIPH OF ISLAM (Vols. 1 & 2) translated by ZAFAR ALI KHAN (1957) cited in AL-BURAEY.   
262 See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1982), 56. 
263 Id. 
 
Revista Contraponto | vol. 1 n. 1 | jan./jul. 2014                                                                                  223 
 
These essentials are (1) protecting religion, (2) protecting lives, (3) protecting 
lineage, (4) protecting posterity and intellect, and (5) protecting property.264 
Furthermore, Islamic law presents the organizational framework for a community by 
maintaining the legal relationships among persons and protecting the interests of one 
person from being attacked by another.265 It also protects individual peace and 
security when an individual is accused of a crime by defining the linkage between the 
individual and the state.266  From the Islamic criminal law perspective, any Head of 
State or leader should be subject to the most important fundamental  principles laid 
down in Sharie‘a which are: 
 
(i) the principle of individual “uniform” criminal accountability;267 
(ii) the principle of the relationship of crime and punishment (the principle of 
legality of crimes and punishments);268  
                                                            
264 Id., at 57. 
265 Id.  
266 Id., at 58. 
267 ‘Arafa, supra note 157. This principle is considered one of the most important foundations of 
personal security in Islam. It means that the actor himself is the only person who can be accused of a 
specific offense, and no one shall escape impunity regardless of blood ties or friendship to the victim 
(or to the judge or ruler). A person, who has participated in a forbidden act, whether as principal or 
accomplice, must be incriminated according to the rules of criminal accountability.  The Qur’an 
repeatedly sets forth the principle of individual liability in the following verse: (“And that man hath only 
that for which he maketh effort…”). THE QUR’AN, 53:39.   
268 Id. Under this principle, there shall be no offence, no punishment except by virtue of law; thus, no 
act may be considered a breach of law if it has not been explicitly anticipated in a penal law in force at 
the time the act was committed. This principle applies to all offences, although not in a regular 
manner. Therefore, the scope of its application differs depending on whether crimes of Hudud, Quesas 
and Diyya, or Ta‘azir are in question. (a) Quesas means “Equality” or “Equivalence.” It implies that a 
person who has committed a given violation will be punished in the same way and by the same means 
that he used in harming another person. Quesas crimes are divided into two categories: The first is 
“Homicide” (intentional and unintentional), for which the sanctions are diverse. The second is “Battery”, 
which includes infliction of intentional and unintentional bodily harm which result in permanent and 
serious injury to the person. It includes maiming, beating, wounding, and other forms of physical 
disfigurement. These criminal acts are defined both in the Qur’an and Sunnah and establish two sorts 
of sanctions: retaliation (Principle of “Talion”) and Diyya (“Legal Compensation”); (b) the legality 
principle is realized strictly in this type of offense. Hudud (the plural of Had) are offenses sanctioned by 
fixed legal penalties. Hudud crimes are those that bring injury and harm to the essential interests of an 
Islamic community. There are seven such crimes: Theft (“al-sariqah”), Fornication (“al-Zena”), Slander 
and Defamation (“al-qazf wa al-tashir”), Brigandage (“al-baghi”), Drinking Wine (“shorb al-khamr”), 
Apostasy (“al-ridda”), and Rebellion against the Legitimate Authority (“al-haraba”). Under the principle 
of legality, the judge at least has minimal discretion in the imposition of the fixed penalties. Islamic 
criminal law creates these sanctions to safeguard the institutions of the society, guarantee a free and 
honorable life, and remove the root of crime in general; and (c) Ta‘azir is the third group of crimes in 
Islam which encompasses all offenses for which the Sharie‘a does not prescribe a punishment like 
corruption and bribery. Penalties of these crimes emerge from the discretionary power delegated to 
the Qadi (“judge”). Literally, Ta‘azir means discipline, rehabilitation or discretionary correction. Ta‘azir 
offenses are not subject to the legality principle in the same manner as Hudud and Quesas crimes. All 
acts which infringe private or community interests of the public social order are falls into the Ta‘azir 
category. The available penalties include traditional physical punishments, some of which are applied 
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(iii) the principle of non-retroactivity of the criminal laws;269   
(iv) the principle of al-mousawaah (“equality”) and the non-existence of 
immunities;270 and 
(v)  the principle of the presumption of innocence and the rights guaranteed to 
the accused during the indictment and the criminal trial.271 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
under Ta‘azir such as the death penalty, which is rarely imposed, and flagellation. Deprivation of 
liberty is another sanction. Under Ta‘azir, Islamic law imposed this kind of punishment through 
imprisonment or the less restrictive manners of local banishment, displacement, or expulsion. 
Moreover, it is accepted by Muslim jurists that fines as compensation and reparation for injury under 
Ta‘azir be pecuniary. Further, there is the area of social control, where the judge’s intervention is 
essential and his discretionary power is manifest. This is obvious in certain penalties which fall outside 
the scope of purely penal law and relate more to the moral and educational theories of penology. 
There are several punishments designed to instill morality, such as exhortation by the judge to do 
good and avoid evil deeds, blame (reproach), and dismissal from employment for abuses of 
confidences. Id.  
269 Id. Because it is essential to protect individual security and abstain the abuse of power, individuals 
cannot be accused of crimes for acts which were allowed when they were committed. Thus, Islamic 
law has realized the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal laws as one of the most essential 
foundations of its criminal justice system. In essence, this rule means that criminal laws have only 
prospective and not retroactive effect.  
270 Id. The equality of all people as a universal principle in Sharie‘a prevents discretionary power 
concerning Hudud and Quesas penalties, since these are determined by the Qur’an. Therefore, most 
jurists agree within the equality concept, the Had punishment can be imposed even on the “Imam” 
(“The Head of State”). Islamic jurists point out that the ruler is bound in the criminalization and 
penalization of such acts to Islamic values and the public interest taking into account changing 
conditions and times in order to adjust—within the equality of punishment—the form and severity of 
punishment to the seriousness of the crime and the degree of guilt. Ta‘azir offences were not codified 
at the beginning of the Islamic state in order to give the judge the flexibility to respond to the 
subsequent circumstances through the instrumentality of the criminal law. For that reason, special 
emphasis was placed on the qualification of judges to whom so much discretion was given. In this 
regard, one scholar stated that: (“Ta‘azir resembles the doctrine of analogy which was relied upon at 
one time in Soviet and Socialist law.”). In any event, appeal to the ruler could always redress the 
injustice. Bassiouni, supra note 262, at 228-232. 
271 The principle of the presumption of innocence and its impact on the burden of persuasion 
represents the fundamental backbone of Islamic criminal evidence. Consequently, the burden of proof 
is on the public prosecution. In this domain, the Islamic scholars interpret this norm by saying that the 
status of the accused is that of one who is in fact innocent, or that his condition is that of collateral 
innocence. Moreover, it is essential that the rule be strictly discharged, since the law recognizes that 
without this presumption the accused faces the onerous if not impossible burden of proving he did not 
commit the crime. It is also significant that the post-conviction legislation prescribes the means for 
attacking the sentences and gaining a new trial in certain types of cases. Newly discovered evidence 
proving innocence after conviction results in vacating a conviction. Thus, it is far preferable as a 
safeguard to presume the accused to be innocent from the time he is accused of the criminal act until 
he is convicted, based on what the Prophet recorded in this sense: “No Had in case of doubt.” See 
Bassiouni, supra note 262, at 66-67. These rules embody the presumption of innocence and place the 
burden of proof on the accuser. In Islamic jurisprudence, evidence in criminal matters essentially 
consists of al-Shhada (“testimony”). The majority of Muslim jurists restrict proof to the testimony of 
witnesses. In addition to testimony there are al-iqrarat (“confessions”). Also, evidence takes the form 
of evidentiary al-Qara’in (“presumptions”). In Islamic criminal procedure, all crimes including financial 
crimes, as corruption and bribery, must be proved by these modes of evidence. ‘Arafa, supra note 157 
(discussing the requirements of each mode of Islamic criminal evidence).  
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Furthermore, the principles which regulate evidence and standards of proof in 
any legal system reflect the intellectual achievement and cultural values of its 
society.272 Hence, the Islamic criminal evidence rules seek to balance and harmonize 
the rights of the accused with the rights of the community.273  
Observing the three objectives of punishment (justice, general deterrence, and 
rehabilitation or retribution) under Sharie‘a, Islamic law retains the traditional 
penalties of deprivation of liberty and pecuniary sanctions in addition to other 
punishments which are designed to instill morality.274 According to the Islamic 
criminal law, the success of criminal and penal policies in any society is measured by 
the degree to which they harmonize these goals.275 Thus, reformation of the criminal 
must be considered during the punishment stage to the degree it is compatible with 
the actual punishment imposed.276 As regards to the investigation and primary-
questioning phase of the criminal act, it is subject to the general rules for indictments 
in Islamic criminal procedures, taking into consideration the rights of the accused 
regarding searches, seizures, eavesdropping, interrogation, and pre-trial preventive 
detention.277  Furthermore, the rights of the accused during a criminal trial include the 
adoption of legal evidence, the trial before a competent, fair, and impartial trial, the 
right to counsel his/her own defense, the right to speak or remain silent, and the 
indemnity of an erroneous conviction.278 
All in all, leadership is very important. Islamic law also pays very high attention 
to it. In fact, it is even included as the prevalent part of the objectives and obligations 
that are to be actualized by religion.279 Where its function is as a replacement for the 
prophetic role in maintaining this dine and regulates the world.280 At this point, 
                                                            
272 Bassiouni, supra note 262.  
273 Bassiouni, supra note 262, at 122-237. 
274 Id., at 231. (“Since crime is deemed to be a challenge to the prevailing values of society and a 
violation of the victim’s rights, it must seek justice for the victims of the crimes. This is not to imply that 
the penalty is nothing more than thoughtless impulse of revenge. Rather the search for justice entails 
a measured response which serves as an index of social values and progress. Satisfaction for the 
victim and his family is a necessary part of that search, which in turn plays a significant role in the 
process of social control.”). (“On the other hand, the deterrent function of punishment serves as a 
warning to the public not to commit crimes, to prevent them from imitating the criminal lest they suffer 
his fate, and to guarantee the safety of those who refrain from crime. Public deterrence is not achieved 
merely by defining the crime and prescribing the sanction. It depends essentially on the speed with 
which the accused is tried and punished.”). 
275 ‘Arafa, supra note 157. 
276 Id.  
277 Bassiouni, supra note 262, at 92-100.  
278  Id., at 102-107. 
279 Al-Buraey, supra note 120. 
280 Id.  
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Muslims must appoint a leader or an imam who regulates them with the 
Kitab/Shar‘Allah (“Islamic Sharie‘a”).281 Indeed, many Sharie‘a obligations cannot be 
realized without the existence of an Islamic rule, such as the establishment of hudud 
(“serious punishments”) and implementing the Islamic law, guarding the border, 
preparing and sending troops, maintaining the security, appointing of judges and 
others.282 Generally, any obligation cannot be fulfilled except with its existence, it thus 
becomes binding, especially in terms of its urgency to prevent serious threat that 
occurs among the chaos and the non-establishment of the Islamic rule, thus, the 
demand to actualize an Islamic leadership becomes very mandatory.283 The 
actualization of it becomes the most urgent requirement of the Sharie‘a. Due to that, 
there is no excuse to abandon and underestimate this obligation.284 
The query remains open, Is Mubarak subject or fit to all of these legal 
criterions in Islamic law with respect to the headship which lead—with no doubt—to 
his criminal liability? And, if yes, is there is any difference to initiate a criminal motion 
(verdict) against him emphasizes this liability in the domestic positive law (Egyptian 
law); and to what extent? The answer of this question will be provided in the following 
article.  
 
III. The Mubarak criminal trial in the Egyptian law: a historical  trial of the 
century 
 
This is not a case about the killing of one or 10 or 20 civilians, but a case of an 
entire nation.  Raised the idea of liability without fault or responsibility, known as the 
great doctrinal debate material, and different views and trends in legislation, is there 
no mental element of crimes, so ask the perpetrator of the act only? Or is this a 
necessary element in all the crimes so as not to imagine the criminal offense without 
him? 
In this respect, it should be noted that Egypt has already begun to make 
strides and progress in the movement towards democracy, as shown by the event on 
                                                            
281 In this respect, God says: (“Indeed, Allah commands you to render trusts to whom they are due.”). 
THE QUR’AN, 4:58. The context of this verse is that, the khitab (“percipient”) is broad and general in 
nature, which requires leaders to perform a variety of amanah (“trust”) and (“honesty”), which includes 
the amanah of legislating. The Muslims are obliged to carry out this trust as a duty and give it to those 
experts who will establish it correctly. 
282 Al-Buraey, supra note 120. 
283 Id. 
284 Id.  
 
Revista Contraponto | vol. 1 n. 1 | jan./jul. 2014                                                                                  227 
 
August 3rd, 2011, when the unthinkable happened.285 “The deposed pharaoh who 
had ruled Egypt with an iron fist for thirty years was wheeled into a courtroom and 
placed in the defendant’s cage.”286 
Hosni Mubarak appeared in “a normal criminal court, namely the Fifth Felonies 
Circuit of the Cairo Court of Appeals.”287 The court was presided over by a civilian 
natural judge, Chief Justice Ahmad Refa‘at, which ensures, or at least gives a prima 
facie showing, that the former President will enjoy basic due process guarantees.288  
 
1. Hosni, ‘Alaa, Gamal Mubarak, Hussein Salem, and Habib Al-‘Adly Criminal 
Charges 
 
1.1 Hosni Mubarak and his two sons 
 
The Egyptian Public Prosecution charged former Egyptian President Hosni 
Mubarak with three criminal offenses.289 In addition to the allegation of premeditated 
murder and its attempt against demonstrators during the uprising against his reign, 
Mubarak stands accused of two separate cases of financial corruption.290 The first 
corruption charge concerns a 161,000-square-foot seaside mansion in the Sinai 
resort of Sharm al-Sheikh which Mubarak obtained as a kickback from his closest 
friend, the businessman tycoon Hussein Salem.291 Mubarak obtained the mansion 
after he exploited his influence to facilitate Salem’s purchase of a large tract of prime 
land in the Sinai Peninsula at a deeply discounted price, formally as part of a 
                                                            
285 ‘Arafa, supra note 7. See also EGYPT COURT TO DELIVER MUBARAK TRIAL VERDICT ON 2 JUNE, BBC 
News, Feb. 2012, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17120915. (last visited 
May 23, 2012). 
286 Id. All criminal defendants have the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. Holding 
criminal defendants in a courtroom cage undermines the presumption of innocence as it portrays them 
as dangerous criminals. This practice, however, is typical in Egyptian criminal courtrooms. 
287 Id.  
288 Id. (“Egypt is to be credited for following this typical criminal trial procedure, “especially when 
compared to other revolutionary settings where Heads of State were deposed and summarily tried and 
executed, as was the case in Czrist Russia, Iraq after the 1958 coup d’état, and Romania after the fall 
of Nicolae Ceausescu in 1989.””). 
289 Id.  
290 Id.  
291 Id. See also BASSEM ABO ALABASS, FUGITIVE TYCOON HUSSEIN SALEM TALKS MUBARAK, ISRAEL GAS 
DEAL IN FIRST TV INTERVIEW SPEAKING FROM MADRID (May 2012), available at 
http://www.english.ahram.org.eg/.../Fugitive-tycoon-Hussein-Salem-talks-Mubarak.  (last retrieved May 
23, 2012). (“Salem denies charges of corruption and profiteering that in March saw him sentenced to 
15 years in prison by a Cairo Criminal Court.”). See infra. 
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privatization deal.292 Salem also provided the former president’s two sons with 
another five luxury villas worth EGP 14 million ($2.4 million).293 The two sons, ‘Alaa 
and Gamal, are charged with profiteering by abusing their father’s power in receiving 
these five villas as part of the same bribe.294 
The second corruption charge concerns a separate deal for the sale of natural 
gas to Israel.295 This deal has been the subject of rumors and suspicions in Egypt for 
years and caused widespread anger and ire among Egyptians because gas was 
exported to Israel at very low prices while Egypt suffered a natural gas shortage.296 In 
this count, criminal prosecutors charged Mubarak with having sold national gas from 
the Egyptian government to the East Mediterranean Gas Company, in which Salem 
owned a large stake, at below market rates.297 The East Mediterranean Gas 
Corporation may have then resold the gas to Israel at a substantial mark-up, thus 
enriching Salem at the public’s expense, although the prosecutors’ statement is 
unclear, vague, and imprecise on those details.298  It is obvious that Salem made 
enormous profits out of the deal, which resulted in $714 million in lost revenue for 
                                                            
292 See MUBARAK TO BE CHARGED FOR CORRUPTION, PROTESTER DEATHS, CNN WORLD (May 2011). See 
also MUBARAK AND SONS CHARGED WITH CORRUPTION, DEATHS OF PROTESTERS; (May 2011), and HOSNI 
MUBARAK, THE N.Y. TIMES, (Updated: Jan. 5, 2012) (“For close to 30 years, Hosni Mubarak was the 
man Egyptians called their modern pharaoh, though usually in a cautious whisper.”). 
293 Id. See PAUL OWEN and JACK SHENKER, MUBARAK TRIAL—THE DEFENDANTS AND THE CHARGES 
(“Hosni Mubarak has gone on trial charged with corruption and the unlawful killing of protesters...The 
trial has begun of Hosni Mubarak, former President of Egypt, after the start of an uprising that 
overthrew his government and sent shockwaves throughout the Middle East.”). Further details of the 
charges against the former Egyptian President and his co-defendants available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk. › News › World News › Hosni Mubarak. (Aug. 2011). 
294 Id. See also Extending the Detention of Gamal and ‘Alaa Mubarak, AL-YOUM 7 (Apr. 26, 2011), 
http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=399195. (last visited May 23, 2012). 
295 DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK, EGYPT CANCELS THE DELIVERY OF GAS TO ISRAEL, THE N.Y. TIMES, (April 
2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/.../egypt-cancels-delivery-of-natural-gas-to-israel. (“Egypt’s 
state-owned natural gas company said that it was ending a deal to ship gas to Israel because of a 
payment dispute. Israeli officials responded by warning that the termination cast a new shadow over 
the bilateral Peace Treaty of 1979.”). 
296 DINA AL-SHIBEEB, MUBARAK ASSOCIATES DETAINED OVER GAS DEAL WITH ISRAEL, AL-ARABIYA NEWS 
(Apr. 2011), available at http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/04/24/146505.html. (“Egypt’s former 
energy minister Sameh Fahmy and six other officials will stand trial on charges related to a natural gas 
deal with Israel.”).  
297 See MUBARAK SONS GOT MILLIONS FROM ISRAEL GAS DEAL: REPORT, AL-ARABIYA NEWS (Mar. 2011), 
available at http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/03/07/140510.html.  (last retrieved May 23, 2012). 
298 RANA MAMDOUH, EGYPTIAN GAS TO ISRAEL: PLUGGING THE LEAK, AL-AKHBAR ENGLISH (Apr. 2012), 
available at http://www.english.al-akhbar.com/.../egyptian-gas-israel-plugging. (“The provision of 
underpriced natural gas to Israel under the Mubarak government has long been fuel for public anger, 
but critics predict that the current powers will not be willing to permanently sever the old deals.”). (last 
visited May 23, 2012). 
 
Revista Contraponto | vol. 1 n. 1 | jan./jul. 2014                                                                                  229 
 
Egypt.299 As more media attention was focused on the gas deal and Salem’s role, he 
sold his stake in the East Mediterranean Gas Enterprise, thereby earning $2 billion in 
profit.300 The charges brought by prosecutors did not address the former President’s 
interest in the gas exportation deal, focusing instead on his role in helping the unjust 
enrichment of Salem through exercising his influence.301 
Mubarak and his sons plead not guilty to the charges against them.302 In this 
context, the former President found guilty, and face life sentence imprisonment.303 
‘Alaa and Gamal Mubarak get acquittal because of statute of limitations time period 
has been lapsed.304 
 
1.2 Hussein Salem   
 
Hussein Salem is a notorious business magnate known for his close ties to 
Mubarak. He has been described in Egyptian mainstream media as “one of the most 
secretive businessmen in Egypt.”305 Salem fled Egypt with his son and daughter on 
                                                            
299 Id. For further discussion on the Egyptian-Israeli Natural Gas Agreement, see generally Daniel 
Fink, Turning Off the Egyptian Gas Spigot: Implications for Israel, IAGS JOURNAL OF ENERGY SECURITY 
(May 2011). 
300 Fink, supra note 299. 
301 DAVID D. KIRCKPATRICK, EGYPT IS MOVING TO TRY MUBARAK IN FATAL PROTESTS, THE N.Y. TIMES (May 
2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/25/world/middleeast/25egypt.html. (last retrieved 
May 23, 2012). 
302 Many scholars have noted other concerns regarding the charges against Mubarak, such as the 
current charges are only a fraction of the corruption charges attributable to Mubarak and his family. In 
particular, his sons, ‘Alaa and Gamal, were known to have extensive business interests that were 
rumored to have been wholly dependent on the power and influence of their father. Another point of 
concern is the evidence the prosecution has against Mubarak, which may be insufficient to hold 
Mubarak criminally accountable for the killing of demonstrators and could result in Mubarak being 
found guilty of only criminal negligence. Further, many think Mubarak should face charges for the 
numerous human rights violations his security forces committed:  thousands of political detainees who 
were held incommunicado for many years, the systematic torture of political opposition, and systemic 
police brutality that Egyptians regularly experienced. Furthermore, several scholars think Mubarak 
should be liable for the political corruption as well. The political corruption during his reign in Egypt, 
which began in 1981 when he took office of the Republic, took many forms, including preparing the 
way for his son Gamal to inherit power from him, and stifling political dissent. ‘Arafa, supra note 7, at 
37. [Keep the footnote and the explanation I offered as it is my own words and I cited my article which 
elaborates in more details about these crimes before. A copy of my article attached  and available 
online too]  
303 JACK SHENKER, MUBARAK TRIAL: TOPPLED DICTATOR DENIES ALL CHARGES, THE GUARDIAN, available 
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/03/mubarak-trial-dictator-denies-charges.  (“One of the 
most significant concerns over the nature of Mubarak’s corruption charges is the limitation on the 
charges; the charges only concern the profiteering through facilitating the unjust enrichment of his 
close friend, business tycoon Hussein Salem.”). For further elaboration, see in details section (5) 
regarding the verdict analysis from the criminal legal perspective.   
304   Owen & Shekner, supra note 293. For further illustration on the verdict, see infra. 
305 Hussein Salem is an Egyptian-Spanish businessman, co-owner of the East Mediterranean Gas 
Company (“EMG”), and ally and advisor to former President Hosni Mubarak. He is also the chairman 
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February 3rd, 2011 at the height of the Egyptian revolution, a week before Hosni 
Mubarak was forced to resign.306 Salem was arrested in a wealthy Madrid suburb in 
June 2011 over charges of money laundering brought against him by Spanish 
authorities.307 The money is said to have been attained in Egypt through illegitimate 
means and sent to Salem’s family accounts in Spain.308 He was arrested after the 
International Criminal Police (“Interpol”) issued an international arrest red-warrant 
against him.309 He is wanted in Egypt and Spain for various charges of corruption and 
money laundering.310 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
and CEO of HKS Group, a hospitality company that operates Maritim Jolie Ville Resort in Sharm al-
Sheikh. He has been described as “one of the most secretive businessmen in Egypt”, a mogul, and 
Mubarak’s close confidant. He fled Egypt during the Egyptian revolution. A criminal warrant for his 
arrest was issued by the (“Interpol”) in May, 2011. See Matt Bradley, Mubarak Associate is Arrested in 
Spain, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, MIDDLE EAST NEWS, June 16, 2011. He was later arrested at his 
home in La Moraleja; Madrid, Spain on June 14. Salem is currently being innocent from the charges 
that he bribed Mubarak and his family to gain a monopoly on the sale of gas to Israel and for 
squandering public funds by selling Egyptian natural gas to Israel at below market prices. Id. Salem’s 
trial in Egypt began on August 3, 2011. See generally YEHIA KAREM, HUSSEIN SALEM: A BUSINESSMAN 
FROM THE TIME OF CRONY CAPITALISM, AL-AHRAM WKLY, (June 2011). [I am referring to the whole article 
on this point] 
306 Id. 
307 Around $47 million of his possessions were frozen and houses worth $14 million were seized, 
including some in the jet-set resort of Marbella. See generally Raheel Zafar, Spain Will Extradite 
Egyptian Businessman Hussein Salem Associate of Hosni Mubarak, THE LAHORE TIMES, Mar. 2, 2012, 
available at http://www.lhrtimes.com/2012/03/02/spain-will-extradite-egyptian-businessman-hussein-
salem-associate-of-hosni-mubarak/#ixzz267IDPrhh.  
308 ESLAM OMAR, BUSINESS TYCOON HUSSEIN SALEM JOINS FROZEN ASSETS LIST, AHRAM ONLINE (Mar. 
2011). (“The General Prosecutor has decided to freeze the assets of Egyptian businessman Hussein 
Salem, children, and his relatives on suspicion of corruption.”). [Keep the source and the citation on 
this point fit what I want to say in an indirect way, don’t remove it as we already make sure about the 
verification of it. Also you can refer to Bradley, supra note 305 to support the textual illustration more] 
309 As a result of the public diplomacy delegation efforts, it is noteworthy in that domain, the Spanish 
Foreign Affairs stated the Spanish Cabinet had decided in its meetings to hand over Hussein Salem—
seeking his extradition—to the Egyptian authorities. Spanish charges of money laundering, fraud, 
bribery, and corruption are related to the use of money Salem is accused of obtaining illegally in 
Egypt. See SPAIN TO EXTRADITE EGYPTIAN TYCOON HUSSEIN SALEM TO FACE JAIL SENTENCE, AHRAM 
ONLINE, (Mar. 2012). (“Spain has agreed to extradite Hussein Salem, a business tycoon and Mubarak 
top ally who escaped a corruption trial in Egypt and now faces 15 years in jail.”), available at  
http://www.english.ahram.org.eg/.../Spain-to-extradite-Egyptian-tycoon-Hussein-. [Keep the source 
and the citation on this point as it fit what I want to say, don’t remove it as we already make sure about 
the verification of it. Also you can refer to Bradley, supra note 305 to support the textual illustration 
more]  
310 His son and daughter, who were arrested in Spain summer of 2011, are also accused of laundering 
some two billion Euros. Recently, The Spanish Supreme Court has approved the extradition of 
Egyptian businessman Salem, his son Khaled and daughter Magda to Egypt. It confirmed a verdict 
issued by another Spanish court to extradite Salem and his children for their retrial over charges of 
money laundering, seizing state lands, and exporting natural gas to Israel at low prices. See EGYPT 
STATE INFORMATION SERVICE,  EGYPT: SPANISH COURT UPHOLDS RULING TO EXTRADITE SALEM, CHILDREN 
TO COUNTRY, EGYPT, EUROPE AND AFRICA, EXTERNAL RELATIONS, LEGAL AFFAIRS, NORTH AFRICA, May 
12, 2012 
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 Salem faces charges in four various cases in Egypt.311 He was being tried in 
absentia in the same trial as Mubarak and his sons ‘Alaa and Gamal in what is known 
as the “trial of the century.”312  Salem is also being prosecuted in absentia along with 
former Minister of Petroleum, Sameh Fahmy, for the above mentioned purchase of 
Egyptian natural gas at low market-prices, and sale to Israel at a substantive 
markup.313 Furthermore, the Cairo Criminal Court sentenced Salem, his son and 
daughter in absentia to seven years in prison and a fine of $4 billion on charges of 
money laundering and profiteering, as the court found Salem guilty of laundering 
more than $2 billion in the Egyptian-Israeli gas deal.314 In a fourth case, a Giza 
Criminal Court sentenced Salem to 15 years in prison for the illegal acquisition of 
public property—the nature reserve al-Bayadeyya in the Upper Egypt city of Luxor.315 
Mr. Salem was the owner of the Crocodile Tourism Project Company which acquired 
the island.316 His son Khaled, who was the managing director of the company, 
received the same criminal sentence.317 
                                                            
311 ‘Arafa, supra note 7, at 12-15 & 37.  
312 See Hussein Salem Sentenced to Jail in absentia, THE DAILYNEWS EGYPT.COM, REUTERS, Oct.12, 
2011. [Keep the source and the citation on this point as it fit what I want to say, don’t remove it as we 
already make sure about the verification of it]  
313 TAMIM ELYAN, TOP EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS INVOLVED IN FACILITATING ISRAEL GAS DEAL, SAY LEAKED 
DOCUMENTS, DAILY NEWS EGYPT, (June 27, 2011). See also MOHAMED FADEL FAHMY, EGYPT GAS DEAL 
SPARKS ATTACKS IN EGYPT, CNNWORLD (May 2011). Trying a defendant in absentia can undermine 
some of the defendant’s fundamental rights to a fair and impartial trial, including the right to be 
present, to be defended by counsel of the person’s choice, and to examine witnesses. International 
law disfavors but does not abstain trials in absentia. National legal systems that maintain the practice 
should, at minimum, institute and guarantee procedural safeguards to ensure the defendant’s basic 
rights. These include requirements that the defendant be notified in advance of the proceedings and 
that the defendant unequivocally and explicitly waive his right to be present. The defendant should 
also have the right to representation in his or her absence, and should be able to obtain a fresh 
determination on the merits of the conviction following the person’s return to the jurisdiction. 
314 Elyan, supra note 313.   
315 See SPAIN TO EXTRADITE EGYPTIAN TYCOON HUSSEIN SALEM TO FACE JAIL SENTENCE, AL-AHRAM, 
available at http://www.english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/35865/Egypt/Politics-/Spain-to-
extradite-Egyptian-tycoon-Hussein-Salem-t.aspx. (last visited May 25, 2012). 
316 Id.[=Same source stated in FN 315 and fit my pointin an indirect way, keep it and don’t remove it. 
Also you can refer to Karem, supra note 305 to support the textual illustration more]   
317 FORMER MINISTERS SENTENCED TO 10 YEARS IN CORRUPTION CASE, AL-MASRY AL-YOUM, available at 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/690026. (“Although Mr. Salem also holds Spanish citizenship, 
Spain informed the Egyptian ambassador in Madrid of a Spanish court’s decision to extradite Hussein 
Salem, his son Khaled and his daughter Magda to Egypt on the condition that they do not face the 
death penalty―a standard condition made by all European Union (“EU”) countries in extradition 
decisions. Salem and his children have appealed the decision allowing their extradition, and a final 
decision is expected soon. The charges do not involve Salem’s previous embezzlement in 1983 of 
U.S. aid funds for Egypt. In addition, the charges do not address the questionable concession that he 
obtained from Egypt to export Sinai Gas to Israel.”). See RANIA BADAWY INTERVIEWS PROFESSOR M. 
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, AL-MASRY AL-YOUM (in Arabic), available at 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/506644.  (last retrieved May 25, 2012). [This article is Arabic 
only and keep the information and the citation as well, you just can refer to the article as it is available 
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1.3 Habib Al-‘Adly and his six high-ranking security officers 
 
Standing on criminal trial along with Ex-President Mubarak and his sons, his 
notorious Minister of Interior, Habib al-‘Adly, faced charges of profiteering and money 
laundering before a Cairo criminal court.318 He convicted with the same life 
imprisonment punishment along with Mubarak as they failed to stop the killing by 
using live ammunition on pro-democracy protesters during the revolution in January 
2011.319 Furthermore, he is accused of causing a security vacuum by withdrawing 
police during the uprising and releasing prisoners to induce chaos.320 He also should 
face charges related to torturing and murdering members of the opposition.321  
On the other hand, the security personnel were accused of killing or trying to 
kill at least 68 protesters on January 28, 2011 in what is known as the “Friday 
Anger.”322 Plaintiffs’ attorneys requested a cross re-examination of the evidence and 
demanded the forensic medicine office in Cairo examine those injured and submit 
reports on their conditions.323 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
in Arabic and as we arlredy make sure that the article is online in Arabic, and this is an unofficial 
translation using my own wordings] 
318 His assets were ordered frozen by a court order. He is estimated to have amassed a fortune of 
$1.2 billion. He pleaded not guilty to corruption charges on March 5, 2011, answering questions by the 
judge on whether he had illegally profited from his government position or laundered money. The 
charges read by the prosecutor revolved around a piece of land controlled by the Ministry of Interior. 
Prosecutors said the former Minister of Interior had sold the piece of land to a private contractor 
working for the ministry. Prosecutors also found money in al-‘Adly’s bank account that the government 
said did not belong there. These charges involved a total of about $1.6 million. On May 5, 2011, al-
‘Adly was found guilty of money laundering and profiteering, and was sentenced to 12 years in jail. 
Furthermore, the court sentenced him to seven years in prison for profiteering and five years for 
money laundering. The former minister was also fined approximately EGP 15 million ($2.5 million), 
and the court ordered the confiscation of his assets. See Egypt Ex-Minister Habib Al-Adly Jailed for 12 
Years, BBC NEWS AFR. (May 5, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13292322. [The 
information is proper. Keep the source and the citation on this point as it fit what I want to say, don’t 
remove it as we just make sure about the verification of it and also I am sure about the explanation in 
the footnote as it is my own words and I supported with the citation] 
319 See, e.g., Daniel Finnan, Cairo Court Orders Former Interior Minister Adly’s Assets Seized, RFI, 
available at http://www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20110217-cairo-court-orders-former-interior-minister-adlys-
assets-be-seized.  
320 See Trial of Habib Al-Adly Postponed Again, EGYPT INDEPENDENT (Apr. 2011), 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/trial-habib-al-adly-postponed-again. (last visited May 25, 
2012). 
321 Id.  
322See generally Yasmine Saleh and Sherine El Madany, Protests Against Egyptian President Spread, 
REUTERS, Jan. 27, 2011, (“Web activists called for mass protests across Egypt on Friday to end 
President Hosni Mubarak’s three-decade rule after protesters clashed with security forces late into the 
night in the eastern city of Suez.”) 
323 Ahmad Ramzy headed Central Security Forces (“CSF”) during the 18-day uprising, during which an 
estimated 846 protesters were killed and thousands were wounded. Videos show Central Security 
trucks running over protesters, particularly on Qasr al-Nil Bridge, which leads to the square. Contrary 
to accusations, Ramzy gave instructions that firearms should not be used in dealing with 
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Court Rejects Mubarak Amnesty Referendum: It should bear in mind that an 
Egyptian court has rejected a lawsuit seeking a referendum on whether to give 
amnesty to former President Hosni Mubarak and his family.324 The lawsuit had 
sought the referendum in exchange for Mubarak and his family members 
surrendering their money.325 The majlis al-Dawla (“Conseil d’Etat / State Council’s”) 
Administrative Court said “no provision in the abrogated constitution—replaced by the 
temporal constitutional declaration—or law allows a referendum to pardon a previous 
president and there had been no prior administrative ruling doing so.”326 
 
• Is Mubarak’s Trial Going Anywhere? 
 
Chief Justice Ahmad Fahmy Refa‘at’s327 decision to grant former President 
Hosni Mubarak’s legal team a month to prepare its final remarks ended speculation 
that a ruling against the Ex- President was imminent.328 Some believed the ruling 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
demonstrators, according to his lawyer. Ramzy was also responsible for ordering the withdrawal of the 
CSF. “Whoever killed peaceful protesters is not part of the police forces, and identifying those 
responsible is not the task of the defense but of the prosecution. The prosecution has indicted the 
defendants in a generalized manner and without evidence. Also, the prosecution did not mention how 
the defendants instigated police officers to kill demonstrators and from where they got these orders. 
There is no evidence to prove that Ramzy is guilty of murder or attempted murder, and described 
alleged orders to kill demonstrators as “an illusion.” He added that no Interior Ministry official issued 
such orders and no eyewitness testified to that effect. See Lawyer of Former Security Chief Demands 
Acquittal Due to “Ambiguous” Charges, EGYPT INDEPENDENT (Feb. 2012), 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/.../lawyer-former-security-chief-deman. [Keep the source and the 
citation on this point as it support what I want to say on this point regarding the acquittal of the police 
officers in in direct way, don’t remove it as we already make sure about the verification of it and the 
information is all proper using my own wordings in the explanation] 
324 The lawsuit, filed against the military council and the cabinet, said Mubarak’s wife, Suzanne, was 
pardoned after giving up her money. See Court Rejects Mubarak Amnesty Referendum, Giving up her 
Money, WORLD NEWS (Feb. 2012), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World.../02/.../UPI-
30221330533671/. (last retrieved May 25, 2012).   
325 Id.  
326 Id.  
327 In this regard, Al-Ahram Newspaper wrote: (This is only in Arabic, and the BBC link, just to support 
what I found in the Arabic version, so Keep the source and the citation on this point as it fit what I want 
to say, don’t remove it as we already make sure about the verification of it) 
For the final case of his career, has no easy task: to deliver justice in the trial of the 
first Arab head of state to appear in court since popular uprisings swept the Middle 
East…Ahmad Refa‘at, the respected, quiet judge, could have never imagined he 
would be the first Egyptian in history to try an Egyptian pharaoh.  
See HOSNI MUBARAK TRIAL: JUDGE HALTS LIVE TV COVERAGE, BBC NEWS (Retrieved Dec. 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14524363. (last visited May 27, 2012). (“The judge at 
the trial of the former Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak, has adjourned it for three weeks and said 
hearings will no longer be televised based on the grounds of keeping public interests, order, and 
security stable.”). 
328 See Mubarak Trial: Egyptian Army ‘Responsible for Deaths’, BBC NEWS MIDDLE EAST, (Jan. 2012), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16619949. (last retrieved May 27, 2012). (“Hosni 
Mubarak’s lawyer has said the Egyptian army was in charge of security when protesters were killed 
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would be issued before January 25 in order to counter plans for demonstrations on 
the anniversary of the start of the revolution.329 This most recent unexpected turn in 
the trial left many wondering whether the evidence presented by the prosecution and 
the civil rights attorneys is enough to lead to a ruling against Mubarak.330 While some 
lawyers are concerned that the case against the former President is weak, other legal 
experts are confident that Mubarak will be convicted.331 
 
• The legal status quo analysis 
 
(1) Criminal investigations  
 
The Egyptian government adopted a number of legal measures to investigate 
the criminal charges against Mubarak and his family.332 The General Prosecutor Dr. 
‘Abdelmagied Mahmmoud banned Mubarak and his family from traveling outside the 
Egyptian territory.333 Furthermore, he prohibited them from having access to their 
personal bank accounts in Egypt and abroad.334 In this domain, the government 
created a Judicial Commission (“JC”) to inspect and investigate the real property 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
during the uprising that led to his overthrow. Farid al-Deeb said the former President had imposed a 
curfew on the afternoon of 28 January and transferred responsibility to the Head of the Army. 
329 See Mohamed Fadel Fahmy, Egyptians Pack Tahrir Square for Revelry, Protests a Year After 
Historic Revolt, CNN, Jan. 26, 2012, (updated 10:45 AM EST). 
330Tom Pfeiffer, Mubarak Trial Set to Resume after Appeal Rejected, REUTERS (Dec. 2011), 
http://www.reuters.com/.../us-egypt-mubarak-idUSTRE7B60TR20111207. (last visited May 28, 2012).  
(“An Egyptian court turned down an appeal for a new judge in the trial of former President Hosni 
Mubarak, the official news agency MENA, signaling the trial can resume…The court has concluded 
with the result that the request to reject justice Ahmad Refa‘at is not valid and has no legal basis. Also, 
the court argued that justice Refa‘at has a reputation of working by the book and following procedures. 
He has been praised for his independence and judicial reputation by the media.”). [Keep the source 
and the citation on this point as it fit what I want to say and not in a direct words as it is my own 
explanation and supported by the source I cited, don’t remove it as we already make sure about the 
verification of it] 
331 See Mubarak is Still Egypt’s President and Cannot be Convicted, Attorney Tells Court, THE 
ASSOCIATED PRESS,  (Jan.22, 2012) (“Hosni Mubarak on trial for his complicity in killing of protesters, 
corruption, may face death penalty if convicted”), http://www.haaretz.com/.../mubarak-is-still-egypt-s-
president-and-cannot-b. [Keep the source and the citation on this point as it fit what I want to say and 
not in a direct words as it is my own explanation and supported by the source I cited, don’t remove it 
as we already make sure about the verification of it] 
332 See BANNING MUBARAK AND HIS FAMILY FROM TRAVELING ABROAD, AL-JAZEERA, available at 
http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/FBE0E235-3D4D-43FE-85B8-27F1CCBC9722htm.   (last 
retrieved May 28, 2012). [This article is Arabic only and keep the information and the citation as well, 
you just can refer to the article as it is available in Arabic] 
333 Id. [This article is Arabic only and keep the citation] 
334 Id. [This article is Arabic only and keep the citation]  
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owned by Mubarak and his family in Egypt and foreign countries as well.335 According 
to news accounts, the Attorney General requested that the Egyptian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs work through diplomatic channels in conjunction with the Commission 
to inquire about the controversial wealth of Mubarak’s family and all family accounts 
in foreign banks.336 Moreover, the Committee is cooperating with the Ministries of 
Justice in the European Union (“EU”) countries and the Department of Justice in the 
United States to track any money-laundering operations and hard currency 
smuggling outside Egypt and requesting the mutual legal assistance in case of final 
verdict.337 Additionally, the government established a fact-finding mission to 
investigate who authorized police forces to use live ammunition against peaceful 
protestors.338 The mission is investigating whether Mubarak, as the Supreme 
Commander of the Armed Forces, used his powers to order the killing of 
demonstrators.339 Mubarak denies that allegation, claiming that the former Minister of 
Interior made that decision without Mubarak’s authorization/permission.340  
On the other hand, another initiative has been adopted by the government in 
the investigation process. The Justice Ministry assigned what is known as the “Illicit 
Gains Authority” to subpoena (“summons”) Mubarak and his sons for interrogation.341 
                                                            
335 ‘Arafa, supra note 7, at 32 [FN 134]. (“Officials from the Egyptian Ministry of Justice, judges, and 
law professors comprise this committee.”). 
336 See AHMED RAJAB, EGYPT WILL INVESTIGATE MUBARAK’S WEALTH (Apr. 2011), available at 
http://www.yallafinance.com/2011/04/.../egypt-will-investigate-mubaraks-wealth/  (last visited May 28, 
2012). 
337 Commission to Retrieve Egypt’s Money Abroad Discussing the Procedures Necessary to Freeze 
the Foreign Accounts of Mubarak and 18 Former Officials, AL-MASRY AL-YOUM (May 2011), 
http://www.almasry-alyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=296301&IssueID=2131.  (last retrieved May 
28, 2012). [It is an Arabic version of an Independent Egyptian Newspaper, and there is on English 
version of it, so keep the citation and don’t remove it, if you want to refer to it as an Arabic document, 
feel free to do so] 
338 This mission consists of human rights activists and magistrate judges. As a result of these 
shootings, over 800 people were killed and thousands were wounded. [It is my own wordings, no need 
to cite]  
339 The Fact-Finding Commission: Mubarak is Responsible for the Killing of Protestors Whether By 
Contributing to the Crime or By Being Silent, AL-SHROUK (Apr. 2011), 
http://www.shorouknews.com/contentdata.aspx?id=435944. 
 (last visited May 28, 2012). [It is an Arabic version of an Independent Egyptian Newspaper website 
link and the link opened in Arabic and not copied, and there is on English version of it, so keep the 
citation and don’t remove it, if you want to refer to it as an Arabic document, feel free to do so] 
340 Id.  
341 The Illicit Gains Authority Orders Mubarak To Disclose His Secret Bank Accounts, AL-YOUM 7 (Feb. 
28, 2011), http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=360387. The Illegal Profiting Apparatus (“IPA”) 
was established by Law No. 11 of 1968 under the authority of the Ministry of Justice to investigate 
suspected illegal income. Public officials are required to disclose their assets and those of their 
spouses and children upon taking office. The IPA receives reports concerning corruption from the 
general public and from private and public employees. The system periodically traces any increase in 
the wealth of public officials or their spouses and minor children. See Business Anti-Corruption Portal: 
 
Revista Contraponto | vol. 1 n. 1 | jan./jul. 2014                                                                                  236 
 
The authority is headed by a Chief Justice and investigates the reports sent from the 
Administrative Control Authority (“ACA”)—a financial monitoring apparatus—342and 
the Public Funds Prosecution (“PFP”)—a judicial body specializing in financial 
crimes—on claims of embezzlement of public funds, including cash and gold.343   
 
(2) A death penalty sentence: was it a possible choice? 
 
As generally well-known, Mubarak and his two sons were charged with two 
types of criminal offenses: first, corruption crimes, which include the embezzlement of 
public funds and illegitimately acquired wealth; and second, the killing of 
demonstrators.344 Article 18 of Law No. 62/1975 on “Combating of Illicit Gain” 
stipulates that “every individual who gained, for himself or for someone else, illicit 
revenue should be punished by imprisonment.”345 The same provision calls for the 
designated authorities to confiscate the revenue that the convict gained through illicit 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Egypt Country Profile, Public Anti-Corruption Initiatives, available at http://www.business-anti-
corruption.com/index.php?id649. (last retrieved May 28, 2012). 
342 The Administrative Control Authority (“ACA”), governed by Law No. 54 of 1964 and its 
amendments, is in charge of investigating the reasons behind work and production incompetence, 
including revealing the defects of the administrative, technical, and financial systems that obstruct the 
orderly processing of operations in public entities, proposing means to prevent corruption, and 
monitoring the implementation of laws, decisions, and regulations. This agency is Egypt’s anti-
corruption watchdog. It is also tasked with exposing administrative and financial violations, and 
criminal offenses committed by employees during the performance of their duties, including abuse of 
authority. Generally, it has a legal mandate to detect public sector corruption, and has arrest powers. 
‘Arafa, supra note 7, 31.   
343 Id.  
344 Owen & Shekner, supra note 293. 
345 See LAW NO. 62 OF 1975 [COMBATING OF ILLICIT GAIN], Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, July 31, 1975, at art. 
18 (Egypt), http://www.mohamoon.com/montada/default.aspx?action=Display&ID=108457&. With 
respect to financial crimes and corruption, the Egyptian Supreme Court (“Court of Cassation”)—the 
highest judicial body in the Egyptian court system—ruled in a landmark 2004 decision that: 
[T]he burden of proof shifts from the accused to the prosecutor in crimes related to 
illicit gains. Also, the court said in its ruling that Article 2 of Law No. 62 of 1975 
contradicts article 67[13] of the [Abrogated] Egyptian Constitution stating that all 
citizens are innocent until proven guilty before a court of law.  
Case No.30342-2004, Apr. 28, 2004, The Egyptian Court of Cassation (Supreme Court). If this legal 
tenet is applied to Mubarak’s case, he does not have to prove himself and his family innocent. On the 
contrary, the General Prosecutor and the Illicit Gain Authority would be obligated by law to prove the 
involvement of Mubarak and his family in all the illicit gains crimes. ABROGATED EGYPTIAN 
CONSTITUTION, at art. 67/13 compares it with EGYPT TEMPORAL CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION, at art. 
20, supra note 73. See also ‘Arafa, supra note 7, at [FN62]. [On this Footnote, don’t touch or do 
anything in it as I am sure about every single letter in it, You will not find the case or the decision I 
stated online even in English or Arabic but we have that decision at the Supreme Court in Egypt, and 
the law mentioned and available on the website is the exact law not the Egyptian constitution as you 
stated but in Arabic, please check the website carefully, so keep the citation and don’t remove it. I 
think I have enough experience on my home country laws and constitution and aware about what I 
wrote!!] 
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means.346 Under this article, there is no dismissal of the case if the accused is 
deceased.347 Article 18 grants the court the right to summon the immediate family of 
the accused who benefited from the illicit revenue and demand that they return the 
revenue.348 Accordingly, Mubarak is convicted, and the court or the Illicit Gains 
Authority has the right to ask his wife, children, and their spouses to return all the 
revenue obtained through illicit means.349  
Mubarak is also charged with submitting a forged financial statement that 
understates his wealth.350 In this case, Mubarak is guilty; and article 112 of the 
Egyptian Penal Code is applied, as it provides explicitly “[t]hat any public official 
involved in the embezzlement of public funds by committing forgery on official 
documents may be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment.”351 
Additionally, Mubarak is accused of using his powers to transfer money to 
foreign bank accounts abroad.352 In addition to article 112 of the Criminal Code and 
article 18 of Law No. 62 of 1975, Mubarak may be charged under article 116 of the 
same Code, which states that “[a]ny public servant who damages the economic 
reputation or national interest of the State (in which it is Egypt in our case) by abusing 
his powers is sentenced to a period of imprisonment of one to six years and a fine 
does not exceed the maximum amount of 1000.00 EGP.”353  
According to the current Egyptian Penal Law, Mubarak could face the death 
penalty if he is convicted under articles 40, 230, 234, and 235 of the Criminal Code. 
He is charged with inciting the killing of the demonstrators for failing to stop the killing 
                                                            
346 Id.[= I am referring to both the law and the Court Decision and keep it like that unless you want  to 
refer to them again] 
347 Id.  
348 Id. 
349 Id. The former first lady of Egypt, Suzan Mubarak was detained for fifteen days in the women’s jail 
of Cairo on the ground of abusing her husband’s position to gain revenue from illicit transactions. She 
was later released after relinquishing her assets to the government of Egypt. 
350 See Law No. 58 of 1937 (EGYPTIAN PENAL LAW, as amended by Law No. 95 of 2003), Al-Jarida Al-
Rasmiyya, August 1973, at art. 112 (Egypt). [hereinafter EGYPTIAN PENAL CODE]. 
351 Id.  
352 Owen & Shekner, supra note 293. (“The Egyptian Attorney General Dr. ‘Abdel Meguid Mahmmoud 
wrote in a requested document that Mubarak and his sons, Gamal and ‘Alaa, may have violated laws 
prohibiting the “seizing of public funds and profiteering and abuse of power,” using complex business 
schemes to divert the assets to offshore companies and personal accounts…The 12-page document, 
written in Arabic and titled “Request for Judicial Assistance,” is intended to provide the legal basis 
under civil law to recover assets belonging to the Egyptian people…”) (“A spokeswoman for the U.S. 
Justice Department, the agency responsible for recovering stolen assets, declined to comment on the 
document. A former Federal Fraud Prosecutor said some of the claims made against Mubarak remind 
him of the allegations against deposed Philippines dictator Ferdinand Marcos in the 1980s.”).  
353 EGYPTIAN PENAL CODE, supra note 350, at art.116. 
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against the protestors.354 Article 40 provides that “[any] individual who incites a felony 
is considered a main culprit.”355 Under Article 230, “[any] individual who murders 
someone deliberately is sentenced to death…”356 Article 235 also imposes upon any 
individuals who participate or contribute to the crime the same sentence as the 
offender.357 Thus, Mubarak is found guilty of the deliberate assassination of anti-
regime protesters; and it was an option to face the death penalty.358 But in this case, 
based on the discretionary power of the judge, he cannot apply this penalty or make 
it lenient according to the status of the offender, his age, personality, health, 
etc…based on Article 17 of the Criminal Code.359 
Concluding the last three-day presentation of the case, the General 
Prosecutor requested the death penalty for the former President, his prior Interior 
Minister and six of his high senior security assistants, for conspiring to commit 
premeditated homicide and attempting to murder protesters in January.360 In my 
                                                            
354 Owen & Shekner, supra note 293. 
355 EGYPTIAN PENAL CODE, supra note 350, at art. 40. This article defines the “Accomplice” as follows:  
A person is concerned as an accessory in the commission of an offence: (1) Who 
instigates to the commission of the act constituting the offence, provided that the act is 
the consequence of such instigation; or (2) Who is a party to an arrangement having 
for its object the commission of the offence, provided that the offence is the 
consequence of such arrangement, or (3) Who knowingly supplies weapons or other 
implements or means employed in the commission of the offence, or in any manner 
aids the principal or principals concerned in the offence in the preparation, facilitation, 
or commission thereof. 
356 Id., at art. 230. 
357 Id., at art. 235. 
358 With respect to Mubarak’s criminal charges, the Office of the General Prosecutor announced on 
May 25, 2011, that Mubarak had been referred to the Criminal Court of Cairo to begin the process of 
his trial. The General Prosecutor assigned the Ministry of Interior the task of transferring Mubarak from 
a hospital in Sharm al-Sheikh, East of Cairo, to the Torah Prison hospital to stand trial. See Hosni 
Mubarak to Stand Trial, Prosecutors Say, LOS ANGELES TIMES (May 25, 2011), 
http://www.articles.latimes.com/2011/may/25/world/la-fg-egypt-mubarak-20110525. (last visited May 
28, 2012). 
359 Article 17 of the Egyptian Penal Code reads: 
When in criminal cases the circumstances of the case appear to be such a nature to 
merit leniency on the part of the court, the penalty may be migrated as follows: (1) 
death penalty may be substituted by life imprisonment or aggravated detention; (2) life 
imprisonment may be substituted by aggravated detention or detention; (3) 
aggravated detention may be substituted by detention or imprisonment for not less 
than six months, and (4) detention may be subsisted by imprisonment for not less 
than three months.  
360 Article 45 of the Egyptian Penal Code defines “Attempt” as being: 
The commencement of execution of an act with the intent to commit a felony or a 
misdemeanor if completion thereof has been interrupted or has failed of effect owing 
to circumstances independent of the will of the party. Shall constitute an attempt 
neither the determination to commit the offence nor the preparatory acts for its 
commission. 
Attempt, as appears from this Article of the Egyptian Penal Code, is based on three main constituent 
elements: (1) The actus reus (“material element”) which is the Commencement of Execution; (2) The 
mens rea (“moral or mental element”) which is the Criminal Intent required, and (3) The Non-
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moderate opinion—as a legal scholar and a professor of criminal law—I argued that 
acquitting Mubarak is “almost impossible,” and instead was expecting that the former 
President will get 10 to 25 years in prison as the criminal evidences is not sufficient or 
adequate (appropriate) to obtain a death sentence.361 It should be noted that “The 
death sentence requires proof of premeditation, and I haven’t seen anything that 
proves that in what has been said. There is evidence of murder, the maximum 
sentence for which is life sentence.”362 The case getting weak as the Attorney 
General depends on the testimony of officers who allegedly heard conversations 
between the former minister of interior and his assistants.363 In those conversations, 
the former minister ostensibly told his assistants to use all means necessary to stop 
the protesters and the officers also allege they witnessed the arming of ground forces 
with automatic weapons.364 From the criminal procedural perspective, as for 
Mubarak, no solid evidence or eyewitness account connects him to the killings, 
leaving the prosecution with only deductive evidence to implicate the former   
President.365 The Prosecutor cited the two former ministers of interior who 
came after al-‘Adly.366 They testified before the criminal court that orders to open fire 
on protesters could only come from the Head of State.367 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
consummation (no completion) of the offence for reasons and causes independent of the offender’s 
will. Therefore, the scope of punishable attempt encompasses three main situations. First, the case in 
which the offender’s act produces no criminal harm neither the originally intended nor any lesser one, 
Second, the case in which the very criminal result intended is realized but it is revealed that its 
occurrence was due to another cause than the offender’s act, and the third situation included in the 
scope of attempt concerns the case in which the originally intended result fails but another lesser one 
materializes. See EGYPTIAN PENAL LAW, supra note 350, at art. 45.  
361 It should be taken into consideration that it was expected that the evidence the prosecution has 
against Mubarak, which may be insufficient to hold Mubarak criminally liable for the killing of 
demonstrators and could result in Mubarak being found guilty of only criminal negligence or 
recklessness. [I am presenting my personal opinion in this sentence so this sentence does not need to 
be cited, and what just between parentheses in the text is just the implicit elaboration from the general 
theory of criminal code. All in the parenthesis in the text in this regard, is my legal explanation in my 
own wording from the Egyptian criminal law attitude and it will not a direct explanation in the article. 
So, keep it and don’t remove it. You can use this Arabic source in case, See generally FATTOUH EL-
SHAZELLY, SHAR’H MABAD’E KANUN AL-‘UQUBAT AL-MASRY: AL-KESM AL-‘AMM [EXPLANATION OF EGYPTIAN 
CRIMINAL LAW PRINCIPLES, THE GENERAL PART, BOOK I: THE THEORY OF CRIMINAL OFFENCES] (2003).]   
362 Laying out his evidence in court, the prosecutor presented autopsy reports to prove that protesters 
were killed between January 28 and 31 with live ammunition. He then used visual evidence and 
eyewitness accounts to prove that they were killed by police. The prosecution’s case has become 
weaker as it tries to link the killings to the officials on trial. [My own explanatory words and does not 
need to be cited, don’t remove it] 
363 Owen & Shekner, supra note 293. [It is in the article but not in direct way, I rephrased implicitly from 
the general meaning as there is no direct source to cite and from watching the trial itself online and 
hearing the judge reading the verdict, so, keep it and don’t remove it]. 
364 Id. (=Same source, what I mentioned in the previous footnote, apply here) 
365 See Mubarak is Responsible for What Happened Because He Was the Supreme Chief of Armed 
Forces, AL -SHROUK (Mar. 19, 2011), http://www.shorouknews.com/contentdata.aspx?id=412078. (last 
retrieved May 28, 2012). 
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In summation, the public prosecution does not have to prove that Mubarak 
well-ordered the killings in order to convict him of murder. Due to his responsibility as 
the Head of State to protect citizens, proving that Mubarak was aware of the killings 
is sufficient for a criminal conviction. “If it was proved that he knew about the use of 
live bullets while he has a legal obligation to protect the citizens from being killed, this 
is enough to convict him of murder.”368 In order to prove Mubarak’s awareness of the 
events, the prosecution is relying on al-‘Adly’s testimony that he briefed the former 
President about the events.369 The prosecution is also relying on Mubarak’s speech 
the night of January 28, 2011, in which he said that “the police were following orders 
to protect protesters.”370 If Mubarak’s defense team was able to prove that he wasn’t 
aware and conscious of the killings, still that Mubarak would still not be exempted of 
criminal accountability and could receive a 10 year prison sentence for breaching his 
duties as President.371 On the other hand, some civil rights lawyers representing 
some of the victims’ families in the case expected the former Interior Minister to 
receive the death sentence, thereby allowing Mubarak to get off with a lighter 
sentence.372 
 
(3) Evidence Shortage 
 
The prosecution has a tough job, as the most important evidence is in the 
possession of the security apparatus that he used to head and whose loyalties are 
unclear.373 Since the start of the trial, the prosecution has struggled and often failed 
to obtain vital evidence in the case.374 In his final remarks, the prosecutor complained 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
366 Id.  
367 Egypt Prosecutor Alleges Schemes by Mubarak Family, THE WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 9, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/egypt-seeks-help-to-find-mubarak-family-assets 
abroad/2011/04/07/AFCMkZ9C_story.html. (last visited May 28, 2012). 
368 Owen & Shekner, supra note 293. [It is in the article but not in direct way, I rephrased implicitly from 
the general meaning as there is no direct source to cite and from watching the trial itself online and 
hearing the judge reading his verdict, so, keep it and don’t remove it, All in the parenthesis in the text 
in this regard, is my legal explanation in my own wording from the Egyptian criminal law attitude and it 
will not direct explicit in the article]. 
369 Id. (=Same source, what I mentioned in the previous footnote, apply here)  
370 Id. (=Same source, what I mentioned in the previous footnote, apply here) 
371 Id. (“Despite the difficulties faced by the prosecution, that a strong ruling against Mubarak remains 
possible because the criminal court relies on the judge’s beliefs more than it does on evidence. The 
judge is free to form his conviction based on any evidence he has, whether it was material or verbal. 
He can even choose to form his judgment based on one eyewitness.”). 
372 Id.  
373 Id. 
374 Id.  
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of the lack of cooperation from state institutions in providing it with evidence.375 Many 
have complained that the start of the case, six months after Mubarak stepped down, 
gave plenty of time for his supporters, who are still in office, to destroy evidence.376 It 
should be noted that one of the most imperative improvement that reflects the 
evolvement of rule of law is when Field Marshal Mohammad Hussein Tantawi, the 
Head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (“SCAF”),377 received a subpoena 
to testify during Mubarak’s trial.378 Before the Revolution, it was stiff to imagine that 
senior members in the regime would appear before a court to testify.379 In Mubarak’s 
trial, senior members of the new regime were required to testify, including: the Army 
Field Marshal, (General) ‘Omar Suleiman, the former Chief of the Intelligence 
Organization and former Vice-President, and two former Ministers of Interior.380 
These summons indicated the first time in the history of the Egyptian judiciary that 
such important people could be compelled to testify before a court of law.381 Leaks of 
Field Marshal Tantawi’s testimony, which constitute the strongest evidence to some 
extent in the case, were disappointing.382 According to lawyers who attended the 
session, Tantawi denied that Mubarak had ordered directly or explicitly the military to 
                                                            
375 Id. 
376 Id. At the beginning of the trial, it was announced that a CD containing phone recordings between 
the Ex-Minister of Interior and his senior assistants during the days of the revolution was destroyed. 
Cherif AbulFadl, Mufag’a fi Muakamt Mubarak [Surprise in Mubarak’s Trial], AL-AHRAM (Sept. 5, 
2011), http://www.gate.ahram.org.eg/News/112146.aspx. Additionally, during the trial, the Public 
Prosecutor accused the Ministry of Interior and the Intelligence Agency of withholding evidence 
against Mubarak. Mahmoud Al-Mamlouk et. al, al-Niyaba: al-Dakhliya wa al-Amn al-Kawmy lam 
Yukadima lana al-Ma‘alomat al-Kafiya [Prosecution: Interior Ministry and Intelligence Agency did not 
provide us with enough Information], (Jan. 4, 2012),  
http://www1.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=570218&SecID=12. Earlier in the case, head of central 
security communications Hussein Moussa was sentenced to two years in prison for destroying audio 
recordings of conversations between al-‘Adly and his assistants in the ministry’s operation room during 
the days of the uprising. The recordings are believed to have included orders to shoot protesters. 
(Both articles are Arabic Newspaper website and no English version for them, so, keep them and don’t 
remove from the footnotes or citation, I am sure of every single word on them and I translated the 
official title in Arabic to English, so it will be understandable by the reader  in a very official and careful 
way) 
377 al-majlis al-a‘la Lil-quwwat al-musallaha, is equivalent in the United States to an enlarged Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. (My personal knowledge, keep it and don’t remove) 
378 El-dakak, supra note 97. (Eldakak’s article attached, and will be online soon as it is in editing 
process within the law review editorial board of the journal) 
379 Id. (“This pursuit of legal justice is what distinct the 2011 Egyptian Revolution from other past 
revolutions.  After other historical revolutions, people in power were often executed without fair trials. 
Giving a trial to a 30-years dictator who caused the death of more than eight hundred brave innocents 
during the Revolution is the best first step to establishing full rule of law in new democratic Egypt.”). 
380 Id. 
381 Id.  
382 Id. See also Anthony Shadid & Heba Afify, Military Ruler Offers Region in Revolt, INT’L HERALD 
TRIB., Sept. 26, 2011, at 4, available at 2011 WLNR 19484127 (citing Field Marshal Tantawi stating 
that he had to testify “to stress the rule of law, which must be the guiding approach for the Egyptian 
state after the January 25 Revolution.”). 
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open fire on protesters, despite previous statements by the military ruling council 
saying that the military had refused to carry out orders to kill protesters.383 Civil rights 
attorneys were astonished when video evidence presented by the intelligence 
services comprising videos starting from February 1, 2011, which is not the period 
when the events examined in the trial took place.384 Another cause for concern arose 
when the prosecution said it was unable to identify who carried out the killing of 
protesters.385  
 
(4) Three cases in one case (“legal  procedural joining”) 
 
In the same case that Mubarak, al-‘Adly and his assistants are being 
prosecuted for killing protesters, the former President, along with other defendants, is 
also facing charges of squandering public funds.386 Legal experts and lawyers in the 
case complain that the decision to combine or join unrelated charges into one case is 
causing unnecessary evidential and procedural legal complications.387 Mubarak, his 
two sons and businessman Hussein Salem, as stated earlier, are facing charges of 
bribery and abusing power.388  
In the third crime alleged in the case, Mubarak and Salem face charges of 
squandering public funds. As stated previously, the allegation is based on evidence 
that Mubarak directly assigned Salem’s company the privilege of exporting gas to 
Israel, instead of holding an auction as the law requires.389 The allegation is also 
                                                            
383 Id.  
384 Id.  
385 Id. However, a civil rights lawyer representing victims’ families in the case dismisses such 
concerns. He argued that “The conviction of the one who carried out the crime is not necessary for the 
conviction of the instigators, as long as there is an ongoing investigation.” 
386 Id.  
387 Id. 
388 The prosecution also accuses Mubarak of hiding foreign grants to the Alexandria Bibliotheca in a 
bank account that only he can access. (My personal knowledge, keep it and don’t remove) 
389 Abo Alabass, supra note 291. See, e.g., Law No. 89 of 1998 on Bids and Tender Offers (“Public 
Procurement”), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 1998, at art.2 (Egypt). (The website not working anymore, but 
keep the law ciaiation as I am sure about it). This law stipulates that: “public tenders and public 
auctions must be subject to “Publicity Principles.” Article 2 states: “Since all public bids and auctions 
follow the principles of rationality, equal opportunity, and free competition, they must be declared in 
daily newspapers and other widespread information media.”), its executive regulation, the set 
instructions and the contract conditions at the conclusion and the execution of the contracts of labors, 
supplies, and the required steps. This consequently led to many amendments, additional orders, some 
works were carried out upon the direct order, the removal of some works after been carried out, 
purchases of unneeded items, purchases of banned items, needlessly spending sums or even more 
given to some contractors and suppliers. There are several due sums at the suppliers and contractors, 
represented in fines, compensations, price difference, and administrative fees...etc. as a result of 
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based on the deal’s contract, which obligates Egypt to sell its gas to Israel at sub-
standard prices and does not give it the right to modify the contract.390 I believe that 
this is a big mistake and was against it since the beginning of the trial and do not 
know whether it was intentional or not, but it has caused unnecessary detours in the 
case. This creates a burden on the court but it is not a legal flaw. It is neither justified 
nor harmful, and each defendant will be judged based on the charges he faces. The 
author asking, are the partners in the crime getting innocent?391 
 
(5) The June 2nd, 2012Verdict Analysis: A Historical Land-Remarkable Decision not 
only in whole Middle East but all over the World 
 
Montesquieu stated, “[l]aw should be like death, which spares no one.”392 
Mubarak’s trial is a massive progress for rule of law in Egypt.393 Despite several 
enlargements that casted serious doubts on the success of the trial, it marks the first 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
committing violations in carrying out the works or as the works and contracts were taken from them 
and they carried out them on their expense. Also, Procurement rules process is laid down explicitly in 
the aforementioned law which in itself establishes the rules for transparency. There is a lack of internal 
censorship, accountability, auditing, and discipline in the most units of the state administrative system. 
Not enough effort is exerted in inspecting and investigating the documents, presented by the officials 
in which include incorrect, misleading, falsified, and distorted data. They, in this way, could seize a 
part of the public funds, evade paying taxes, and attempt to reduce them for no reason.  ‘Arafa, supra 
note 7. [This chapter in my doctoral dissertation attached. I am sure abpout the law and may be not 
available online either in English or Arabic] 
390 Kirkpatrick, supra note 295.  In this regard, the court rejected lawyers’ request that the charges 
relating to the squandering of public funds and the export of gas to Israel be heard in a separate trial. 
The allegations concerning the gas and squandering of public funds require different evidence and 
witnesses than the allegations concerning protester deaths. [Yes, the cited source go to both 
sentences in the footnote as well]  
391 If the cases of officers accused of killing protesters is an indication of whether Mubarak, al-‘Adly, 
and the other Interior Ministry officials will be convicted, observers are not optimistic. Only one low-
ranking police officer was sentenced to death in absentia for killing protesters. Further, four police 
officers were acquitted of charges they killed protesters outside of al-Sayeda Zeinab police station. 
See generally Reem Leila, CASE DISMISSED: 
CAIRO CRIMINAL COURT ACQUITS FIVE POLICE OFFICERS ACCUSED OF KILLING PROTESTERS LAST JANUARY, 
AL-AHRAM WEKLY ONLINE, Jan. 5-11, 2012. Officers accused of killing protesters in Suez were released 
on bail. On the other hand, lawyers in Mubarak’s case are confident that the trials and verdicts of the 
officers will not affect their case. The prosecutor clarified to the court that the victims listed in 
Mubarak’s trial do not include those killed in front of police stations. All the officers on trial are being 
tried for killing protesters outside police stations, while those who carried out the killings remain 
unknown. Id. Of course, the al-Sayeda Zeinab verdict will have no bearing on Mubarak’s trial, clarifying 
that the ruling in a case is left entirely up to the judge regardless of rulings in similar cases as long as 
they are issued from courts of the same level. However, that the officers should have been tried in the 
same case with Mubarak as they are partners in the same crime. See also Court Acquits Officers 
Accused of Killing Revolution Protesters, AHRAM ONLINE, JADALIYYA, Dec. 29, 2011. 
392 RIDDHI DASGUPTA, CHANGING FACE OF THE LAW: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 291 (2006). 
393 El-dakak, supra note 97. (Eldakak’s article attached, and will be online soon as it is in editing 
process within the law review editorial board of the journal. Also you can found that at 
http://works.bepress.com/ahmed_eldakak/1/) 
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time in Egyptian history that a former ruler pharaoh was brought before courts of 
law.394 Mubarak’s trial sends a strong and clear message that rule of man has ended 
and rule of law has recurred.395 The remaining challenge is how to launch a full rule 
of law that will accomplish and achieve the motivations of the Egyptian community.396 
On June 2nd, 2012 at 10:00 am Egyptian Eastern time, the “trial of the century” 
had been launched.397 The Head of the Cairo Criminal Court, Chief Justice Ahmad 
Refa‘at accompanied with Chief Justice Mohammad ‘Asam Bassiouni and Chief 
Justice Hani Borham398 announced that the court session and the verdict was in 
progress.399 Refa‘at delivered a strongly powerful worded statement before handing 
down the criminal sentences.400 He described Mubarak’s era as “30 years of intense 
darkness” and “a darkened nightmare” “…black, black, black, the blackness of a 
chilly winter night,” the judge declared, “when officials committed the gravest sins, 
                                                            
394 Bradley Hope, Mubarak Verdict far from a Done Deal, NATIONAL (UAE), Aug. 5, 2011, (“Many 
Egyptians considered the appearance of Hosni Mubarak inside a metal cage a victory for the rule of 
law, but the real challenge will play out as the trial gets underway, lawyers and analysts say.”), 
available at http://www.thenational.ae/news/.../mubarak-verdict-far-from-a-done-deal.  (citing Chibli 
Mallat, a visiting professor at Harvard University School of Law, stating that “[t]his is the first time in the 
history of Egypt for 5,000 years that a Pharaoh is being brought to court to be judged on his 
rule…There is a historic dimension about it. It is very unusual for the region, for the rule of law, and for 
the whole world.”). 
395 El-dakak, supra note 97. (Eldakak’s article attached, and will be online soon as it is in editing 
process within the law review editorial board of the journal. Also you can found that at 
http://works.bepress.com/ahmed_eldakak/1/) 
396 Sandro Contenta, Egypt: A Revolution without Justice, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 19, 2011, (citing 
official counts that declared the death of 846 people during the days of the revolution). 
397 In this regard, it should be noted that more than 20,000 security personnel outside Mubarak trial. A 
very tight security plan was adopted, created, and was laid down coordinately between the Armed 
Forces and the police forces to secure the trial of former President Hosni Mubarak, his two sons ‘Alaa 
and Gamal, Ex-Interior Minister Habib al-‘Adly and six of his top aides, which decided on Saturday, 
June 2nd, 2012 and in which a verdict handed down. Also, it includes unprecedented precautionary 
measures to ensure smooth proceedings during the trial. See 20,000 Police, 160 Tanks to Secure 
Mubarak Trial Ahead of Verdict, EGYPT INDEPENDENT, June 8, 2012. No one was allowed into the 
courtroom, except for special pass holders. The Egyptian state TV was the only side to videotape and 
air the session. Additionally, contacts with Chairman of State Information Service (“SIS”) had been 
settled to arrange attendance of foreign correspondents and reporters who want to cover the trial. Id. 
[the citation at the end of the footnote apply to all of the sentences in the footnote, in addition to the 
textual sentence as it discussed the same idea] 
398 It should not be overlooked that the panel of judges in the Mubarak trial, consisting of Presiding 
Chief Justice Ahmad Refa‘at and Judges Bassiouni and Burham, have acted in a dignity way that 
honors the best tradition of the Egyptian judiciary and stands out as a shining example of what 
courageous and professional judges should do in difficult situations such as these. They have upheld 
the fair rule of law and that should not be forgotten. [My own wordings and does not need to be cited, 
keep it and don’t remove it as I am sure about these facts, I know about those judges very well and 
does not required that their reputation to be published in a source!!] 
399 See HOSNI MUBARAK LIFE IMPRISONMENT ON TRIAL VERDICT—2 June 2012: Part I and II, “Video 
Featured Live”, available at http://www.youtu.be/47naK6H5Hlo and http://www.youtu.be/5yKTlp8-3yU. 
See also HOSNI MUBARAK FOUND GUILTY [CNN 6-02-2012], at http://www.youtu.be/YhqqB9K2jp8. (last 
retrieved June 5, 2012). 
400 Id. (“The trial of Mubarak and his co-defendants before an ordinary criminal court subject to 
ordinary criminal law and procedures.”) 
 
Revista Contraponto | vol. 1 n. 1 | jan./jul. 2014                                                                                  245 
 
tyranny, and corruption without accountability or oversight as their consciences died, 
their feelings became numb and their hearts in their chests turned blind...that ended 
only when Egyptians rose up to demand change.”401 “The peaceful sons of the 
homeland came out of every deep ravine with all the pain they experienced from 
injustice, heartbreak, humiliation and oppression.”402 He added “Bearing the burden 
of their suffering on their shoulders, they moved peacefully toward Tahrir Square in 
Cairo, Egypt’s capital, demanding only justice, freedom, dignity, and democracy from 
their rulers and politicians who held a tight grip on power,” “…in which Egypt become 
developed country politically, economically, socially, culturally, educationally, 
etc…What’s happened to you beloved Egypt? the only nation described by God in 
the Qur’an…” and the judge continued his robust discourse or said about the glorious 
January 25 uprising against ousted President Mubarak and his corrupt regime.403  
During the court session, Mubarak sat stone-faced on a hospital gurney and 
frowning in the courtroom’s metal defendants’ cage while judge Refa‘at read out the 
conviction and sentence against him, showing no emotion with his eyes concealed by 
dark sunglasses.404 His sons Gamal and ‘Alaa looked very nervous and stressed out 
when the judge announced that he will read out  the conviction decision along with 
the legal qualification of the verdict afterwards.405 “Chief Justice Refa‘at declared that: 
According to Articles 15/1, 17, 18, 304, 309, 313, and 384 of the Egyptian Criminal 
Procedural Law and Articles 30, 40/3, 45, 46/1, 234, and 235 of the Egyptian Penal 
Law, the court decided its verdict to the all defendants except the second offender 
(Hussein Salem) will be in absentia406 the following: 
                                                            
401 Id. Mubarak Receives Life Term for Protest Deaths, AL-JAZEERA, June 2, 2012; Protests Erupt in 
Egypt over Hosni Mubarak Verdicts, BBC, June 3, 2012; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Egypt: Mubarak 
Conviction a Message for the Next President: But Acquittal of Police Chiefs A Green Light for Future 
Abuse, June 2, 2012. 
402 Id. 
403 Id. See also WAKAE‘ AL-NOTQ BIL HUKUM FI QADIAT MUBARAK [The Hearing of the Mubarak Verdict], 
AL-MASRY AL-YOUM, “Video Featured”, available at  http://www.youtu.be/wtjz7odWrNA (in Arabic) (last 
visited June 5, 2012). 
404 Id. See also Hamza Hendawi, Former President of Egypt Hosni Mubarak Gets Life Sentence; Sons 
Acquitted, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 3 June 2012. 
405 See Egyptians Protest Against Mubarak Verdict in Cairo, BBC NEWS, June 5, 2012, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18330411. (last retrieved June 6, 2012). (“‘Alaa 
appeared to recite verses of the Qur’an as the verdict was read. Both sons stood in front of their father 
to shield him from the cameras, and had tears in their eyes when the ruling came out.”). 
406 See EGYPTIAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL LAW No. 150 of 1950, as amended by Law No. 95 of 2003 
and Law No. 145 of 2006), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, September 1950, at arts. 384 & 388 (Egypt) 
[hereinafter EGYPTIAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL CODE]. The Egyptian law does not meet the minimum 
requirements for trial in absentia adopted by national legal systems. Article 388 of the aforementioned 
Law explicitly (“denies a defendant being tried in absentia the right to be represented at trial (a lawyer 
is allowed to represent such a defendant to explain the reason for the person’s absence and arrange 
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(1) Punishing Mohammad Hosni El-Sayed Mubarak with Life Imprisonment for 
the allegations ascribed to him, being an accessory/accomplice to murder 
(complicity in murder) and attempted murder; 
(2) Punishing Habib Ibrahim Habib Al-‘Adly with Life Imprisonment for the 
allegations ascribed to him, being an accessory/accomplice to murder 
(complicity in murder) and attempted murder; 
(3) The both aforementioned defendants will be beard and responsible for the 
criminal hearing fees;407 
(4) Asset Forfeiture and confiscation of the assets alleged proceeds and 
instrumentalities of the crime;408 
(5) The acquittal of the following (al-‘adly senior assistants): (a) Ahmad 
Ramzy; (b) ‘Adly Fayied; (c) Hassan ‘Abdualrahman; (d) Isma‘il Al-Sha‘er; 
(e) Osama Al-Marasy; and (f) ‘Omar Farmauy;409 
(6) Dismissal of the criminal action (motion) against Mohammad Hosni El-
Sayed Mubarak, Hussien Kamal El-din Ibrahim Salem, ‘Alaa Mohammad 
Hosni El-Sayed Mubarak, and Gamal Mohammad Hosni El-Sayed 
Mubarak concerning the peddling in influence crime and offering a 
kickback/bribe crime and the misdemeanor of its acceptance on the 
ground of statutes of limitation lapse period for the criminal motion; 
(7) The acquittal of Mohammad Hosni El-Sayed Mubarak of being an 
accomplice with a public official to obtain a private interest in favor of 
another person’ interest illicitly from his public job (office of the Republic) 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
the person’s appearance, but may not present a defense”). In addition, Egyptian law does not 
comprise any procedural safeguards requiring that the court take into consideration whether the 
defendant’s absence was by choice or assess whether a defendant unequivocally and expressly 
waived the right to be present before deciding to proceed with a trial in absentia. 
407 Id., at art. 313. See MARWA AWAD AND TOM PFEIFFER, Egyptians Threaten More Protests after 
Mubarak Verdict, REUTERS, June 3, 2012.  Nick Meo, Crowds Call for Mubarak to Hang, DAILY 
TELEGRAPH, 4 June 2012. [Keep the citation and don’t remove it since you eventually able to find them 
online]. 
408 See EGYPTIAN PENAL CODE, supra note 350, at art. 30. [The Code Attached] 
409 a) Former Head of the Central Security Forces; b) Former Director of General Security; d) Former 
Director of Security for Cairo; e) & f) Directors of Security for the Greater Cairo Governorates of Giza 
and 6th October. It should be noted that Hassan ‘Abdualrahman, the former President of the State 
Security Apparatus (“SSI”) remain in jail while he face charges for losing and destroying evidences 
including written documents, papers, electronic CDs and DVDs containing information and tapes 
recording which—with no doubt—convicting him along with the other senior assistants of killing 
protesters and causing seriously bodily injuries in custody of Torah prison, the same jail where 
Mubarak was flown after the verdict. However, their innocence, the General Attorney has also banned 
the six police officers from travel, as he has lodged a case on appeal against them charged over the 
killing of protesters during the uprising against Hosni Mubarak.  
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and the crime of causing harm to the public interests or funds of his public 
office; and 
(8)  Referring on renvoi the civil motion before the criminal court to the 
specialized competent civil court as to the civil rights of the victims without 
fees.410 This is our book (decision) talking on you on reasonable and fair 
grounds, Refa‘at said…” 
 
Based on the above verdict, Hosni Mubarak was sentenced to life in prison for 
failing to stop the killing of protesters during the uprising that forced him from 
power.411 The court in its legal qualification of the decision stated that Mubarak and 
his Interior Minister are certainly—without doubt—assure and aware of the protests 
and demonstrations against the ousted President and his corrupt regime as well, as it 
represents a general knowledge of any recognizable person, in particular that these 
incidents had been covered not only by the national media but also the international 
one.412 The court stated that both of the first and second defendants (Mubarak and 
al-‘adly) intentionally ignored to issue the significant decisions, orders, and 
regulations in which they obliged in accordance with the constitution and law 
according to their legal positions at the time of the events to do in order to protect the 
whole nation, general public especially the demonstrators, and the public and private 
property from any imminent danger for the State national security or any criminal acts 
may cause instability or non-security of the State during the normal course of the 
occasions to keep their position without caring.413 Furthermore, the Court recited that 
                                                            
410 See EGYPTIAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL CODE, supra note 406, at arts. 271, 272, 288, & 309. As the 
victims are civil parties to the proceedings, their attorneys may question witnesses for both the 
prosecution and the defense counsels, and may request additional witnesses, under articles 271 and 
272 of Egypt’s Law of Criminal Procedure. Article 288 of this law also permits civil parties to be heard 
as witnesses. Civil party lawyers have the right to present arguments to the court orally and in writing. 
[The Code Attached] 
411 See LAHAZAT AL-NOTQ BIL HUKUM ‘ALA AL-MAKLOUH HOSNI MUBARAK [The Moment of the Ousted 
Presdient Hosni Mubarak Verdict Come out], AL-NAHAR, “Video Featured”, available at 
http://youtu.be/i4OzU6WKZsA. (in Arabic) (last visited June 6, 2012). [Keep the video cited and don’t 
remove it as I found it since you was able to follow the link for this video. Also here is another video 
with unofficial English translation you can cite for more support, See EGYPT’S HOSNI MUBARAK TRIAL: 
VERDICTS AND SENTENCES, “Video Featured”, available at http://youtu.be/tsxQS0K0dHo. (“The Former 
Egyptian President has been sentenced to life in prison for his role in killing hundreds of protesters 
during the revolution that toppled him.”)] 
412 Id. 
413 Id. In this regard, Article 73 of the Abrogated Egyptian Constitution stipulates that:  
The Head of the State is the President of the Republic. He shall assert the sovereignty 
of the people, respect for the Constitution and the supremacy of the law. He shall 
safeguard national unity and the socialist gains and maintain the limits between 
authorities in a manner to ensure that each shall perform its role in the national action.  
 
Revista Contraponto | vol. 1 n. 1 | jan./jul. 2014                                                                                  248 
 
the documents presented by the public prosecution are insufficient and lack the 
essential material evidences of proofing which part had the responsibility for shooting 
the protestors directly with live ammunition, weapons, guns, rifles, etc…which leads 
to their killing and seriously bodily injuries.414 Moreover, the Court detailed that the 
Interior Minister purposefully disregarded to take urgent decisions and precautionary 
measures or techniques at the central and vital time of the episodes to keep his 
Ministerial spot and protect Mubarak for keeping his presidential position.415 In this 
sense, Article 155, of the de facto Egyptian Constitution of 1971 reads that: 
 
Before exercising their functions, the members of the Cabinet shall take the 
following oath before the President of the Republic: “I swear by Almighty 
God to uphold the Republican system with loyalty, to respect the Constitution 
and the law to look after the interests of the people in full and to safeguard 
the independence and territorial integrity of the motherland.”416 
 
In the same vein, Article 156 of the same Abrogated Constitution stipulates: 
 
The Cabinet shall exercise in particular the following functions: …(k) 
supervising the implementation of law, maintaining State security and 
protecting the rights of the citizens and the interests of the State. 
 
In addition, the Court said that both Mubarak and Al-‘adly confessed during the 
criminal investigations and interrogation phase that they were fully aware about the 
course of the events broke on January 25 and followed up with the news, in addition 
to the reports presented to Mubarak from his Interior Minister regarding the protests, 
which means that both of the accused possessing a free conscious and guilty will, in 
which the blameworthy shall take normally the form of the criminal intent that leads to 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Furthermore Article 74 of the same de facto Constitution reads: 
If any danger threatens the national unity or the safety of the motherland or obstructs 
the constitutional role of the State institutions, the President of the Republic shall take 
urgent measures to face this danger, direct a statement to the people, and conduct a 
referendum on those measures within sixty days of their adoption. 
In the same domain, Article 79 of the same Abolished Constitution states: 
Before exercising his functions, the President shall take the following oath before the 
People’s Assembly: “I swear by Almighty God to uphold the Republican system with 
loyalty, to respect the Constitution and the law, and to look after the interests of the 
people fully and to safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of the 
motherland.” 
See ABROGATED EGYPTIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 73, at arts. 73, 74, & 79. 
414 Id.  
415 See generally Fareed Zakria, What the Mubarak Verdict Reveals about Egypt, GPS, CNN WORLD, 
June 4, 2012. [Keep the citation and don’t remove it since you eventually able to find it online]. 
416 See ABROGATED EGYPTIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 73, at arts. 155 & 156. [The link already cited 
in FN 73 and work correctly] 
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the criminal liability for the act or omission attributed to them.417 Likewise, the Court 
based its verdict for conviction of the first two offenders on the former Vice 
President’s and the Head of the SCAF’s testimony and cross-examination.418 
Accordingly in this respect, the Court recited: 
 
[…] [B]ased on all of the aforementioned legal, doctrinal, judicial principles, 
and in light of the legal definition of the criminal act (conduct) by omission, 
which means that “Passive/Negative criminal activity (omission) is a 
voluntary abstention or refraining from complying with a legal duty imposed 
upon an individual to act in particular circumstances…The legally protected 
interest is injured (or sometimes exposed to risk) by the mere fact of 
omission, or refraining from acting.” “Criminal activity in these sorts of 
offenses is composed of two elements: omitting to abide by a legal obligation 
and the voluntary character of such omission.”419 
                                                            
417 David Kirkpatrick, New Turmoil in Egypt Greets Mixed Verdict for Mubarak, THE N.Y. TIMES, MIDDLE 
EAST, June 2, 2012. Also, the Court stated that the Ex-Interior Minister said that he attended an urgent 
meeting on January 20, 2011 with all ministers at that time concerning the risky situation in Egypt. 
[Keep the citation and don’t remove it, and you can find that on a microfilm at the main library or 
regularly online as an online article] 
418 Former Vice President ‘Omar Suleiman testified that the Public Intelligent Apparatus caught and 
realized that some demonstrations will be emerge on January 25 and he discuss that issue with the 
first defendant Mubarak and told him that also there were armed criminal elements and get in conflict 
with the civilian protesters. Accordingly, Mubarak decided to hold urgent meeting to discuss the 
problem with the Ex-Prime Minister and the whole other ministers including the Interior Minister. By the 
same token, Field Marshal Tantawi testified that he was in contact via urgent meetings and phone 
callings with Mubarak within the course of the occasions and he updated him with the dangerous 
results of the protests which lead to the killing of the civilians and seriously bodily injuries, and he said 
implicitly: “that the President shall obliged within his constitutional and legal authority to issue 
significant orders and decisions to protect civilians, national security, and keep stability and public 
order of the State…Generally, every responsible person shall know his obligations and duties and 
should be committed to it…And logically, the Interior Minister—second defendant—should informed 
the first (Mubarak) with the whole imminent risk of the situation and its ancillary consequences, as it 
was impossible that the President have no ideas or conscious will about what is going on his nation…” 
In the same vein, both Ex-Interior Ministers Generals Mahmmoud Wagdy and Mansour El-‘Esawy 
testified that the situation was risky and both defendants were failing to protect the civilian 
demonstrators from criminal gangs and thugs by their ignorance to take the immediate precautions 
and preventive security means to abstain the imminent risk within the normal course of the incidents 
which take place in Tahrir square.       
419 The Court alluded to the materiality of the act as being the rationale of criminalization and 
penalization, the object of evidence, the basis of sentencing, of ascertaining the criminal intent, and 
the criminal causal link, etc…In this case the Court stated that: 
…a passive attitude shall not be treated as criminal activity unless it is a violation of a 
legal duty imposed on the individual to intervene…If the obligation is only imposed by 
moral rules or social traditions, not by law, failing to respect it will not be deemed an 
omission in the eye of the law. But if the duty to act is derived from a legal obligation, 
the source of the latter will be immaterial. An obligation might be imposed by a statute, 
contract, tort, and general principles of law…Abstention (omission) must be voluntary. 
It should be possible to conclude that the person abstaining has actually willed or was 
actually conscious of his omission. Omissions in criminal law are encountered in 
which law imposes specific duties on some individuals and punishes them if they fail 
to obey them. “[O]ffenses of commission might be perpetrated by mere omission 
provided other elements and conditions of criminal liability are realized. The issue of 
[causality] is no objection, for it suffices to remark that if the individual refraining has 
interfered he would have prevented the occurrence of the criminal result; since he did 
not and the result occurred, his omission is evidently the cause of the result.”  (This is 
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Thus, the Court based its conviction of punishing Mubarak and his Interior 
Minister being an accessories/accomplices to intentional homicide and attempted 
murder with same penalty according to Article 40(2) of the Penal Code which 
establishes the criminal liability for “any person who agrees with another to commit a 
crime that takes place on the basis of such agreement”, as they both had the criminal 
intention (free will and culpable knowledge) with knowledge for killing the protestors 
on the technical ground that they both failed to stop the killing; a rationale that 
attorneys said would not meet the usual requirements and considered low standard 
of proof in the criminal matters especially with murder conviction under either 
Egyptian or international law.420 Furthermore, the Egyptian Criminal Code does not 
encompass a theory of command responsibility, which is only found in the Military 
Code.421 The Egyptian Criminal Code also does not contain a theory of criminal 
responsibility for omission, unless specific intent can be proven for the failure to 
act.422  
 On the other hand, the Court said since it was very difficult to arrest and 
proofs the real perpetrators for the intentional homicide and its attempt, the judge 
acquitted several lower-ranking security officials of criminal responsibility for the 
same deaths, raising questions about the chain of command, as the Chief Justice 
criticized and blamed the prosecution for failing to provide concrete evidence that 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
a manuscript of the court decision with my own translation as the original version is in 
Arabic, so keep the block quote, don’t remove it as it is very significant in this regard, 
and refer to it as (author’s translation) and a copy of the Arabic version of the verdict 
attached) 
420 See EGYPTIAN PENAL CODE, supra notes 350, at arts. 40 & 45. In this regard, Articles 234 & 235 of 
the Penal Code reads:  
Any one kills a person without premeditation or deliberation is punished by life 
imprisonment or aggravated imprisonment…Accomplices to murder shall be punished 
by the same penalty imposed on the perpetrator which is death penalty or life 
imprisonment.  
See EGYPTIAN PENAL CODE, supra note 350, at arts. 17, 234 & 235.  Also, Articles 230 and 231 provide 
that the death penalty is the punishment for premeditated murder. Thus, Article 235 specifies that the 
accomplices to premeditated murder shall be sentenced to death or life in prison. That said, it should 
be noted, as mentioned earlier that Article 17 of the Penal Code gives the court discretion to substitute 
a prison sentence for a death sentence and a lenient sentence for a sentence of life in prison. 
421 See generally AHMAD ‘AWAD BELAL, MABAD’E KANUN AL-‘UQUBAT AL-MASRY: AL-KESM AL-‘AMM 
[PRINCIPLES OF EGYPTIAN CRIMINAL LAW, THE GENERAL PART, BOOK 1: THE THEORY OF CRIMINAL 
OFFENCES] (Arabic/English Source 2004), 241-245. [This is an Arabic source and attached the first 
scanned pages for verification and I am sure about their accuracy and existence cited as this way in 
my upcoming article published by the 18 Golden Gate Annual Survey of International and Comparative 
Law 171 Spring 2012 and keeps them as I cited]. 
422 Id. 
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police officers killed protesters.423 But the dismissal of murder charges against a 
group of Mr. Al-a‘dly’s aides and other security officials raised inquiries about which 
officials, if any, might be held more directly criminally liable.424 At this point, the Court 
added in the merits of its ruling that what is attributed to punish both former President 
Mubarak and his Interior Minister based on refraining to act in accordance with law 
and such acts may be attributed to the rest of the defendants, but in different legal 
framework, because logically the legal position of Hosni Mubarak and Al-‘adly are 
diverse from the legal positions for the rest of the other defendants, as Mubarak was 
the President of the Republic and Al-‘adly, was his Interior Minister which enabling 
them to act, decide, and each of them has the authority to issue obeyed duties in eye 
                                                            
423 See After Mubarak Verdict, Justice for Victims of Egypt’s Old Regime Still Only a Distant Hope, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 3, 2012. (“The Court stated that the documents presented lacks any 
legitimate material evidences including the existence of any equipment, bullets, weapons, audio or 
video tapping and recording, wireless telecommunications or correspondence or papers or written or 
verbal instructions, etc…) to satisfy, reassure or persuade the court that the police officers and their 
members staff have the indigenous intention to kill the protestors or even have the self-lawful defense 
intention or even  establishes the presumption that the police officers agreed or inciting or assisting the 
other criminal gangs to commit the facts of killing the demonstrators.”) [It is in the Arabic article but not 
in direct way, I rephrased implicitly from the general meaning and translate into English and supported 
by the article I cited as it is closed to the ideas in the Arabic article that you will not find it online as 
there is no direct source to cite and from watching the trial itself online, the verdict copy, and hearing 
the judge reading the verdict, so, keep it and don’t remove it as it is very important to understand very 
carefully the technical parts of the trial itself, All in the parenthesis in this regard, is my legal 
explanation in my own wording from the Egyptian criminal law approach and it will not direct explicit in 
the article. Also parts of this illustration came from the Arabic version of the verdict itself. Copy of the 
verdict attached and if you want to remove the quotation marks and keep my explanation without 
them, feel free to do so]. 
424 Id. See also Protests Erupt Across Egypt After Surprise Mubarak Verdict, COMMON DREAMS, June 
2, 2012 (Mubarak’s sons and assistant ministers of interior acquittals causing outrage). (“The Court 
does not rest assured to what has been proven in the book records of the sectors of Central Security 
Forces (“CSF”) data which tamper with proven which of the data or interference deletion or addition to 
these database in which those records were not count at the time of the events or even at the time 
period followed directly the course of the occasions, which makes the court skeptical of its accuracy, 
and the absence of such books from any instructions or directions indicated on the launch of the police 
officers to kill the demonstrators. The Court relied also on the lack of any technical evidence to prove 
that the death and injury of the victims have taken place of weapons, vehicles belonging to the police 
and this means—logically and legally—the separation of the criminal causality linkage between the 
killing/injury and the tool used and the extent attributable to a specific part which guarantee the court 
to keen on the availability of causal link between the criminal conduct and the criminal result 
(effect)…Furthermore, there is no obvious or clear evidence persuade the court by the existence of the 
elements of the crime of causing serious harm to the public interests or funds of their jobs or that the 
defendants had issued instructions to withdraw the police forces responsible for protecting public 
institutions and private property.”). [It is in the Arabic article but not in direct way, I rephrased implicitly 
from the general meaning and translate into English and supported by the article I cited as it is closed 
to the ideas in the Arabic article that you will not find it online as there is no direct source to cite and 
from watching the trial itself online and hearing the judge reading his verdict, so, keep it and don’t 
remove it as it is very important to understand very careful the technical parts of the trial itself, All in 
the parenthesis in this regard, is my legal explanation in my own wording from the Egyptian criminal 
law attitude and it will not direct explicit in the article. Also parts of this illustration came from the Arabic 
version of the verdict itself. Copy of the verdict attached and if you want to remove the quotation marks 
and keep my explanation without them, feel free to do so] 
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of the law and the rest of the accused does not have the same legal position as they 
just only possess the functional authority as they considered as an implementation 
tools in the hands of Mubarak and Al-‘adly.425 Also, the murder and attempted 
conviction has another procedural real legal effect that the Penal Law contains a set 
of particularly deterrent ancillary sanctions, such as stripping of rights and privileges 
relating to official functions and dismissal from office for up to ten years under Article 
24;426 disbarment from any public position or any public procurement opportunity, 
hindering of any decorations and medals including the military merits, and banning 
from eligibility under Article 25;427 and disbarment from holding a governmental 
position under Article 26 of the above mentioned code.428  
For the financial corruption crimes, Chief Justice Refa‘at dismissed these 
charges against Mubarak, his sons, and their businessman friend Salem on technical 
grounds,429 the judge ruled that a 10-year statute of limitations had expired and 
lapsed since Mubarak and his sons, allegedly received a set of luxurious Red Sea 
vacation homes (five villas) as a kickback from a Mubarak crony, Hussein Salem.430  
The Court based its conviction on that the referral order charging Mubarak 
does not specify the Penal Code articles relevant to the bribery charge.431 Instead, 
the order clusters together all the Penal Code articles relevant to a range of 
corruption charges against Mubarak, his sons, and Salem leaving indeterminate and 
uncertain, which legal provisions apply to which defendants.432 The bribery charge 
against Mubarak appears to involve articles 103, 104, and 106bis, which criminalize a 
public official’s demand or acceptance of a bribe to perform, or cease to perform, an 
                                                            
425 Id. See also EGYPTIAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL CODE, supra note 406, at art. 304. 
426 See EGYPTIAN PENAL CODE, supra note 350, at art. 24. In any event, a public official who commits a 
felony is also subject to disciplinary penalties, essentially a matter of administrative law rather than 
criminal law. 
427 If the judge imposes the felony punishment on the official, the official must be deprived of his rights 
and privileges as provided in Article 25 of the Penal Law. Thus, the official is dismissed from 
membership in general or local legislative bodies. The official may be shown leniency and convicted to 
a misdemeanor jail sentence in lieu of the felony penalty, in which case (under Article 27) he/she is 
banned from membership in legislative bodies for a period not less than twice the period of the 
applicable misdemeanor jail term. Id., at arts. 25 & 27. 
428 Id., at art. 26. 
429 Kirkpatrick, supra note 417. As a result, protesters angry at the flimsiness of the decision were 
pouring into Tahrir Square, the symbolic heart of the revolt. 
430 Mubarak is also charged with accepting a bribe from Hussein Salem, a resort developer who is his 
co-defendant, to exploit his influence and facilitate land concessions in Sharm al-Sheikh for a golf and 
tourism investment company Salem owns. 
431 See generally Joe Stork, Egypt: Mubarak Conviction a Message for Next President: But Acquittal of 
Police Chiefs A Green Light to Future Abuse, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, June 2, 2012.    
432 Id. 
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act within the scope of his authority or to use his actual or alleged influence to secure 
a license, concession, or benefit from a public authority.433 The Court strictly 
illustrated in its legal qualified ruling the following legal concept: 
 
[t]he offense specifically targets the act of influencing public officials through 
a triangular relationship between the briber, the trader in influence—who 
actually receives the bribe in order to obtain a favorable public decision—
and the public official who grants an advantage to the briber.  This may 
include intermediation, where an agent indicates to the company which is 
willing to grant valuable advantages that he or she is able to exert influence 
on a public official to obtain a decision favorable to the company. “And as 
this crime is classified as a continued criminal offense committed when it is 
fully completed even if the beneficial reject the peddler’s demand. Also, the 
non-use of influence (trading) does not constitute an element of the 
offense…”434 
 
On the other hand, the Court assured that the purchase contracts of these 
villas are legally registered and recorded in the Office of the Real Estate Registry with 
a constant (fixed) date.435 The case lacks any evidences persuade the court that the 
                                                            
433 “Requesting” or “soliciting” a bribe occurs when an official indicates to another person that the latter 
must pay a bribe in order for the official to act or refrain from acting. Articles 103-105/b of the Criminal 
Code covers such situations. The soliciting of a bribe must be in consideration of one of the following 
acts performed by a public official: 
a) performing a duty that falls within the scope of his or her competences (Article 103); 
b) performing a duty that is wrongfully considered as falling within the scope of his or her duties 
(Article 103bis); 
c) abstaining from carrying out a duty falling within the scope of his work, or committing a breach 
of any of his duties (Article 104); 
d) doing any of the following, but unintentionally carrying out a duty that falls within the scope of 
his or her work, or which is wrongly thought to fall within his or her scope of work; or 
pretending that it falls within his or her scope of work, or abstaining from carrying it out; or 
committing a breach of his or duties (Article 104bis); 
e) accepting a gift from a person in return for rendering a service that falls within the scope of his 
or her work (Article 105);  
f) performing or abstaining from carrying out a duty falling within the scope of his or her work, or 
committing a breach of his duties as the result of a request, recommendation, or 
intermediation (Article 105bis); 
Additionally, Article 106/b criminalizes the use of real or fake authority to obtain, or attempt to 
obtain, any official order, decision, emblem, delivery order, construction contract, employment, favor, 
or advantage of any kind (e.g. the action of receiving from or giving rewards to public officials to 
influence decisions). Furthermore, Article 106bis of the same code proscribes the abuse of real or 
supposed influence for private gain or obtaining undue advantage, whether the wrongdoer is a public 
official or not. See EGYPTIAN PENAL CODE, supra note 350, at arts. 103, 103bis, 104, 104bis, 105, 
105bis, 106 & 106bis. (The Code Attached)  
434 Id. Influence trafficking’s punishment shall be imprisonment for up to two years for the briber or a 
fine as a pecuniary sanction of EGP 200.00 and up to EGP 500.00 or by one of both sanctions. The 
same penalties are applicable to bribe-takers acting in ways set forth in Article 104, i.e. refraining from 
performing their work or defaulting on their duties.   (This is my own wordings and the Code Attached) 
435 See generally Protests Heat up After Mubarak Given Life Sentence, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 2, 
2012. (Keep source as it fit what I said in an implicit way, don’t remove. For more support, this is one 
closet source to promote my argument in text, See generally Maggie Michael, Aya Batrawy, and Sarah 
El-Deeb, Sentence for Egypt’s Mubarak; Sons Acquitted, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 2, 2012, available 
at http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/06/02/egypt-ex-leader-mubarak-faces-verdict-in-
 
Revista Contraponto | vol. 1 n. 1 | jan./jul. 2014                                                                                  254 
 
documents which need to be cut rigging or forgery of any of these contracts, which 
concludes with the court to that the legal effect of the ownership (property) 
transferability of these villas referred to the date of registration of the purchase 
contracts from the owner.436 Accordingly, having this date is the date of taking the 
first defendant (Mubarak) for himself and his two sons (‘Alaa and Gamal) the 
kickback of the second defendant (Salem), and this is the date of the abuse of power 
crime assigned to the first defendant on January 14, 2000 and starts from the date of 
calculating the period of prescription for criminal proceedings arising from this felony 
and the subsequent charges attributable to other defendants in the same range.437  
In this context, the Court explained as follows: 
In terms of what it was to be legally listed as advanced in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 15 of the Code of the Criminal Procedure that the call for criminal 
felonies shall expire at the lapse of ten years from the day of the crime committed.438 
And then the criminal case dismissed at the arising from the use of influence, a felony 
assigned to the first defendant (Mubarak) on October 5, 2010.439 
Based on the facts and the merits presented by the prosecution, the Court 
attributed to the second defendant, Hussein Salem the crime under Article 107bis of 
the Penal Code, which stipulates that: “The briber and the mediator…shall be 
punished with the [same] penalty prescribed for the bribe-taker.”  In this domain, the 
Criminal Court commented:  
 
In accordance with Articles 107 and 107bis, an illegal promise is created by 
any benefit obtained or accepted by the public official.  “Giving” occurs when 
the briber actually transfers the bribe. These acts constitute active bribery. 
By the same token, under Article 107bis, an illegal gift is “any benefit 
obtained or accepted by the public official.” Under Article 107bis of the same 
statute, the briber and the intermediary are considered accomplices in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
cairo/#ixzz26Dx9NGKDLife,  (“Former President Hosni Mubarak got a life sentence for failing to stop 
the killing of protesters during Egypt’s uprising. But he and his sons were cleared of corruption 
charges, setting off protests for greater accountability for 30 years of abuses under the old regime.”)) 
436 Id.=Michael, Batrawy, and El-Deeb. See also Johannes Stern, The Mubarak Verdict, 
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL (“ICFI”), 5 June, 2012, available at 
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2012/jun2012/pers-j05.shtml. (Keep source as it fit what I said in implicit 
way, don’t remove). 
437 Id. (Id.= the first previous source in FN 436 “Michael, Batrawy, and El-Deeb”. Keep source as it fit 
what I said in implicit way, don’t remove ). 
438 Id. (Id.= the previous source in FN 436 “Michael, Batrawy, and El-Deeb. Keep source as it fit what I 
said in implicit way, don’t remove). 
439 Id. For further discussion regarding the charges and the verdict in details, see generally HEISIEIAT 
AL-HUKUM FI QADIAT MUBARAK [The Legal Reasoning of the Mubarak Verdict Ruling], AL-AHRAM, June 
7, 2012 (in Arabic) (on file with author). (Keep the citation and don’t remove it, a copy of the verdict 
Attached)   
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crime of bribery if it takes place, and shall receive the same punishment as 
the bribe-taker. With the exception of ancillary sanctions, penalties for 
bribers and intermediaries are indexed to sentences passed on public 
officials…In this respect, Article 108bis of the Penal Code reads «everyone 
intermediate to take ‘attiyah (“benefit”) or interest or aware of it and accepted 
by the bribee to take it with the knowledge shall be punished by 
imprisonment for not less than one year and a fine equal to the value given 
or promised if it had not mediate the bribery. »  Revealed on that, these are 
the crimes attributed to the second, third, and fourth defendants…that the 
date of transfer of ownership of the five villas referred to the registration date 
of the purchase contracts and thus this date is the date of submission of the 
bribe/kickback from the second accused (Salem) which considered the same 
date of the ‘attiyah acceptance from the third and fourth defendants (‘Alaa 
and Gamal) …[H]aving this date is the date of commission and the same 
offense fully assigned to the second defendant is the similar date of the 
offense attributed fully to Mubarak’s sons.440  
 
Accordingly the Court has concluded that January 14, 2000, is the date in 
which the limitation statutes lapse period calculated and the first measure proscribed 
(boycotted) the statute of limitations in this criminal motion.441 In this regard, Article 
15 of the Egyptian Criminal Procedural Code reads: 
 
Dismissal of the criminal motion (action) concerning felonies lapse of ten 
years from the day of the crime committed, in misdemeanors lapse of three 
years, and in infractions (contraventions) lapse of  one year unless the law 
provides otherwise. As in the crimes stipulated in Articles 117, 126, 127, 
282, 309, 309bis (a) and the offenses set forth in Section I of Part II of Book 
II of the Penal Code, which takes place after the date of this law does not 
dismissed the criminal action arising by lapse of the statutes of limitations. 
Without any prejudice or violation to the provisions of the preceding two 
paragraphs in which the lapse period do not start within the duration of the 
proceedings in the criminal offenses set forth in Part IV of the Second Book 
                                                            
440 Id. On the other hand, Article 18 of the Egyptian Criminal Procedural Code reads that: “If there are 
several defendants, the interruption duration for one of them result in interruption for the rest of what 
had taken were not conclusive action against them for the duration.” See EGYPTIAN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURAL CODE, supra note 406, at art. 18. (A copy of the code attached) 
441 Tariq Mohammad testified on May 18, 2011 within the criminal investigations phase which 
represents the—proscribed procedure for the criminal action lapse—that the criminal case arising from 
the offense alleged to the second defendant had been lapsed of ten years on October 15, 2010. 
Likewise, the criminal case arising from the offense assigned to each of the third and fourth 
defendants had been time-barred based on the lapse of three years from the date of the crime 
committed on October 10, 2003, pursuant to Article 15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court at 
that point does not convinced by the evidences presented by the prosecution which make this crime 
so weak as it just stated that new constructions without any determinate date of the construction 
process, etc… for these villas had been started and some other undocumented doubtful evidential 
proofs. (My own wordings from the general understanding of the events surrounding the trial and does 
not need to be cited, keep it and don’t remove it. Also, I used the verdict Arabic version and a copy of 
the Arabic version attached. You can also use this source for more support, See POLICE TESTIFY IN 
MUBARAK TRIAL AMID CLASHES, ALJAZEERA, MIDDLE EAST, Sep. 5, 2011, at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/.../20119517859820792.html. (“Police witness "not aware" 
of order to fire on protesters as scuffles break out at trial of Egypt’s Former President.”) 
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of the Penal Code, which lies only from a public official from the date of 
resignation or dismissal of such an investigation unless before that.442 
Concerning the third corruption offense alleged to Mubarak, the Court based 
its innocence on the testimony of ‘Omar Suleiman that he said “the first defendant in 
question did not intervene in the pricing of exporting Egyptian natural gas to the State 
of Israel through the East Mediterranean Gas Corporation, and the price limited by 
the Petroleum Authority.”443 In terms of that, and as well as the above, the Court does 
not see nothing wrong in the statement that the Attorney General in the field of 
assigning the merits of these crimes that the first defendant (Mubarak) in 
interrogation has agreed444 with the Former Minister of Petroleum (Fahmy), to allege 
                                                            
442 See EGYPTIAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL CODE, supra note 406, at art. 15. Article 17 of the same Code 
Provides: 
Uninterrupted period of investigative proceedings or charge or trial, as well as the 
matter of criminal procedures or inference if taken against the accused or if officially 
notified, the formal lapse period will start within a new drop (boycott/cut-off). And if 
there are several procedures that cut off period, the validity period starts from the date 
of last action. Id., at art. 17. (A copy of the code attached) 
443 Further, he explained that the details of the contract, quantity, and the sale prices are not presented 
to the former President. Thus, the court was assured and persuaded by Suleiman’s testimony that 
«defendant Mohamed Hosni Mubarak has nothing to do regarding the exportation of Egyptian natural 
gas to Israel or determine the price of export and the responsible part for price determination is the 
Petroleum Authority». Also, the Court assured acknowledged by the investigations and the former 
Minister of Petroleum, Amin Sameh Samir Amin Fahmy of the Council of Ministers is the decision to 
export Egyptian natural gas to the State of Israel, and determine the quantity and price and that it is 
related to Mubarak. Moreover, the Court assured that what was testified by ‘Atef ‘Ebeid, former Prime-
Minister during the criminal investigations concerning this case, that the contract was concluded by the 
former Minister of Petroleum, and that the Council of Ministers—under his chairmanship—and agreed 
to the quantities and price listed and presented by Fahmy. The court applies the same principles with 
complete assurance that this agreement was concluded within the consent of the Council of Ministers 
and the Ex-Minister of Petroleum. (My own wordings from the general understanding of the events 
surrounding the trial and does not need to be cited, keep it and don’t remove it. Also, I used the verdict 
Arabic version and a copy of the Arabic version attached)  
444 Article 115 of the Egyptian Penal Code reads:  
Any public official obtain or try to obtain for himself or another party illicitly a private 
interest, benefit, or profit from his public job shall be punished by aggravated 
imprisonment.  
In the same vein, Article 116bis of the same statute  provides: 
Any public official intentionally harm by negligent or recklessness the funds to the 
interests of his public job or neglect/harm the third’s party funds or interests, shall be 
punished by aggravated imprisonment. And if the harm caused is not that serious, 
shall be punished by imprisonment. 
See EGYPTIAN PENAL CODE, supra note 350, at arts. 115 & 116bis. As prosecution charged Mubarak 
with being an accomplice to the former Petroleum Minister, Sameh Fahmy, in improperly authorizing 
another Salem-controlled company, the East Mediterranean Gas Company, to export Egyptian natural 
gas to Israel for prices lower than those in the international markets, granting an illicit benefit to 
Salem’s company and harming public coffers. This charge appears to involve Penal Code Articles 
40(2) and 40(3), which establish criminal liability for agreeing with another to commit a crime or to 
intentionally provide assistance to another to commit the crime, as well as Article 116bis which 
prohibits any public employee from intentionally harming the funds and interests of a public authority. 
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something to sell and export the Egyptian natural gas to Israel within a lower prices 
than the standard market prices through East Mediterranean Gas Company.445 
Mubarak’s sons remain in jail—Torah prison, the same jail where their father 
sentenced—while they awaiting criminal trial on charges in an unrelated insider 
trading and stock-markets manipulation dealings case.446 In light of these legal 
problems, an appeal by Mubarak to the Egyptian Supreme Court (“Court of 
Cassation/mahkamat al-naqd”) is likely to succeed and doomed to reversal on appeal 
of the conviction.447 The General Prosecutor appeals the verdict in former Egypt 
President Hosni Mubarak’s trial.448 
 
(6) Political approaches versus legal attitudes 
 
This is the first trial of a former Arab leader in an ordinary court of law in which 
the defendant has personally appeared in court since waves of street protests hit the 
Arab world in December 2010.  Zine el-‘Abidine Ben ‘Ali of Tunisia was tried in 
absentia in late 2011; Saddam Hussein of Iraq was tried before a special tribunal in 
2005 and 2006.449 On the other hand, Mubarak’s trial has the potential to set a 
meaningful regional precedent for accountability for human rights abuses and for 
upholding international fair trial standards.450 In the trial of a man who ruled the 
country for 30 years and was forced out of power by a popular uprising, politics are 
bound to interfere.451 But several were worried that the prosecution is counting too 
much on political resentment—which is real—and neglecting to build a strong case 
based in law, but all acted under the extraordinary political pressures unleashed by 
                                                            
445 See Former Minister’s Israel Gas Trial to Resume on Wednesday, AHRAM ONLINE, May 1, 2012 
(Sameh Fahmy, accused of corruption in relation to the Israeli gas deal, will be transferred to a prison 
closer to hospital because of his deteriorating health). See also Tamsin Carlisle, Corruption Inquiry 
Focus on Egyptian Gas Contract, THE NATIONAL, Apr. 26, 2011.   
446 See Financial Corruption Trial for Mubarak’s Sons to Begin 9 July, EGYPT INDEPENDENT, June 12, 
2012.  
447 Hamza Hendawi, Egyptian Prosecutor to Appeal Mubarak Trial Verdicts, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 
4, 2012. 
448 Alana Horowitz, Mubarak Verdict To Be Appealed By Top Prosecutor, THE HUFFINGTON POST, June 
3, 2012. (“The state prosecutor’s office had already ordered the start of the appeals process, without 
providing any details about the appeal.”). 
449 See YOLANDE KNELL, Mubarak Verdict: Searching for 'Justice', BBC NEWS, Cairo, June 1, 2012. 
450 Id. (“Mubarak has his supporters and many Egyptians do not want to see him disgraced.”). 
451 Id. 
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the revolution, and the lack of transparency has invited conspiracy theories about 
behind-the-scenes machinations.452  
Human rights attorneys stated that “The prosecutor’s speech was political and 
a public opinion pleaser, but legally it does not add anything to the case.”453 In the 
first day of the prosecutor’s remarks, public prosecutor gave a resonant and 
prosperous speech where he praised the revolution that brought Mubarak down and 
dug into the corruption of the deposed President’s 30 years in power.454 Prosecution 
accused Mubarak of corrupting political life in Egypt, and forging the people’s will by 
rigging elections.455 He also accused him of oppressing anyone that challenged his 
rule, paving the ground for his son Gamal to become President, and of halting 
development in Egypt as a whole.456  
                                                            
452 Id. (“The banner reads: ‘The gallows awaits you Mubarak.’”) (Other demonstrators brandished 
nooses to symbolize the sentence they sought. “We wanted them to be slaughtered…”). 
453 See YASMINE EL-RASHIDI, A Revolution Stalled? Scenes from Mubarak’s Trial, N.Y. REV., (Aug. 8, 
2011), http://www.nybooks.com/.../egypt-revolution-stalled-scenes-mubaraks-trial.  (last retrieved May 
28, 2012).  
454 El-dakak, supra note 97. See also Mubarak and Minister Sentenced to Life, Sons Go Free, AGENCE 
FRANCE PRESSE, June 2, 2012. 
455 Id. (“In any event, Instead of a sweeping examination the systemic abuses of the Mubarak 
government, the prosecutors rushed the case to trial in an apparent attempt to placate street 
protesters.”). 
456 While the prosecutor’s speech encompassed all fallen President’s wrongdoings in past years, the 
charges against Mubarak only hold him accountable for a handful of incidents of financial corruption 
and the killing of protesters in January uprising. Mubarak’s regime has adopted three steps to execute 
the succession scenario. First, it has designed a careful campaign to market Gamal Mubarak 
domestically and internationally. (“Mubarak disrespected the constitution and circumvented the will of 
the nation, enforcing constitutional amendments without a popular referendum in 2005 and after.”) 
(“He presented by the NDP as a man of people and true liberal and reformer, a man uniquely qualified 
to be Egypt’s next President…His views receive extensive coverage, similar to that accorded in the 
United States to a President—elect: front-page covered in both the official and semiofficial press, 
delivered presentations to enraptured audiences, listening quietly during a Cabinet meetings, and 
siting between his father’s advisors”). See generally MONA EL-GHONBASHY, Egypt’s Summer of 
Discontent (2003). See also JOSHUA STACHER, Egypt: A Leap Toward Reform or Succession? 4 ARAB 
REFORM BULLETIN 8, (Oct. 2006). Second, it has prepared Gamal with the political experience required 
for leadership. (“Mubarak learned the importance of giving his son significant policy responsibility well 
in advance of succession to preempt international criticism. In 2000, he appointed him to the NDP 
general secretariat, after which he began travelling official visits and appeared increasingly in the 
Egyptian media. He tried to make reform in which he recruited a circle of young, reform-minded 
businesspeople and technocrats to write policy papers addressing Egypt’s’ most essential issues.”) 
(“Gamal may be getting political experience to rule a big country like Egypt…His persistent focus on 
US-Egyptian strategic relations is considered evidence that he approved of the despised American 
Middle East policy. This, along with his slavish imitation of his father’s behavior and policies, made him 
repulsive to the Egyptian people.”). Id. See Yotam Feldner, Egypt’s Succession: Part I: Will Egypt 
Follow Syria’s Precedent?, 31 THE MIDDLE EAST MEDIA RESEARCH INSTITUTE (“MEMRI”), July 24, 2000. 
Third, it has begun replacing the old conservatives in the state apparatus with Gamal and his 
associates. (“Gamal tried to insert some of his associates and friends to the Cabinet Ministers and 
removed those who had become a heavy burden on the regime. He did not deny his influence in 
selecting the newcomers, and in fact considers it a feather in his cap.”). Now and after the January 
revolution, the game was almost over, and Gamal’s path to the presidency is essentially gone done!! 
Id. See GAMAL ESSAM EL-DIN, Gamal Mubarak’s Coup D’état, AL-ARABI, (Feb. 5, 2006). See also 
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Last but not least, the paradox between the strength of the case’s political side 
and the weakness of its criminal one is the result of a tradition inculcated in the 
prosecution throughout Mubarak’s reign: to pay more attention to political than legal 
concerns.457 Even though, it is acknowledged that political pressure for a fast verdict 
denied time to the prosecution to perform its task properly, thus, the prosecution 
should be held accountable as well for failing to build a strong case against Mubarak. 
According to the Egyptian law, the prosecution could have turned some of its political 
indictments against Mubarak into legal charges as well as prosecution should be 
blamed for neglecting to collect imperative evidences in the Trial of the Century.458 
 
IV. Heads of states and leaders accountability today and future: conclusions 
and policy recommendations 
 
The persons brought to trial were narrowly selected from a much larger 
potential pool, and the charges brought against them were limited. They did not 
include publicly known corrupt events that could have been added to the charges. 
Mubarak landmark case was hastily investigated, presumably, due to the public 
demands for immediate action. This trial is Egypt’s most significant step yet toward 
establishing the principle that “no leader is above the law.” 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
GAMAL ESSAM EL-DIN, Meeting the Press, AL-AHRAM WKLY, (Aug. 5-11, 2004), GAMAL ESSAM EL-DIN, 
Mubarak and the Americans, AL-ARABI, (Sep. 22, 2006). DANIEL WILLIAMS, Clearing the Path for Scion 
of Egypt, THE WASHINGTON POST FOREIGN SERVICE, (Mar. 10, 2006; 2:19 AM).  
457 El-Rashidi, supra note 453. (“Part of this painful but necessary process is a shift from a system of 
rule by law system to rule of law.  No one, no matter how powerful, should be above the law.”).  
458 In this sense, Egyptian Criminal Procedural Law singles out the Parquet—Public Prosecution 
Authorities—as the sole body responsible for setting criminal actions in motion and for the pursuit 
thereof. The first Article of this law and its recent amendments states: “The Public Prosecutor is the 
only competent authority and no other power initiates the criminal procedural action except by the 
virtue of law or within the circumstances prescribed by law.” See EGYPTIAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL 
CODE, supra note 406, at art. 1(Egypt). In this regard, obligatory prosecutes is a general rule of 
criminal procedure. Yet an exception to this obligation is allowed under the principle of “discretionary 
prosecution.” Under this principle, the prosecuting authorities decide whether to bring a prosecution or 
halt proceedings. Prosecution means initiating public proceedings and referring the case to an 
investigating magistrate where they exist, or to a court. On the other hand, it means putting an end to 
the procedure that might have been initiated and results in no public proceedings. Also, the absence 
of a direct victim, the lack of serious and consistent evidence, the insignificance of the harm done, but 
also other discretionary considerations external to the case itself may all lie behind a decision to 
shelve a case. However, the principle of “mandatory prosecution” means that all offenses which come 
to the attention of the prosecuting authorities should be automatically prosecuted. (“The prosecution 
also stated during closing arguments that the Interior Ministry and the National Security branch of the 
General Intelligence Services had not cooperated with prosecutors in gathering evidence for this case 
or providing relevant information or documents.”). 
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 The inquiry arises with numerous jurists and legal scholars in Egypt 
concerning the charges brought and whether the evidence presented in court in this 
case can sustain a conviction. This places the judges in a difficult position if they are 
to act conscientiously in applying the law. They may find many of these persons 
innocent of the charges brought against them. Alternatively, they may respond to the 
pressures of public opinion and convict persons who on a technical legal basis 
should not be convicted of the crimes charged based on the evidence presented.   It 
is obvious that the outcome of Mubarak trial was not satisfying the general public, 
and it is feared that a backlash against the judiciary occur. Already the integrity and 
independence of the judiciary is being questioned by many sectors of the Egyptian 
public. The danger is likely to be that demands for such trials shall constrain judicial 
processes, reduce the rights of the defendants, and would have serious harmful 
effects on the rule of law in Egypt.  
Not to be overlooked, Mubarak’s trial will have significant physiological and 
sociological effects on the Egyptian people and Arabs throughout the region. 
Historically, Mubarak and his predecessors were regarded as untouchable and 
irreproachable pharaohs who governed the country with absolute powers. Yet, this 
mode of governance, which has existed in Egypt and the Arab world thus far, could 
end with outcome of Mubarak’s trial.459 “It is unclear what the social impact of this trial 
will be, but it is [likely] that it will contribute to a shift in the Egyptian and Arab psyche 
that had always revered authority, shunned dissent, and rejected the questioning or 
criticism of those elders who wielded power.”   
The Islamic model of leadership emphasizes “khuluq” or behaving ethically 
towards all (Muslims and non-Muslims) alike. Firmly grounded by his/her faith in God, 
and mindful of his/her role as a trustee, a Muslim leader is expected to be just, 
behave righteously, strive towards self-improvement, and never break his/her word. 
He/She is to consult with others, especially in areas where he/she is not competent. 
He/She is expected to bear adversity patiently, and remain forever humble. 
Hopefully historians and political analysts will record the significance of the 
Mubarak trial. It was the first time that a Head of State was forced to resign by 
peaceful popular demand and was put on trial for at least some of his faults and 
                                                            
459 Hossam Bahgat, The Director of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights said—in which the 
author in favor of his statement—from outside the courthouse that: (“The Trial is far from Over,” “We 
will be in this for Years.”). 
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misdeeds. For sure he should have been prosecuted for so much more than he was, 
among them the systematic policy of torture and brutality which he has reinforced for 
30 years and which is estimated to have resulted in the physical mistreatment and 
the torture of some people per year. Why this outrageous and offensive practice was 
not involved in the charges can be explicated by the fact that they include several 
persons from the regime, including the military. Likewise, many will ask why so many 
publicly known policies and practices of corruption and abuses of power ordered by 
Mubarak, or known to have taken place by his consent or acquiescence were not 
prosecuted, and this also remains an unanswered and equivocal query. But then 
maybe the answer is the same as above, it simply contain too several people who 
are either still in office or still operate in the corridors of power.  
To conclude, for the lawyers and policymakers working on the front lines of 
this issue today, it is important to recognize the current debates which still open the 
floor and the door for help to develop the norms that will guide and bind the national 
and global community in its response to this sort of liability in the future. 
Correspondingly, a coherent national and international solution for this sort of 
responsibility in the light of global implications not only in Egypt but throughout the 
whole Middle East is a sector ripe for reform for the so-called the “The Arab Spring.”  
When all is said and done some will say the glass is half full while others will 
say it is half empty. I believe the glass to be half full. The revolution has achieved 
some successes but Egypt has a long way to go, not only to achieve democracy and 
the rule of law, but also to accomplish economic development and to regain its place 
as the leader of the Arab World and an important Skeleton contributor to peace and 
stability in the region. 
 
“Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere” 
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. 
 
 
